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Introduction 
 
“Public expenditure is the most powerful economic agent 
 in all modern societies” (Arrow and Kurz, 1970). 
 
 
My primary research interest lies in the relationship between government spending 
composition and economic growth, with particular attention to the Italian case. This 
dissertation comprises three academic papers, which have been into three corresponding 
chapters. In general, all three chapters address the same issue, but the level, scope of analysis 
and methodologies vary in each essay. The general scope of my research is to use both 
theoretical and econometric approaches to examine the influence and policy implications of 
different functions of government on economic growth.  
Chapter 1 is titled “Theoretical and Empirical Issues Related to Government Spending 
Composition and Growth: A Survey”. It discusses some theoretical and empirical aspects 
related to the influence of public spending on economic growth. From a theoretical point of 
view, prior to the endogenous growth models, no significant relationship was assumed to exist 
between economic growth and public expenditure. Since neoclassic growth models omit the 
factors that explain long-term growth, sometimes they are viewed as less useful and at worst 
inadequate. However, the recent argument in favour of the relevant relationship between 
public expenditure and long-run economic growth rests on the inclusion of fiscal policies into 
the endogenous growth models. This leads to the conclusion that public spending can affect 
long-run economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Economic theory suggests several 
mechanisms by which government activity can affect growth, following both a linear and non-
linear trend.  
In this light, the first part of this chapter offers a literature review on the relationship between 
the size of government and economic growth to show how findings follow a contrasting 
pattern. In poor countries, public sectors are typically small, and the relationship between 
government size and growth is positive; in rich countries, where public sectors are typically 
large, the same relationship is less positive, and at times negative. 
Generally speaking, there are many reasons to expect an inversely U-shaped relationship, 
which is also referred to as the Armey curve (Armey, 1995). At low levels of public expenditure, 
the Government cannot ensure they will respect private contracts and the property rights 
protection, thus determining a very low level of growth. Conversely, in case of very high levels 
of public expenditure, the citizens have not sufficient incentives to invest and produce because 
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the amount of taxation necessary to finance this level of expenditure is excessively high. Either 
way, growth appears to be very low. It is reasonable to assume that an optimal level of 
expenditure exists. Beyond it, a further increase is likely to determine a fall in the level of 
output (with the consequent decrease of the growth rate). 
The explosion of empirical studies on the endogenous growth led to the distinction of public 
expenditure into productive and consumption items (Barro, 1990; 1991). Henceforth, the 
second part of this chapter focuses on that more recent strand of the literature that attempts 
to evaluate the influence of functional breakdown of public spending on economic growth, 
thus going beyond the simple division between productive and unproductive expenditure. 
Studies that disaggregate public expenditures in healthcare, education, defence, 
infrastructures, housing sector and other expenditures categories show that the results change 
according to the specific countries under scrutiny, the analysed period and methodologies 
applied.  
Chapter 2 is titled “The Composition of Public Spending and Growth: Evidence from Italian 
Regions”. It examines the relationship between government spending composition and 
economic growth within an endogenous growth framework as developed by Ghosh and 
Gregoriou (2008) with two public goods, one being a priori more productive than the other. 
This theoretical model is an extension of Devarajan et al.’s. (1996) model in an optimal fiscal 
policy perspective. Put differently, this model addresses the fiscal policy issue in terms of the 
movements of the key endogenous fiscal variables being directly linked to the productivity 
parameters of the model. An important feature of the original model is that the generally 
assumed productive expenditure may become unproductive if the initial amount allocated to 
them is excessively large. The added value of this research project lies in its empirical analysis 
which is based on a panel of 19 Italian regions over the period 1996-2007. The dataset we use 
here is based on the Territorial Public Accounts (Conti Pubblici Territoriali) which contain 
economic data issued by the Italian Ministry of Economic Development (Dipartimento per lo 
Sviluppo e la Coesione Economica). These data provide the allocation of expenditures and 
revenues flows paid by/collected to each type of public administration within the 19 Italian 
regions under scrutiny. Our interest is to estimate the influence of economic and functional 
expenditure categories of the general government on real per capita GDP growth rate. The 
economic classification is based on the type or economic characteristics of expenditure (mainly 
capital and current expenditure). Conversely, the functional classification is based on the 
purpose or function towards which the expenditure is directed (e.g. expenditure on general 
public services, defence, economic affairs, healthcare, education and social protection). The 
functional breakdown of expenditures includes six components, which have been obtained 
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aggregating the thirty sectoral expenditure components on the basis of the available data. 
Furthermore, inside functional categories we distinguish between capital and current 
components. The reason for this further disaggregation resides in the fact that each functional 
expenditure component sum together of capital and current item. Hence, if one of the two has 
a significant growth effect but the other does not, the aggregate effect may be insignificant. 
From a methodology standpoint, we opt to estimate the effects of fiscal policy by means the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimators, as developed by Holtz-
Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1990) and Arellano and Bond (1991). More specifically, we use the 
System-GMM approach suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
to tackle the finite sample biases caused by the employment of the difference-GMM 
estimators. These estimators allow us to handle the bias from unobserved country-specific 
effects, and to deal with potential endogeneity problems. This peculiar feature of our 
approach is relevant in this context due to the potential reverse causality that may exist 
between the shares of expenditure in total spending and economic growth. Preliminary results 
show only a weak effect of aggregate capital and current expenditure on economic growth 
when using System-GMM technique. In contrast, functional components seem not to have any 
significant effect on growth. 
The results improve slightly when we take into account spatial correlation through a spatial lag 
model. Although there is no evidence of spatial autocorrelation in our specifications, the 
results show that the capital and current expenditure behaviour is driven by capital transfers 
and financial assets. In addition, it is also induced by current expenditure on personnel, 
purchases on goods and services, interest expense and other unclassified current 
expenditures. As for the functional components, the main result is given by capital expenditure 
on economic affairs, such as infrastructures, which plays an important role in augmenting the 
economic growth rate among Italian regions in the short period investigated here. Current 
expenditure on health, and capital and current expenditure on general public services had a 
negative and statistically significant effect on growth. 
Chapter 3 is titled “A Cointegration Analisys of Public Spending Composition for Italy: 1862-
2007”. It discusses the empirical investigation of the relationship between government 
spending composition and economic growth by using a historical time-series on the Italian 
case. Our aim is to estimate the effects of economic and functional components of 
government spending on economic growth both in the short- and long-run. As in our previous 
analyses, our theoretical reference framework is Ghosh and Gregorious’s (2008) model. In this 
chapter, we employ fiscal variables collected from the dataset of the Ministry of Economy 
(Ragioneria Generale dello Stato). To celebrate the 150th anniversary of the Italy’s Unification, 
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this Ministry decided to collect and compile this database. The data is grouped according to 
capital and current expenditure (and their related sub-components). Another group is based 
on expenditures on defence, economic affairs, education and healthcare. The sample is divided 
as follows. One sample is limited to the period 1970-2007 due to the oil crisis occurred in 
1970s and the availability of the private capital series (one of the endogenous key variables of 
the theoretical model) for that period only. We estimate this sample and its specifications are 
later used to estimate the remaining period (from 1862 to 1969), which has no private capital. 
After testing our series for unit roots with structural breaks, we can estimate the influence of 
the different components of public spending by means of an ARDL model. As for the first 
sample (1970-2007), the most surprising result is the negative effect of capital expenditure on 
economic growth, both in the short- and in the long-run. According to the theoretical model, 
the expenditures that are normally considered productive may became unproductive if an 
excessive amount of resources is devoted to them. In particular, capital expenditure appears 
to have been excessively high during the last forty years, thus resulting in an unproductive 
period at margin. On the other hand, current expenditure has an insignificant effect on 
economic growth both in the short- and in the long-run. Among functional components, 
expenditures on defence and economic affairs have a statistically significant effect on 
economic growth in the short-run. In contrast, the latter maintains a significant or even 
negative effect on real per capita GDP in the long-run only. As for the second sample period 
(1862-1969), we split it endogenously so as to establish two structural break dates. Overall, the 
results vary across sub-samples, but educational spending shows a positive and statistically 
influence on per capita GDP in the long-run. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
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Theoretical and Empirical Issues Related to Government Spending 
Composition and Growth: A Survey 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A point of debate among economists is weather the public sector should or should not 
intervene to control the short-term fluctuations in economic activity. Classical and Keynesian 
economists have opposite views on such an approach. While classical economists believed that 
market forces were able to quickly bring economies to a long-run equilibrium, through 
adjustments in the labour market, the Keynesian school (Keynes, 1936) supports the fallibility 
of self-regulatory mechanisms, precisely because of the labour market rigidities. For this 
reason, the Keynesians evoke fiscal policies to support the economy during recession periods.  
The link between fiscal policy and economic growth has raised a great deal of debate at both 
theoretical and empirical level. Public expenditure and national income have been the focus of 
public finance, since the amount of public expenditure has been increasing over time in almost 
all countries in the world.  
Governments need to know the causal relationship between these two variables since the 
former play a significant role in the development of a country. The implication is that an 
increase in government expenditure could yield a positive or negative effect in the growth of a 
country’s economy by increasing the national income.  
From a theoretical standpoint, within the neoclassical framework, government policy, and 
particularly fiscal policy, has no role in determining the long-run economic growth rate1, since 
this is determined by the exogenous population growth and technological progress rates. Due 
to the fact that neoclassical growth models omit those factors that explain long-un growth,  
sometimes the former are viewed as not particularly or, even worse, quite inadequate. 
The explosion of works on endogenous growth, developed mainly since the early 1990s, has 
generated a number of models linking public spending to the economy’s long term growth rate 
(Romer 1986, 1990; Lucas, 1988; Easterly, 1991; Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 
2004, Cashin, 1995). 
In endogenous growth models (cf. Romer, 1986, a forerunner in this sense), the production 
function is specified without diminishing returns. This implies that anything that affects the 
level of technology also affects the long-run per capita growth rate. From a fiscal policy 
perspective, this means that the growth effects of distortionary tax wedges are far greater 
than in neoclassical growth models. Thus, fiscal policies can be used to enhance efficient 
                                                          
1
 Government policy cannot affect growth except during the transition to the steady-state. 
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allocation of resources by correcting market failures and encourage higher human and physical 
capital productivity. 
Barro (1990) offers a particularly simple version of endogenous growth models. His work, 
demonstrate to be a breaking point in the literature on the evolution of the role of public 
spending in growth theory. By allowing for productive public spending, i.e. public spending 
that increases private capital marginal productivity (e.g. infrastructures or property rights), 
Barro identifies the existence of a positive correlation between government spending and 
long-run economic growth. In this work, Barro models government spending (which is a flow 
variable in the economy’s production function) in terms of public services and considers it to 
be complementary to private production. 
The Barro (1990) model has been applied and developed by many. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992) are among those who tend to favour the application of the original model. They analyse 
the productive public good and its rivalry and excludability properties. Fisher and Turnovsky 
(1998) and Piras (2001) draw inspiration from this approach to study the congestion 
phenomenon. Moreover, Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1992) claim that public spending can 
be accumulated. Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) study the effects of productive spending 
financed by taxes on capital and/or labour. Agénor and Neanidis (2011) and Monteiro and 
Turnovsky (2013) combine productive public spending with human capital accumulation and 
study long-run growth effects.   
Despite its apparent importance, the effects of public expenditure composition on growth 
have been rarely investigated, apart from few notable exceptions. These include theoretical 
works such as Barro (1990), who shows that when a government increases public consumption 
(utility enhancing) while reducing public spending (producing enhancing), growth rates fall 
regardless of the level of total spending. Devarajan et al. (1993, 1996) is an influent and more 
recent model focusing on least two component of public expenditure. These authors have 
developed a model that investigates two productive services (i.e. flow variables) in a CES 
production function. Out of these two variables of government expenditure, one is more 
productive than the other one. A shift in favour of an objectively more productive type of 
expenditure may not raise the growth rate if its initial share is too high. Devarajan et al.’s  
model expresses the difference between the two types of expenditure by highlighting how a 
shift in the mix between the two alters the economy’s long term growth rate. Ghosh and 
Gregoriou (2008) have extended this model within an optimal fiscal policy perspective.   
Agénor (2010) show that reallocating expenditure from “unproductive” public spending to 
infrastructure spending would lead to a higher steady-state growth. 
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Much empirical work has been done to test the predictions of theoretical models, but the 
results differ greatly among studies. Some researcher find a positive relationship between 
government spending and economic growth (e.g. Niloy, 2003), while other studies (such as 
Romer, 1990; Folster and Henrekson, 1999) conclude that total government expenditures 
seem to have a negative effect on economic growth.  
In his survey, Berg and Henrekson (2011) focus on the most recent papers that deal with the 
relationship between growth and government size. These authors conclude that the most 
recent studies typically find a negative correlation between total government size and 
economic growth. 
Concerning the various categories of public expenditure, government expenditure on 
education and health care would raise labor productivity. Further, government expenditure on 
such infrastructure as roads and communications would also boost the rate of private 
domestic investment, which in turn fosters economic growth. Barro (1991) argues that 
“expenditures on education and defence are more like public investment than public 
consumption. In particular, these expenditures are likely to affect private sector productivity 
on property rights, which matters for private investment2”. Anyway, the empirical evidence is 
mixed. For example, Baum and Lin (1993) find a positive and statistically significant impact of 
government expenditure on education and defence on economic growth, while Devarajan et 
al. (1996) find that these expenditures fail to produce such a positive effect. In a survey on the 
impact of government on long-run growth, Poot (2000) presents evidence of a positive link 
between growth and education spending, while the evidence on the negative growth impact of 
defence spending was moderately strong.  
In this chapter, we review a wide body of the literature on the issues related to the empirical 
relationship between public spending, its composition and economic growth. Our survey 
shows in general that the influence of government spending composition is inconclusive, it 
varies across countries, time-span investigated and methodology employed.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the Wagner’s Law 
and its empirical findings; Section 3 focuses on the application of the Armey Curve to 
investigate the non-linear relationship between government size and growth; Section 4 
contains an empirical survey on the linear relationship between aggregate government 
spending and its components and economic growth; finally, Section 5 concludes this chapter.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 Barro (1991), pag. 430. 
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2. Causality Between Government Expenditure and Economic Growth: 
Wagner’s Law 
In terms of the relationship between public expenditure and growth, Wagnerians and 
Keynesians present two parallel views. According to the former, causality runs from growth of 
output to public expenditure whereas the latter postulate that causality runs from public 
expenditure to growth in times of recession. 
Adolf H. Wagner, a German economist of the second half of the 19th century, first postulated a 
theory on the public expenditure increase that depends up the structural evolution of a society 
(Wagner, 1883). He conducted some research on the existence of a desirable limit regarding 
the size of the public sector, thus concluding that such a limit was impossible. In his opinion, 
the time path of public spending is essentially determined by the increase of national income 
such as the gross domestic product (GDP). 
The empirical evidence concerning the relationship between national income and expenditure 
is based on the assessment of the elasticity of expenditure in relation to income. Only if such 
elasticity is significant, with a positive coefficient and greater than one, we may conclude that 
the link between the two variables exists and it is consistent with Wagner’s hypothesis. It has 
been subjected to an empirical assessment by different researchers but the results obtained 
are contradictory and lead to conclude sometimes in favour of the existence of Wagner’s Law, 
and sometimes against it. It essentially because the changing of countries analyzed, the 
temporal intervals considered and the methods applied. 
Wagner’s work is based on the empirical observations of Western industrializing countries. His 
main finding is that as the output increased in the past, public expenditure grew as well. 
Hence, his suggestion is not prescriptive, but rather explanatory in type. It does not contain 
any a priori assumption, but this idea encouraged a large number of researchers to study ‘the 
law of increasing expansion of public expenditure’ to find out whether it may empirically fit in 
industrializing countries. 
While studying the causality between public expenditure and national income for India during 
the period 1950-1981, Singh and Sahni (1984) find that the effect of the growth of public 
expenditure on that of national income is relatively low if compared to its effect on the growth 
of expenditure income. The conclusion they reach is that public expenditure and national 
income are linked by a casual feedback mechanism, although empirical evidence suggests that 
such a causal relationship is neither of a Wagnerian nor a Keynesian type.   
Ram (1986a, 1986b, 1987) tests the relationship between the share of public general 
expenditure and the per capita GDP in terms of elasticity. He does so by breaking the analysis 
down into two parts: time-series and cross-section. The time-series study is based 115 on 
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countries, which have been analyzed over the period 1950-1980 showing low or modest 
differences between the various groups of countries. In addition, the ratio between results 
appears to be in line and in contrast to Wagner’s hypothesis having an approximate 3:2 ratio. 
Out of the 115 countries under scrutiny, 41 display inferior to the unit elasticity; as for the 
remaining 75 countries, 54 of them feature a significant relationship at the 5% level. In the 
cross-section estimates, the time period is divided into three sub-periods: 1950-1960, 1961-
1970 and 1971-1980 and into two sub-samples: developed and less developed countries. The 
results show that, in many cases, the elasticity of the government expenditure concerning the 
GDP is inferior to the unit. Hence, they do not seem to confirm Wagner’s hypothesis.     
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find strong evidence in favour of Wagner’s Law in the cross-section 
analysis relating to 115 countries during the period 1970-1988 and the analysis of 26 countries 
that considered the period from 1870 to 1988. 
Henrekson (1993) notes how the crux of Wagner’s Law originates from regressions to levels, 
and evokes Granger and Newbold’s (1974) “causality test” in support of theses of erroneous 
inferences when variables are not steady. Indeed, Henrekson demonstrates how both income 
and the share of public expenditure on national product, even if correlated, are not 
cointegrated. To this end, he uses Sweden as his case study to carry out an empirical analysis 
on data in the historical series from 1861 to 1990. He ultimately concludes that correlations 
reported by other researchers are “spurious” in nature. 
Koop and Poirier (1995) examine Wagner’s hypothesis in terms of a long-term elasticity of the 
per capita government expenditure with regard to per capita income using a bivariate error-
correction mechanism, which correspond to a co-integrated mechanism. Out of the 86 
countries analysed, Wagner’s hypothesis is supported by data in only one-third of them. 
Chletsos and Kollias’s (1997) study examines the validity of Wagner’s law in the case of Greece 
by considering disaggregated public expenditure and using an error correction approach. The 
empirical findings suggest that Wagener’s Law is valid only in the case of defence expenditure. 
By comparing Latin America to OECD countries, Stein et al. (1998), show that the role of the 
public operator is more extensive in richest countries. In other words, those countries with a 
greater aggregate income tend to have wider public apparatus.  
Islam (2001) re-examine the hypothesis at the basis of Wagner’s law by means of advanced 
econometric techniques and find strong support for this law for the USA. Chang’s (2002) study 
examines five different versions of Wagner’s law for six countries and finds that, apart from 
one of this countries, all display long-run relationship between income and public expenditure. 
Using a cross-country panel and random effects methods, Shelton (2007) regresses various 
measures of public expenditure on a vector of explanatory variables. He underlines that richest 
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countries tend to have populations with a higher average age and this would force them to 
spend more in the area of social security and other forms of protection and public assistance. 
By calculating the fraction of population above 65 years old, he demonstrates that the 
countries with a greater national income would tend to have a larger state machine, which is in 
complete opposition to what Wagner’ Law suggests. Put more simply, it may be the health and 
social expenditure that would lead the relationship between public expenditure and per capita 
income, which otherwise would not jointly increase.   
A recent study by Lamartina and Zaghini (2011) on 23 OECD countries finds that the correlation 
between government activity and economic growth is higher in countries with low per-capita 
GDP, thus suggesting that the catching-up period is characterized by a stronger development 
of government activity with respect to economies in a more advanced state. This implies that, 
according to Wagner’s hypothesis, the direct linkage between increasing state activity and 
economic growth might have a higher validity during early stages of development than at a 
later stage.    
In order to shed some light on the coherence between the Wagner’s Law and the development 
stage, Kuckuck (2012) uses historical data regarding five industrialized European countries, 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Italy. He applies an advanced and vector error 
correction analysis and, in line with the Wagner’s hypothesis, shows that the relationship 
between public spending and economic growth weakens due to the advanced stage of 
development.    
Similarly, Magazzino (2010) aims to assess the empirical evidence of the Wagner’s Law and 
applies it to Italy. By means of a time series approach, he studies the relationship between real 
GDP and five different items of real government spending, for the period 1960-2008. The 
results demonstrated to be not in much support of Wagner’s Law, and the relationship 
between several items of government spending and national income appears to be more 
Keynesian than Wagnerian. Magazzino (2012) also examines the empirical evidence of 
Wagner’s Law applying several time-series econometric techniques. This helps him to verify 
the correlation among variables, data stationary and cointegration so as to detect some 
possible spurious relationship and causality. He uses six alternative functional forms and 
applies them to data regarding the 27 European countries over the time period 1970-2009. 
Interestingly, the empirical evidence is in favour of the Wagnerian hypothesis.   
Other studies that attempt to test Wagner’s Law are mostly interested in the elasticity of 
public expenditure to community output. To this end, many scholars have developed several 
versions of the model to investigate and prove empirically what Wagner’s Law suggests. 
Musgrave (1969), Goffman and Mahar (1971), Gupta (1967), Bird (1971), Gandhi (1971), and 
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Ganti and Kolluri (1979) examine the validity of Wagner’s Law and they find elasticity to be 
greater than zero. In line with this, they claim that if the elasticity is greater than zero, then 
Wagner’s Law is confirmed. 
At the core of the Wagner’s thesis is the interaction between the growth of the public sector 
and private activities. With the increase of economic development, exchanges intensify among 
operators and the network or relationships become more and more complicated and 
controversial. All this can be addressed through legislation and arrangement of new and 
heftier controls. Moreover, since the process of industrialization and urbanization creates 
external diseconomies, such as the congestion effect or the deterioration of the environment, 
the public sector has been called to face these challenges.     
In contrast, the growth of social services can be explained by the general attempt to satisfy 
higher needs. A continuous expansion of social services is easily foreseeable and, since citizens 
finance such services with increasing shares of their resources, it would be senseless to set 
limits to these consumptions (Franco, 1993). Consequently, there is a limit to public sector 
growth. It may therefore follow a planned level of public expenditure (and a consequent 
predetermined relationship between this level and the national income) beyond which the 
community would not agree to give up increasing shares for private spending. Having reached 
this point, public spending should become fixed on a proportionally constant share of the 
general economic activity. It is possible, therefore, to highlight two distinct periods of 
development of expenditure. The first is distinguished by progressive growth, and its 
percentage variation of public expenditure turns out to be greater than the percentage 
variation of the aggregate income. Conversely, the second period is distinguished by 
proportional growth, when the percentage variation of public expenditure turns out to be 
equal to the percentage variation of the aggregate income.        
 
 
3. A Non-Linear Relationship Between Government Size and Economic 
Growth: The Armey Curve 
The economic growth provides different methods and tools to evaluate the role of the 
Government into the economic process. One of these is the Armey curve (1995), which takes 
its name from the Republican Senator Richard Armey, who first popularized it during a debate 
on the effects of public spending. This Curve correlates government expenditure and GDP 
growth rate, and has an inverse U shape. It is based on the fundamental law of diminishing 
returns, highlighting the government involvement’s proportion into the economy (i.e. given by 
the ratio of government expenditure and GDP) and the real GDP growth rate. Armey suggested 
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the idea that, in absence of a public sector, the economy produces a very low output 
(theoretically equal to zero). At low levels of public expenditure, the Government cannot 
guarantee it will respect private contracts and the property rights protection, thus determining 
a very low level of growth. Conversely, with very high levels of public expenditure, the citizens 
have not sufficient incentives to invest and produce because the amount of taxation necessary 
to finance this level of expenditure is too high. Once again, the growth appears to be 
extremely low. It is reasonable to assume that, starting with low levels, an increase of public 
expenditure is beneficial to growth. Similarly, starting with an extremely high level of 
expenditure and subsequently decreasing it leads to and increased GDP. However, those 
economic systems characterized by a mix of private and public decisions on the resource 
allocation display a higher and expected level of output.  
As Figure 1 shows, increasing public expenditure also leads to an increase in the growth rate; 
this occurs faster in the descending portion of the curve, and more slowly after, thus reaching 
the maximum level of output in the B point, which represents an optimal level of expenditure3. 
After that point, a further increase in public spending determines a fall of the level of output 
(and consequently a slowing growth rate). Subsequently, the law of diminishing returns comes 
into play, which means that the higher level of public expenditure requires more taxes, thus 
discouraging the economic agents to produce and work. This implies the application of exist an 
optimal level of expenditure that is able to maximize the GDP growth rate. 
Many models that explain why an excess of public expenditure can be negative for growth can 
be found in the literature. On the one hand, taxation generates a distortion in the economic 
agent behaviour, and therefore reduces efficiency. When spending to finance expenditures is 
high, taxation will be high as well, and distortion will be greater. On the other hand, from a 
dynamic point of view, a high tax burden on capital and labour income reduces growth and 
discourages physical and human capital accumulation. Furthermore, public spending can be 
beneficial to growth if it is complementary to private spending (consider for example the case 
of property rights protection), while if the latter replaces the former, private spending will slow 
down the growth rate. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Optimum is defined as that point just before government becomes so large as to reduce the rate of 
economic growth and job creation. Governments are created to protect people and property. A 
government too small to establish the rule of law and protect people and their property from both 
foreign and domestic enemies is less than optimal. 
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                          Figure 1. Government spending size and economy growth  
 
 
   
         
 
 
 
 
                           Source: Armey, 1995 
 
Facchini and Melki (2011) further discuss the shape of the Armey curve by decomposing it into 
two curves that stand for the costs of the State failures and the benefits from correcting 
market failures. This enables to merge into a single theoretical framework, two sets of theories 
that are generally competing. The positive effect of public spending is explained by the 
benefits from correcting market failure, while the negative effect is explained by the costs 
inherent to State failure.   
Figure 2 reports the MF curve that describes the positive effect of public spending with a 
decreasing marginal productivity, associated with the correction of market failures. Its slope is 
due to two different reasons: the law of diminishing returns due to the lack of market that 
however results in no market failures. Therefore, public spending has a positive impact on 
economic growth, but with a decreasing marginal effect. In contrast, the SF curve describes the 
negative effect of public spending, with decreasing marginal effects. The costs of public 
spending come from a crowding-out effect, effects of tax on market transaction costs, 
activities of rent seeking, political transaction costs and bureaucratic additional costs. The 
costs of public spending describe the declining part of the Armey curve, and the costs of public 
spending on economic growth increase at a steady rate. Facchini and Melki (2011) supply four 
reasons to explain the slope of the SF curve showed in Figure 2. First, the crowding-out effect 
increases more than proportionally with the size of government. This is due to the fact that, 
Welfare State affects entrepreneurs’ productive activity by increasing its opportunity costs. 
Second, there is also a systematic crowding-out effect. Market prices solve the knowledge-
dispersal problem since they convey already known information and contribute to the opinion 
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forming process. Competition in market processes is a discovery procedure. Interestingly, the 
market inefficiency is not always a problem, because entrepreneurs perceive inefficiencies as 
opportunities to rearrange the pattern of input utilization or output consumption and to 
correct their expectation errors, i.e. they are opportunities for pure entrepreneurial profit. 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between growth and government size: a 
decomposition of the Armey Curve 
 
Public spending to correct market failures diminishes the numbers of solutions that market 
process can discover. We can therefore speak about systematic crowding-out effect because it 
can reduce both the economic knowledge available on the market and the number of 
participants. Third, the political transaction costs increase more than proportionally with the 
size of government because the displacement costs inside the public sector increase with the 
competition between the various interest groups. The intensity of competition increases with 
the size of government because public resources become scarce. The pro-education or the 
pro-safety groups spend more to obtain a marginal euro. 
Fourth, the bureaucratic wastes rise more than proportionally with the size of government. It 
results from systematic crowding-out effect since they replace the price. There is no economic 
calculation. Nobody knows the value of goods and services. The structure of expenditure has 
no economic justification and it is only based on political reasons (Facchini and Melki, 2011). 
So the U-inverted curve is the total effect of public spending, i.e. the combination of the 
benefits from correcting market failures (the MF curve in Figure 2) and the costs of State 
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failure (the SF curve in Figure 2). Each country has its market and State culture. Public spending 
costs vary according to the level of bureaucratic inefficiency, the citizens’ willingness to pay 
taxes and all those costs connected with the running and management of public institutions. 
Conversely, the more market price works, the lower the benefits from correcting its failures. 
In Figure 2, E* is the optimal size of State. Before E*, the marginal benefits from correcting 
market failure are higher than the marginal costs. This means that, without government, the 
level of public spending is nil and the GDP growth rate would be Ya. Beyond E*, the difference 
between benefits and costs decreases to become negative. Welfare enhancing through public 
spending is not necessarily desirable because public spending becomes too costly. These costs 
may exceed the benefits from correcting market failures. If the size of government remains at 
E*, the growth rate of GDP is maximized. Hence, the Armey curve theory is both positive and 
normative. It also supplies governments with an accurate size that can help them reach the 
highest production possibility frontier.         
Facchini and Melki (2011) provide evidence of the existence of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between government size and economic output using time-series data on France, 
a historical series from 1871 to 2008, and a quadratic model. Unlike many other studies, they 
also control for many exogenous factors. These authors find that the optimal size of the French 
Government (which was reached in the late 1940s), and measured as total spending as share 
of total GDP, would be 30 percent.  
From an empirical point of view, many researchers attempted to determine the linear 
relationship between government spending and economic growth, while others sought to 
determine the level of public expenditure that maximizes growth rate. The threshold 
government size (which maximizes growth rate) is a point at which any rise in government 
spending that is lower than this value will have positive effects: in contrast, going over that 
value, will have negative effects on economic growth.  Yet, results are still inconclusive. 
Sheehey (1993), Vedder and Gallaway (1998), and Chen and Lee (2005) point out that the 
inconsistency concerning the effect of government size on economic growth could be due to a 
non-linear rather than linear relationship.  
Having analysed cross-countries data, Sheehey (1993) finds that government and economic 
growth have a positive relationship when government size (i.e. government consumption 
expenditure/GDP) is smaller than 15 percent. In contrast, the relationship is negative when 
government size becomes larger than 15 percent.  
Karras (1996) estimates the optimal government size for several sets of economies by 
investigating the role of public services in the production process over the period 1960-1985. 
The empirical results suggest that government services are significantly productive and are 
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overprovided in Africa, underprovided in Asia and optimally provided in America and Europe. 
Furthermore, the results show that the optimal government size is 23 percent for the average 
country, but ranges from 14 percent for the average OECD country to 33 percent in South 
America. Karras (1997) focuses on 20 European countries from 1950 to 1990 and  estimates 
the optimal government size to be 16 percent and the marginal productivity of government 
services to be negatively related to government size. Consequently, the public sector may be 
more productive when small. 
Vedder and Gallaway (1998) estimate the same relationship for the United States by means of 
the Armey Curve, over the period 1947-1997 and using five measurements for government 
size. They find evidence for the Armey Curve to be applicable only when “total government 
expenditures/GDP” or “net investment expenditure/GDP” are used as government size 
variables. The optimal size of federal expenditure for the data under scrutiny is equivalent to 
17.45 percent of the US’s GDP. They also find the optimum government size of other countries, 
including 21.37 percent in Canada (1854-1988), 26.14 percent in Denmark (1854-1988), 22.23 
percent in Italy (1862-1988), 19.43 percent in Sweden (1881-1988), and 20.97 percent in the 
United Kingdom (1830-1988). However, these authors state that their results could be 
spurious because they do not take into account some factors that may affect the economic 
growth (as, for example, the innovation cycles).  
Gwartney et al. (1998) find evidence that all different government size indicators have 
negative impact on economic growth.  
Chao and Gruber (1998) estimate that, over the period 1929-1996, the optimum government 
spending size in Canada was about 27 percent. Tanzi and Schuknecht (1998) and Afonso, 
Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003) suggest that general government spending in excess of 30 
percent of national output reduces economic growth. 
Pevcin (2004) empirically verifies the existence of the relationship stated by Armey Curve for a 
sample of 12 European countries, over the period 1950-1996. The results suggest that the 
Armey Curve reaches its maximum point, meaning its optimal level of public expenditure, if it 
is at about 40 percent of the GDP. The results change slowly when using different estimation 
methods (the results range from 36.56 percent with Fixed Effect Model to 42.12 percent with 
Error Correction Model). In the sample under investigation, the total government expenditure 
in 1996 was on average 52.20 percent of the GDP. Therefore, the size of public sector was 
larger than the optimal level. Estimating the Armey Curve for a subsample of eight countries 
leads Pevcin to conclude that the optimal size is 42.90 percent for France, 38.98 percent for 
Finland, 45.96 percent for Sweden, 38.45 percent for Germany, 44.86 percent for the 
Netherlands, 42.28 percent for Ireland and 41.1 percent for Belgium. As for Italy, the total 
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government expenditure (as share of GDP) in 1996 was 44.90 percent, while the optimal level 
of the Armey Curve was estimated to be equal to 37.09 percent, thus implying a potential 
reduction of about 18 percent. 
Chen and Lee (2005) use a threshold regression approach for testing a non-linear relationship 
between government size and economic growth in Taiwan. They find different threshold 
values for different government sizes in Taiwan. Firstly, they explain that the threshold regime 
is 22.84 percent for “total government expenditure divided by GDP”. This indicates that there 
is a non-linear relationship of the Armey Curve. In other words, when the government size is 
smaller than the regime, economic growth is promoted under expanding government 
expenditure. Conversely, if the government size is larger than the regime, then the economic 
growth decreases. Secondly, they point out that the threshold regime is equal to 7.30 percent 
when concerning the “government investment expenditure divided by GDP”. Finally, they 
claimed that, when the variable “government consumption expenditure divided by GDP” is 
used as government size indicator, the threshold regime is 14.97 percent.   
Chobanov and Mladenova (2009) examine the optimal size of government for a set of OECD 
countries. This optimal size is measured as overall government spending (i.e. a percentage of 
GDP) that maximizes economic growth. Overall, the results suggest that the optimal level of 
government spending is around 25 percent. However, these authors point out that, due to 
model and data limitations, the results seem to be biased upwards, and the “true” optimum 
government level is even smaller and also depends on the quality of government, not only by 
its size. Furthermore, they examine the relationship between general government 
consumption on final goods and services for a set of 81 countries and find that the optimal size 
of government consumption is 10.4 percent of GDP.   
Mataşcu and Miloş (2009) take into consideration the real GDP growth and the total amount of 
public expenditures as percentage of GDP for the period 1999-2008. The main results point 
towards an optimum public size of 30.42 percent of GDP in EU-15 and a level of 27.46 percent 
of GDP in the EU-12 countries. The authors use a Pooled EGLS method (Period SUR) in both 
cases. De Witte and Moesen (2009) compute the optimal average government involvement in 
the 23 OECD countries and claim to amount to 41.22 percent of GDP.  
Using the two-sector production function model developed by Ram (1986), Abounoori and 
Nademi (2010), estimate the threshold regression specification for Iran concerning the effect 
of government size on economic growth. They use three government size indicators to find out 
the different threshold points. The results show a non-linear relationship of the Armey Curve 
in Iran, where the threshold effects corresponding to total government expenditure share in 
GDP government consumption expenditure share in GDP, and government investment 
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expenditure share in GDP are respectively 34.7 percent, 23.6 percent and 8 percent. This 
indicates that, when the government size is smaller than the regime, economic growth is 
promoted under expanding government expenditure, but if the government size is larger than 
the regime, then the economic growth decreases. Furthermore, the authors find that the 
results for government consumption, and especially government investment are over-
expanding when, compared to their values observed over the period 1960-2006.   
Herath (2010) applies an analytical framework based on time series and second degree 
polynomial regression. This approach confirms the possibility of constructing the Armey Curve 
for Sri Lanka from 1959 to 2003. She also estimates the optimal level of government 
expenditure to be approximately 27 per cent.   
Nademi et al. (2010) applies the two-sector production function developed by Ram (1986) to 
estimate the threshold regression model for Islamic countries, thus following Armey’s (1995) 
non-linear theory. Their empirical results confirm that, as far as the Islamic countries they 
examine are concerned, there is a non-linear relationship between government size and 
economic growth. Nademi et al. (2011) test the same relationship by following the same 
approach. Yet, for this study also adopt Hansen’s (1996) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) approach by means of the bootstrapping method. They find that the 
Armey Curve is also applicable to the Iranian and Pakistani Economies. 
The heterogeneous nature of the empirical results therefore seem to show that a unique 
optimal size of public spending in the economy that can hold for all countries cannot be found. 
Each country has their own optimal level, which depends on several factors and conditions, 
such as the economic development, the existence and efficiency of institutions in the economy 
market, the public sector efficiency, the state administration and the preferences of the 
population.  
Overall, evidence shows that governments are generally larger than optimal. Yet, the ideal size 
of government cannot be plausibly determined. The data can realistically show that smaller 
governments are better, and suggest that the optimal size of government is smaller than what 
we observe today.  
Furthermore, the optimum level obtained is shaped according to past data and it is likely that 
the periods analysed may affect the results of subsequent studies (Ekinci, 2011). 
 
 
4. From Aggregate Public Spending to its Components  
The empirical literature on the linear impact of government spending on economic growth 
may be subsumed under two main stands. One focuses on the effects of total government 
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expenditures on economic growth (and it is therefore strongly related to the literature on the 
relationship between government size and growth). The other recognizes that different types 
of government expenditures may have different effects on growth.   
 
 
4.1  Total government spending and economic growth 
As for the first stand of the literature described above, several studies within it investigate the 
relationship between government spending and economic growth using different empirical 
methodologies, sample of countries and time spans. For instance, Cameron (1982) carries out 
a cross-country study that finds a negative bivariate correlation between the average 
percentages of GDP over the period 1960-1979. Cameron argues that the size of the effect is 
not very large, and notes that “a very dramatic increase in spending, in the range of 20 
percentage points in GDP, a magnitude of increase that occurred in a few nations such as 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark, would have reduced the rate of economic growth by 
only 1 percent”. 
The evidence obtained by early studies is typically restricted to cross-country regressions with 
no control variables. Agell et al. (2006) show how the negative bivariate correlation between 
government size and growth disappears when controlling for initial GDP and demography. 
Landau (1983) examines 48 countries over  the period 1961-1976 to find a negative 
relationship between public expenditure and growth. In the same vein, Marlow (1986) 
focusing on 19 industrialized countries over the period 1960-1980 and only controls for level 
and growth of social expenditure, thus supporting the view that public sector size retards 
overall economic growth. 
Barro (1990) finds a significant negative relationship between government consumption share 
and the growth of real per capita GDP and determines insignificant positive effects of 
government investment.  
Kneller et al. (1998) recognize that any study, which does not take into account both sides of 
the budget, suffers from relevant biases regarding the coefficient estimate. They maintain this 
further in Kneller et al. (1999) while examining a panel of 22 OECD countries over the period 
1970-1975. In their research study, they find strong support for the Barro’s (1990) model, 
according to which productive government expenditure enhances growth whilst non-
productive expenditure does not. Other studies (such as Romer, 1990; Alexander, 1990; Folster 
and Henrekson, 1999) move in the same direction and conclude that total government 
expenditures have a negative effect on economic growth.    
21 
 
Folster and Henrekson (2001) investigate a panel of 22 rich OECD countries over the period 
1970-1995 to find a robust and significant negative effect due to government expenditure and 
less robust negative effect due to total tax revenue. Agell et al. (2006) criticise Folster and 
Henrekson’s (2001) study for the weakness of their results since including only OECD countries 
cannot be given a causal interpretation due to simultaneity. Agell et al. (2006) conclude that 
the correlation may be significantly less robust when only OECD countries are investigated. 
Dar and Amirkhalkhali (2002) consider a panel of 19 OECD countries over the period 1971-
1999 and find a significant negative relationship between total government expenditure and 
growth, either considering the entire period or taking the 1970s and 1980s separately (the 
1990s do not seem to display significant effects). Furthermore, these authors also run country-
specific regressions to find a significant negative effect for 16 out of the 19 countries under 
investigation.  Agell et al. report a non significant relationship for the three out of those 19 
countries. This relationship is negative but insignificant for Norway and Sweden and positive 
but insignificant for the USA.  
Colombier (2009) examines the relationship between government size and economic growth 
for 21 OECD countries over the period 1970-2001. He finds a stable and positive, albeit small, 
growth effect of government size. In a thorough attempt to replicate this study, Bergh and 
Ohrn (2011) conclude that the results are not driven by the econometric method, but depend 
rather on the omission of time fixed effects and other control variables. Bargh and Ohrn 
demonstrate that adding time fixed effects produces a negative partial correlation in line with 
what other studies have found. Typically, adding controls for inflation, unemployment and 
economic openness does not change this, and often tends to increase the size of the negative 
coefficient on total tax revenue. Furthermore, using Colombier’s data, they argue that direct 
taxation drives a negative correlation between taxes and growth.   
Some other studies focus on a time-series dimension. For instance, Josaphat et al. (2000) 
investigate the impact of government spending on economic growth in Tanzania using time 
series data over the period 1965-1996 and find that increased productive expenditure (i.e. 
physical investment) has a negative effect on growth while consumption expenditure 
stimulates growth. Liu et al. (2008) examine the causal relationship between GDP and public 
expenditure for the United States data over the period 1947-2002. The results show that 
public spending raises the United States economic growth.  
Dalena and Magazzino (2012) examine the long-run relationship between government 
expenditure and revenues for Italy over a historical time-series (1862-1993). By applying co-
integration and causality techniques in the long- as well as in the short-run, they find that 
changes in government revenues (i.e. taxes) led to changes in government expenditures (the 
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so called Tax-and-Spend hypothesis) during the period before World War I. In contrast, the 
interwar years were in line with the reverse relation according to which changes in 
government revenue respond to prior changes in government expenditures (displacement 
effect on Spend-and-Taxes hypothesis). Finally, the fiscal Synchronization hypothesis, which 
argues that expenditures and taxes are simultaneously adjusted, emerges in the republican 
age. 
The literature on the relationship between government spending and economic growth is full 
of seemingly contradictory findings. Nonetheless, Bergh and Henrekson’s (2011) survey 
concentrates on the most recent papers dealing with the relationship between growth and 
government size. This analysis shows that limiting the focus on studies regarding rich countries 
and considering measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to GDP 
and relying on panel data estimators with variation over time can help determine a more 
consistent picture. Research seems to be reaching general consensus regarding negative 
correlation. The negative sign seems not to be an unintended consequence of reverse causality 
in the sense that government generally expands during economic downturns. 
Bergh and Henrekson (2011) find a significant negative correlation. Put differently, an increase 
in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5 percent to 1 percent lower 
annual growth rate. The negative correlation has yet to be reconciled with the fact that big 
government is clearly correlated with higher levels of affluence. The aggregate correlation 
between government size and growth is also less relevant as far as policy concerned since 
political decisions are made on specific taxes and expenditure items, rather than aggregate. 
There are also strong theoretical reasons to expect different types of taxes and expenditures 
to have differential growth effects. However, it should be noted that this analysis mostly 
focuses on government expenditure effects rather than taxes on economic growth.    
 
 
4.2  Public spending composition and growth 
The development of endogenous growth models has allowed a new, the composition of public 
spending (and its components) that becoming increasingly relevant to growth. Only recently 
researchers started to evaluate the influence of public spending functional breakdown over 
economic growth. Consequently, the literature produced lately aims to estimate the elasticity 
of economic growth in relation to different items of government spending, using not only the 
distinction between productive and unproductive spending but also wide disaggregation.   
Different functional spending components have been investigated in relation to economic 
growth, such as public infrastructure, healthcare and educational expenditures. For instance, 
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starting from Aschauer’s (1989) seminal contribution on United States data over the period 
1949-1985, that shows a significant positive effect of investment expenditure on growth, other 
works with mixed empirical findings have subsequently followed.  
Levine and Renelt (1992) use cross-country regressions to find a positive robust correlation 
between growth and the share of investment in GDP. 
Baum and Lin (1993) examine the impact of three different types of government expenditures 
(i.e. defence, welfare and education) on the growth rate of per capita GDP using cross-section 
data from developed and developing countries over the period 1975-1985. They find that the 
growth rate of education and defence expenditure has positive effects on growth rate, while 
the growth rate of welfare expenditures has an insignificant negative effect on economic 
growth. 
Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) study the effects of public expenditure reallocations 
on long-run growth. To this end, they compile a dataset comprising 56 countries (with 
different levels of income) for the period 1970-2010. Using dynamic panel GMM estimators, 
these authors find that a reallocation involving a rise in education spending has a positive and 
statistically robust effect on growth when the compensating factor remains unspecified or 
when this is associated with an offsetting reduction in social protection spending. Within social 
spending, the social protection component has often been assumed not to be productive 
(Kneller et al., 1999), which could reflect the primary re-distributive nature of this type of 
outlay.      
In general, in times of economic downturn, social expenditure provides stabilizers that 
automatically undermine the government’s balanced budget. On the other hand, in boom 
years when growth rates are higher, fewer people will be unemployed, and public expenditure 
shares will be lower. Henceforth, a negative correlation between public expenditure and 
economic growth is to be expected in the short-run.  
In the existing literature there is some evidence about the different effect of public spending 
expenditures on economic growth using a mix of developed and developing countries. It 
should be therefore assumed that studies evaluating the impact of public expenditure on 
growth should analyze both types of countries separately. Yet, findings are still controversial.  
Devarajan et al. (1996) examine the relationship between government spending and 
composition and growth for a panel of 43 developing countries over the period 1970-1990. 
Using OLS and Fixed Effects models, they find that the share of current expenditure on total 
spending has a positive and statistically significant growth effect, while capital spending has a 
negative impact on growth. Furthermore, they also find a reverse relationship for a panel of 21 
developed countries. The same result has been confirmed by Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) who 
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use a panel dataset for 15 developing countries over 28 years and apply a GMM technique. 
Gupta et al. (2005) assess the effects of fiscal consolidation and expenditure composition on 
economic growth in a sample of 39 low-income countries during the 1990s. The results 
(estimated by LSDV and GMM estimators) show that strong budgetary positions are generally 
associated with higher economic growth in both short and long terms. Gupta et al. find 
evidence that countries where spending is concentrated on wages tend to have lower growth, 
while those that allocate higher shares to capital and nonwage goods and services enjoy faster 
output expansion.    
Niloy et al. (2003) examine growth effects of government expenditure for a panel of thirty 
developing countries over the period 1970-1980. They find that the share of government 
capital expenditure in GDP is positively and significantly correlated with economic growth, but 
current expenditure is insignificant.   
Bose et al. (2007) obtain the same results using a panel of developing countries and including 
the complete specification of the government budget constraint. Moreover, they find that 
education is the key sector to which government should direct its resources in order to 
promote economic growth. 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) show that education spending is not always growth enhancing, 
pointing out that the promoting effects become statistically insignificant in some 
specifications. Likewise, Barro (2004), carries out a comprehensive study of growth 
determinants, also finds that an increase in public education spending does not have a 
statistically significant effect on growth. Barro also points out that defence spending can 
promote investment and thereby growth by enhancing entrepreneurs’ property rights. 
Similarly, Agénor (2010) suggests that public health can influence growth by affecting labour 
productivity and individuals’ discount factors. 
Devarajan et al. (1996) find that expenditures on defence and education fail to produce a 
positive effect whereas and healthcare and transport and communication expenditures have 
positive effects on growth.  
Hansson and Henrekson (1994) examine 14 rich countries over the period 1970-1987, and 
conclude that government transfers, consumption and total expenditure are consistently 
negatively related to growth of total factor productivity, whereas educational expenditure has 
a positive effect. 
Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) analyze data for 15 EU countries from 1960 to 2001. The 
results show a significant negative effect of government consumption and transfers, and a 
significant positive effect of government investment on growth. Furthermore, they find that 
direct taxes have negative and significant effects, but indirect taxes and social security 
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contributions have no significant effects. These findings are in line with Widmalm (2001), who 
finds that taxes on personal income as a share of total tax revenue and more progressive taxes 
impede growth.    
Afonso and Fuceri (2010) analyse using 28 OECD and EU countries during the period 1970-
2004, to show how several revenue and expenditure sources, measured as a percentage of 
GDP and in terms of their business-cycle volatility, directly relate to growth. They demonstrate 
that indirect taxes, social contributions and government consumption have a sizable, negative 
and significant effect on growth, both in terms of size and volatility. As for subsidies, only their 
size influences growth, whereas only volatility matters for government investment. Thus, 
government investment is not bad for growth, but if it is highly volatile, growth on average 
suffers. Bottasso et al. (2013) evaluate the productive effect of public capital by estimating 
various production functions on a panel of 21 OECD countries over the period 1975-2002. The 
results show a positive long-run impact between public capital and output. The same authors 
do not find any relevant effect of public capital on GDP in the short-run, suggesting that public 
infrastructure investments might not be a powerful countercyclical policy instrument. 
While analyzing time-series data on Switzerland from 1950 to 1994, Sing and Weber (1997) 
find that educational spending enhances economic growth. In contrast, health expenditure has 
the opposite impact. Furthermore, a negative effect of defence expenditure on growth has 
been observed in the short-run. Colombier (2009) draws the same conclusion while making 
use of Swiss data over the period 1950-2004.  
Benos (2005) uses an unbalanced panel data set covering 16 OECD countries over the period 
1970-1997 and decomposes public spending into various sub-categories and estimates the 
impact of each on economic growth. The results show that government spending on 
education, health and fuel-energy display a hump-shaped relationship with per capita growth, 
while public expenditures on housing-community amenities, social spending and transport and 
communication are characterized by a U-shaped relation with growth. Furthermore, the effect 
of public spending on education and social expenditures on growth are stronger the poorer a 
country is, while the opposite is true for expenditures on health. Akpan (2005) examines the 
effects of public spending composition and growth for Nigeria. The results show any significant 
relationship among variables. Nurudeen and Usman (2010) find different result using time-
series data for Nigeria over the period 1970-2008. According to their analysis, capital, current 
and educational expenditures have a negative effect on growth, while health and transport 
and communication expenditures are growth enhancing.    
Alshahrani and Alsadiq (2014) employ annual data for Saudi Arabia over the period 1969-2010 
and find that, while private domestic and public investments, as well as healthcare 
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expenditure, stimulate growth in the long-run, spending in the housing sector can also boost 
short-run production. 
To the best of our knowledge, only few studies analyze the relationship between public 
spending composition and economic growth. Most studies focus on the impact of public stock 
of capital on production function. Picci’s (1999) application of both Fixed and Ramdom Effects 
models, demonstrates a positive relationship between them. Nonetheless, the results are 
weaker when he adds some control variables to his experiment. De Stefanis and Sena (2005) 
also find a positive impact of public capital on total factor productivity (TFP). Bonaglia et al. 
(2000) find insignificant effects between public capital and productivity, while La Ferrara and 
Marcellino (2000) find a slight negative effect. Di Giacinto et al. (2012) make use of using 
different estimation methodologies over the period 1970-2001 and find that public capital 
enhances the Italian economic growth rate. These results show that the effect is higher when a 
VAR cointegration approach is employed.  
Marrocu and Paci (2008) investigate the role played by public capital in increasing Italy’s 
productivity levels. They examine a panel production function for all 20 Italian regions over the 
period 1996-2003 by using the Instrumental Variables (IV) method. The results show that 
public capital has a positive and significant effect on production, and the effects vary 
considerably between the two macro-areas of the country, namely Centre-North and 
Mezzogiorno (i.e. South of Italy). Furthermore, the disaggregation of the public capital stock 
into functional categories indicates a significant different impact within these two macro-
areas. The most relevant outcome is that economic infrastructures are much more productive 
in the South, while the other type of public infrastructure (namely human capital 
infrastructures, social capital infrastructures and housing) seems to play a very limited role.  
Grisorio and Prota (2013) examine the decentralization process effects on the share of 
different categories of public expenditures for the Italian regional administrations over the 
period 1996-2008. Using an economic and functional classification of expenditures, they show 
that the level of decentralization influences the expenditure composition. Grisorio and Prota 
(2015) also analyze the same relationship adopting a panel cointegration approach. The results 
reveal that the level of decentralization also influences the expenditure composition in the 
long-run. Indeed, it reduces welfare spending and has a positive effect on the share of 
expenditure to support productive activities. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the literature regarding public spending, its 
functional breakdown and economic growth. Since Solow (1956) first proposed his neoclassical 
model, much research has concentrated on the absence of long-run economic growth. 
Subsequently, Romer’s (1986) theoretical seemed to have shed some light on this topic, 
emphasizing the existence of an endogenous economic growth rate in the long-term. More 
recently, Barro’s (1990) model has concentrated on productive public spending.   
According to the endogenous growth models, fiscal policy affects the long-term growth rate 
through decisions on both taxes and expenditures. This happens because both of them can 
affect decisions by private firms about investing in human capital, knowledge or research and 
development, which constitute the engine of growth within the endogenous growth 
framework.  
Bergh and Henrekson (2011) point out that, if productive government expenditures are 
characterized by decreasing returns, the negative effect of taxes to finance public expenditure 
may at some point dominate the positive effect of growth-promoting government activities. 
There are also reasons to expect the marginal negative effect of government size in increase 
absolute terms as government grows. For instance, in an attempt to finance rising 
expenditure, government may increase taxes and/or borrowing. Higher income taxation 
discourages individuals from working many hours or even seeking employment. This in turn 
reduces income and aggregate demand. Similarly, higher profit tax tends to increase 
production costs and reduce investment expenditure as well as profitability of firms.  
Although different types of expenditure and taxes are likely to have different growth effects, I 
have started by describing studies that examine the aggregate correlation between total 
government size and growth. 
From an empirical point of view, research seems to offer mixed and opposing results. On the 
one hand, scholars assert a linear positive or negative relationship between public spending 
and growth. Conversely, others assert the existence of a non-linear correlation between them. 
Despite the absence of unanimous consensus in the literature, existing evidence seem to 
confirm Barro’s (1990) predictions, which maintain that, in poor countries, public sector are 
typically small, and the relationship between government size and growth is positive. In rich 
countries, public sectors are typically large, and the same relationship is less positive than in 
poor countries, and possibly negative.   
Moreover, government expenditures on public and other goods with positive externalities play 
a crucial role as they can lead to higher economic growth.  
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Studies that disaggregate public expenditures in healthcare, education, defence, 
infrastructures, housing sector and other expenditures show that results change according to 
the methodology, sample and time span under investigation. For instance, the results differ if 
the sample under scrutiny comprises developed and developing countries. Moreover, they 
may also diverge if considering only one of these two typologies of countries. Although 
research in this field is progressing rapidly, further evidence is certainly much need. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
References 
Abounoouri, E. and Nademi, Y. (2010) “Government Size Threshold and Economic Growth in 
Iran”, International Journal of Business and Development Studies, 2, pp. 95-108.   
Acosta-Ormahcea, S. and Atsuyoshi, M. (2013) “Can a Government Enhance Long-Run Growth 
by Changing the Composition of Public Expenditure?” International Monetary Fund Working 
Paper, 13/162, Washington, DC. 
Afonso, A. and Fuceri, D. (2010) “Government Size, Composition, Volatility and Economic 
Growth”, European Journal of Political Economy, 26, pp. 517-532. 
Afonso, A., Schuknecht, L. and Tanzi, V. (2003) “Public Sector Efficiency: An International 
Comparison”, Working Paper No. 242, European Central Bank. 
Agell, J. (1996) “Why Sweden’s Welfare State needed Reform”, Economic Journal, 106, pp. 
1790-1771. 
Agell, J., Lindh, T. and Ohlson, H. (1997) “Growth and the Public Sector: A Critical Review 
Essay”, European Journal of Political Economy, 13, pp. 33-52. 
Agell, J., Ohlsson, H. and Skogman Thoursie, P. (2006) “Growth Effects of Government 
Expenditure and Taxation in Rich Countries: A Comment”, European Economic Review, 50, pp. 
211-219. 
Agénor, P. R. (2010) “A Theory of Infastructure-led development”, Journal of Economic 
Dynamics & Control, 34, pp. 932-950. 
Agénor, P. R. and Neanidis, K. C. (2011) “The Allocation of Public Expenditure and Economic 
Growth”, The Manchester School, 79, pp. 899-931. 
Alexander, W. R. J. (1990) “Growth: Some Combined Cross-Sectional and Time-Series Evidence 
from OECD Countries”, Applied Economics, 22, pp. 1197-1204. 
Alshahrani, S. A., and Alsadiq, A. J. (2014) “Economic Growth and Government Spending in 
Saudi Arabia: An Empirical Investigation”, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper, 
WP/14/3. 
Akpan, N. (2005) “Government Expenditure and Economic Growth in Nigeria: A Disaggregated 
Approach”, CBN Economic and Financial Review, 43.  
Armey, D., (1995), “The Freedom Revolution”, Washington, Regnery Publishing Co. 
Arrow, K. J. and Kurz, M., (1970) “Public Investment, the Rate of Return and Optimal Fiscal 
Policy, (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD). 
Aschauer, D. (1989) “Is Government Spending Productive?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
23, pp. 177-200. 
Barro, R. J., (1990) “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth,” Journal 
of Political Economy, 98, pp. s103-s125. 
Barro, R. J. (1991) “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, CVI, pp. 407-443. 
Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X., (1992) “Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth”, Review 
of Economic Studies, 59, pp. 645-661.   
Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X., (2004) “Economic Growth”, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London.   
30 
 
Baum, N. D. and Lin, S. (1993) “The Differential Effects on Economic Growth of Government 
Expenditures on Education, Welfare, and Defense”, Journal of Economic Development, 18, pp. 
175-185. 
Benos, N., (2005) “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from OECD 
Countries”. Discussion Paper 2005-01, University of Cyprus.  
Bergh, A. and Henrekson, M. (2011) “Government Size and Growth: A Survey and 
Interpretation of the Evidence”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 25, pp. 872-897. 
Bergh, A. and Ohrn, N. (2011) “Growth Effects of Fiscal Policies: A Critical Appraisal of 
Colombier’s study”, IFN Working Paper 858, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, 
Stockholm. 
Bird, R. M. (1971) “Wagner’s Law of Expanding State Activity”, Public Finance, 26, pp. 1-26. 
Bonaglia, F., La Ferrara, E. and Marcellino, M. (2000) “Public Capital and Economic 
Performance: Evidence from Italy”, Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 2. 
Bose, N., Haque, M.E., and Osborn, D.R. (2007) “Public Expenditure and Economic Growth: A 
Disaggregated Analysis for Developing Countries”, The Manchester School, 75, pp. 533-56. 
Bottasso, A., Castagnetti, C. and Conti, M. (2013) “And jet they Co-move! Public Capital and 
Productivity in OECD”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 35, pp. 713-729.   
Cameron, D. (1982) “On the Limits of the Public Economy”, Annals of the Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 459, pp. 46-62. 
Cashin, W. E. (1985) “Improving Lectures”, Idea Paper No. 14, Manhattan: Kansas State 
University, Center for Faculty Evaluation and Development. 
Chao, J. C. P. and Grubel, H. (1998) “Optimal Levels of Spending and Taxation in Canada”, In 
Herbert Grubel, eds. How to use the fiscal surplus Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, pp. 53-68.  
Chang, T. (2002) “An Econometric Test of Wagner’s Law for Six Countries based on 
Cointegration and Error Correction Modeling Techniques”, Applied Economics, 34, pp. 1157-
1170. 
Chen, S., and Lee, C. (2005) “Government Size and Economic Growth in Taiwan: A Threshold 
Regression Approach”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 27, pp. 1051-1066. 
Chletsos, M. and Kollias, C. (1997) “Testing Wagner’s Law using Disaggregated Public 
Expenditure Data in the Case of Greece: 1958-1993”, Applied Economics, 29, pp. 371-377. 
Chobanov, D. and Mladenova, A. (2009) “What is the Optimum Size of Government”, Institute 
for Market Economics, Bulgaria. 
Colombier, C. (2009) “Growth Effects of Fiscal Policies: An Application of Robust Modified M-
estimator”, Applied Economics, 41, pp. 899-912. 
Dalena, M. and Magazzino, C. (2012) “Public Expenditure and Revenue in Italy, 1862-1993”, 
Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, 41, pp. 145-172.  
Dar, A. A. and AmirKhalkhali, S. (2002) “Government Size, Factor Accumulation, and Economic 
Growth: Evidence from OECD Countries”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 24, pp. 679-692. 
De Stefanis, S. and Sena, V. (2005) “Public Capital and Total Factor Productivity: New Evidence 
from the Italian Regions, 1970-1998”, Regional Studies, 39, pp.603-617. 
Devarajan, S., Swaroop, V. and Zou, H. F., (1993) “ What Do Governments Buy? The 
Composition of Public Spending and Economic Performance”, Working Papers 1082. 
31 
 
Devarajan, S., Swaroop, V., and Zou, H. F., (1996) “The Composition of Public Expenditure and 
Economic Growth”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 37, pp. 313-44. 
De Witte, K. and Moesen, W. (2008) “The Performance of Government”, Review of Business 
and Economics, 53, pp. 171-187. 
Di Giacinto, V., Micucci, G. and Monatanaro, P. (2012) “Network Effects of Public Transport 
Infrastructure: Evidence on Italian Regions”, Papers in Regional Science, 91, pp. 515-541.   
Easterly, W. and Rebelo, S., (1993) “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth”, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 32, pp. 417-458. 
Ekinci, A., (2011) “What is the Optimum Size of Government: A Suggestion”, International 
Journal of Economics and Finance Studies, 3, pp. 45-54. 
Facchini, F. and Melki, M. (2011) “Optimal Government Size and Economic Growth in France 
(1871-2008): An Explanation by the State and Market Failures”, Documents de travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne; Centre d’Economie de la 
Sorbonne.  
Feldstein, M. (2006) “The Effect of Taxes on Efficiency and Growth”, NBER Working Paper No. 
12201, May 2005.  
Fisher, W. H. and Turnovsky, S. J. (1998) “Public Investment, Congestion, and Private Capital 
Accumulation”, Economic Journal, 108, pp. 399-413.  
Fölster S. and Henrekson M., (2001) “Growth Effects of Government Expenditure and Taxation 
in Rich Countries”, The European Economic Review, 45, pp. 1501-1520. 
Fölster, S. and Henrekson, M., (1999) “Growth and the Public Sector: A Critique of the Critics”, 
European Journal of Political Economy, 15, pp. 337-358. 
Franco, D. (1993) “L’Espansione della Spesa Pubblica in Italia”, Il Mulino, Bologna. 
Futagami, K., Morita, Y. and Shibata, A. (1993) “Dynamic Analysis of an Endogenous Growth 
Model with Public Capital”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 95, pp. 607-625. 
Gandhi, V. P. (1971) “Wagner’s Law of Public Expenditure: Do Recent Cross-Section Studies 
Confirm It?, Public Finance, 26, pp. 44-56. 
Ganti, S. and Kolluri, B. R. (1979) “Wagner’s Law of Public Expenditures: Some Efficient Results 
for the United States”, Public Finance, 34, pp. 225-233. 
Ghosh, S. and Gregoriou, A., (2008) “The Impact of Government Expenditures on Growth: 
Empirical evidence from an Heterogeneous Panel”, Bulletin of Economic Research, 61, pp. 95-
102.  
Glomm, G., and B. Ravikumar, (1997) “Productive Government Expenditures and Long-Run 
Growth”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 21, pp. 183-204. 
Goffman, I. J. and Mahar, D. J. (1971) “The Growth of Public Expenditure in Selected 
Developing Nations: Six Caribbean Countries”, Public Finance, 26, pp. 57-74. 
Granger C. W. J., Newbold, P. (1974) “Spurious Regressions in Econometrics”, Journal of 
Econometrics, 2, pp. 111-120. 
Grisorio, M. J. and Prota, F. (2013) “The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on the Composition 
of Public Expenditure: Panel Data Evidence from Italy”, Regional Studies.  
32 
 
Grisorio, M. J. and Prota, F. (2015) “The Short and the Long Run Relationship between Fiscal 
Decentralization and Public Expenditure Composition in Italy”, Economics Letters, 130, pp. 113-
116. 
Gupta, S. P. (1967) “Public Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Time-Series Analysis”, Public 
Finance, pp. 423-461. 
Gupta, S., Clements, B., Baldacci, E. and Mulas-Granados, C. (2005) “Fiscal Policy, Expenditure 
Composition, and Growth in Low-Income Countries”, Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 24, pp. 441-463. 
Gwartney, J., D., Lawson, R. A. and Holcombe, R., G., (1998) “The Size and Function of 
Government and Economic Growth”, Washington, D.C.: Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. 
Congress. 
Hansson, P. and Henrekson, M., (1994) “A New Framework for Testing the Effect of 
Government Spending on Growth and Productivity”, Public Choice, 81, pp. 381-401. 
Henrekson, M. (1993) “Wagner’s Law – A Spurious Relationship?” Public Finance, 46.  
Herath, S. (2010) “The Size of the Government and Economic Growth: An Empirical Study of Sri 
Lanka”, SRE Discussion Papers, 2010/05. WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 
Vienna. 
Islam, A. M. (2001) “Wagner’s Law Revisited: Cointegration and Exogeneity Tests for USA”, 
Applied Economics, 8, pp. 509-515. 
Josaphat, P. K. and Oliver, M. (2000) “Government Spending and Economic Growth in 
Tanzania”, 1965-1996: CREDIT Research Paper (University of Nottingham). 
Karras, G., (1996) “The Optimal Government Size: Further International Evidence on the 
Productivity of Government Services”, Economic Inquiry, pp. 193-203. 
Karras, G., (1997) “On the Optimal Government Size in Europe: Theory and Empirical 
Evidence”, The Manchester School, LXV, pp. 280-294. 
Keynes, J. M. (1936) “The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money”, New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World Inc. 
Kneller, R., Bleaney, M., and Gemmell, N., (1998) “Growth, Public Policy and the Government 
Budget Constraint: Evidence from OECD Countries”, School of Economics, Discussion paper n. 
98/14. University of Nottingham. 
Kneller, R. A., Bleaney M. F. and Gemmell, N. (1999) “Fiscal Policy and Growth: Evidence from 
OECD Countries”, Journal of Public Economics, 74, pp. 171-190. 
Koop, G. and Poirier, D. J. (1995) “An Empirical Investigation of Wagner’s Hypothesis by Using a 
Model Occurrence Framework”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 158, pp. 123-
141.  
Kormendi, R. C. and Meguire, P. C., (1985) “Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: Cross-
Country evidence”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 16, pp. 141-164.  
Kuckuck, J. (2012) “Testing Wagner’s Law at Different Stages of Economic Development – An 
Historical Analysis of Five Western European Countries”, Institute of Empirical Economic 
Research, Working Paper 91, Osnabrueck University, Germany.  
La Ferrara, E. and Marcellino, M. (2000) “TFP, Costs, and Public Infrastructure: An Equivocal 
Relationship”, IGIER Working Paper, n. 176. 
33 
 
Lamartina, S. and Zaghini, A. (2012) “Increasing Public Expenditure: Wagner’s Law in OECD 
Countries”, German Economic Review, 12, pp. 149-164. 
Landau, D. (1983) “Government Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Study”, 
Southern Economic Journal, 49, pp. 783-792. 
Levine, R. and Renelt, D., (1992) “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regression”, 
American Economic Review, 82, pp. 942-963.  
Liu, C. HL, Hsu, C., Younis, M. Z. (2008) “The Association Between Government Expenditure 
and Economic Growth: The Granger Causality Test of the US Data, 1974-2002”, Journal of 
Public Budgeting, Accounting and Financial Management, 20, pp. 439-452. 
Lucas, R. (1988) “On the Mechanics of Endogenous Growth”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
22, pp. 3-42. 
Magazzino, C. (2010) “Wagner’s Law in Italy: Empirical Evidence from 1960 to 2008”, G. & L. E. 
R., 14, pp. 91-115. 
Marlow, M. L. (1986) “Private Sector Shrinkage and the Growth of Industrialized Economies”, 
Public Choice, 49, pp. 143-154. 
Marrocu, E. and Paci, R. (2008) “The Effects of Public Capital on the Productivity on the Italian 
Regions”, Applied Economics, pp. 1-14. 
Monteiro, G. and Turnovsky, S. (2013) “Anticipated Consumption and its Impact on Capital 
Accumulation and Growth: Forward-Looking vs. Backward-Looking” Consumption Reference”, 
CESifo Working Paper Series 4536, CESifo Group Munich. 
Musgrave, R. A. (1969) “Fiscal Systems”, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
Mutascu, M. and Milos, M. C. (2009) “Optimal Size of Government Spending. The Case of 
European union Member States”, Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, pp. 1-11. 
Nademi, A., Nademi, Y., Paghe, A.A., and Vaziri, H. (2011) “Does Armey Curve Exist in Pakistan 
and Iran Economies?”, Journal of Applied Sciences Research, 7, pp. 562-565.  
Nademi, Y., Samimi, A. J. and Zobeiri, H. (2010) “Government Size and Economic Growth: A 
Threshold Regression Approach in Selected Islamic Countries”, Australian Journal of Basic and 
Applied Sciences, 4, pp. 2247-2249. 
Niloy, B., Emranuel, M. H., and Denise, R. O. (2003) “Public Expenditure and Economic Growth: 
A Disaggregated Analysis for Developing Countries”, JEL, Publications. 
Nurudeen, A. and Usman, A. (2010) “Government Expenditure and economic Growth in 
Nigeria, 1970-2008: A Disaggregate Analysis”, Business and Economics Journal, 4. 
Pevcin, P., (2004) “Does Optimal Size of Government Exist?”, Paper presented at the EGPA 
(European Group of Public Administration), 2004 Annual Conference, 1-4 September, Ljubljana, 
Slovenia. 
Picci, L. (1999) “Productivity and Infrastructure in the Italian Regions”, Giornale degli 
Economisti e Annali di Economia, 58, pp. 329-353. 
Piras, R. (2001) “Government Spending Composition in an Endogenous Growth Model with 
Congestion”, Metroeconomica, 52, pp. 121-136. 
Poot, J. (2000) “A Synthesis of Empirical Research on the Impact of Government on Long-Run 
Growth”, Growth and Change, 31, pp. 516-546.  
 
34 
 
Ram, R. (1986a) “Government Size and Economic Growth: A New Framework and  Some 
Evidence from Cross Sectional and Tim Series Data”, American Economic Review, 76, pp. 191-
203. 
Ram, R. (1986b) “Causality Between Income and Government Expenditure: A Broad 
International Prospective”, Public Finance, 41, pp.393-414. 
Ram, R. (1987) “Wagner’s Hypothesis in Time-Series and Cross-Section Perspectives: Evidence 
from “Real” Data for  115 Countries”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69, pp. 194-204. 
Romer, P.M. (1986) “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth”, Journal of Political Economy, 
94, pp. 1002-1037. 
Romer, P. (1990) “Endogenous Technological Change”, Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 71-
102. 
Romero-Avila, D. and Strauch, R. (2008) “ Public Finances and Long-Term Growth in Europe: 
Evidence from a Panel Data Analysis”, European Journal of Political Economy, 24, pp. 172-191. 
Shelton, C. A. (2007) “The Size and Composition of Government Expenditure”, Journal of Public 
Economics, 91, pp. 2230-2260. 
Singh, B., and Sahni, B. S. (1984) “Causality between Public Expenditure and National Income”, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 56, pp. 630-644. 
Singh, R. J. and Weber, R. (1997) “The Composition of Public Expenditure and Economic 
Growth: Can Anything be Learned from Swiss Data?”, Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur 
Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, 133, pp.617-634. 
Solow, R. (1956) “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 70, pp. 65-94.  
Stein, E., Talvi, E. and Grisanti, A. (1998) “Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: 
the Latin American Experience”, Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the Chief 
Economist, Working Paper, 367, February. 
Swan, T. W. (1956) “Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation”, Economic Record, 32, pp. 
334-361. 
Vedder, R. K. and Gallaway, L., (1998) “Government Size and Economic Growth”, Paper 
presented for the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, pp. 1-15.  
Wagner, A. (1883) “Three extracts on Public Finance”, in R. A. Musgrave and A. T. Peacock 
(eds.), 1958, Classic in the Theory of Public Finance. London: Macmillan.  
Widmalm, F. (2001) “Tax Structure and Growth: Are some Taxes Better than Others?”, Public 
Choice, 107, pp. 199-219. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
The Composition of Public Spending and Growth: Evidence from 
Italian Regions 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The role of fiscal policy in the long-run growth process has been central in macroeconomics 
especially since the birth of endogenous growth models. In a seminal paper, Barro (1990) 
models the productive government spending in terms of public services, a low variable, being 
in the economy’s production function, instead Futagami et al. (1993) introduce public capital, 
as a stock variable. The theoretical relationship between the composition of government 
expenditure and growth is investigated by Devarajan et al. (1996), Ghosh and Roy (2004), Chen 
(2006) and Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008)4.  
Devarajan et al. (1996) have developed a model that defines two productive services as flow 
variables in a CES production function. Furthermore, one type of government expenditure is 
seen to be as more productive than the other. Consequently, a shift in favour of an objectively 
more productive type of expenditure may not raise the growth rate if its initial share is too 
high. The model expresses the difference between the two types of expenditure by how a shift 
in the mix between the two alters the economy’s long term growth rate. Ghosh and Gregoriou 
(2008) have extended Devarajan et al.’s (1996) theoretical model in an optimal fiscal policy 
perspective, rather than taking governmental decisions as a given.  
Several researchers have attempted to analyze the aggregate public spending effects on 
economic growth. Yet their results have been thus far inconclusive and mixed. Some authors 
find that the impact of government expenditure on economic growth is negative or non 
significant (Landau, 1983; 1986; Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Aschauer, 1989; Romer, 1990; 
Barro, 1990, 1991; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Grier and Tullock, 1999; Folster and Henrekson, 
1999; 2001). Others find that the impact of government is positive and significant (Aschauer, 
1989; Sàez and García, 2005). 
Only recently researchers started to evaluate the influence of the composition of public 
spending on economic growth. With this objective in mind, scholars have aimed to estimate 
the elasticity of economic growth in reference to different items of government spending. 
They have made use of a wide disaggregation along with the pure distinction between 
productive and unproductive spending. A number of papers have specifically investigated how 
compositional changes in public spending affects economic growth by means of panel data 
                                                          
4
 Ghosh and Gregoriou’s (2008) model consider two productive services as flow variables. 
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approaches (Devarajan et al., 1993, 1996; Kneller et al., 1999; Benos, 2005; Bose et al., 2007; 
Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2008; Martins and Veiga, 2014; Acosta-Ormachea and Morozumi, 2013).  
It is broadly accepted that public spending on infrastructure such as roads, railways, bridges, 
telecommunications, expenditures on research and development, education and health are 
growth-enhancing in economy. Moreover, they are the most functional categories examined in 
the literature. It is generally assumed that to find a positive relationship between expenditures 
on education, health and growth, because they promote accumulation of human capital. 
Nonetheless, evidence appears not to be exhaustive. For instance, some works find a positive 
effect (e.g. Bose et al., 2007; Acosta-Ormachea and Morozumi, 2013), while others find that an 
increase in public education spending has a negative or not statistically significant effect on 
growth (Devarajan et al., 1996; Barro, 2004; Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2008). Benos (2009) finds a 
non-linear effect on growth. For instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Hansson and 
Henrekson (1994b) find a significant positive effect on growth from educational spending and 
Aschauer (1989) found that public investment in infrastructure has had a positive effect on the 
growth rate in the United States. However, when government expenditure is increasingly 
channelled to transfer payments and taxes are raised, there are many theoretical reasons to 
believe that there is a point where higher government spending begins to have a negative 
effect on growth.      
From an empirical point of view, most of existing works focus on developing and developed 
countries. It seems important to remark that the potential growth effects of public programs 
may have some implications in the selection procedure of countries for empirical testing. In 
particular, studies that mix rich and poor countries, or those that use OECD membership as a 
sample of rich countries may appear to be problematic (Folster and Henrekson, 1998).  
Folster and Henrekson (1998) state that many empirical studies (such as Agell et al., 1997) do 
not take into account the econometric problems that arise while studying the relationship 
between the rate of economic growth and the size of the public sector. They present evidence 
showing that, once a number of econometric issues are dealt with, the relationship between 
growth and public expenditure may be more robust than it first appears. Slemrod (1995) 
places greater emphasis on the econometric problems in most studies and concludes that 
"there is no persuasive evidence that the extent of government has either a positive or a 
negative impact on either the level of growth or the growth rate of income, largely because 
the fundamental problems of identification have not yet been adequately addressed". This 
approach creates a bias towards agnostic conclusions. 
As for Italy the relation between composition of public spending and growth has sparsely been 
investigated. Grisorio and Prota (2013), for example, study the effects of the decentralization 
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process in Italy on the share of different categories of public spending in total expenditure of 
the Italian regions over the period 1996-2008. They also use the economic and functional 
classification of public expenditures to show that the level of decentralization influences the 
expenditure composition. Grisorio and Prota (2015) also examine the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and public expenditure composition of the Italian regional 
administrations in the long-run. The results demonstrate that the level of decentralization 
influences the expenditure composition. In other words, it reduces welfare spending, while 
having a positive effect on the share of expenditure for productive activities support.  
In this chapter, we contribute to the literature on the growth impact of government spending 
composition in various ways. Firstly, we attempt to empirically examine the effects of 
government spending on growth based on Ghosh and Gregoriou’s (2008) theoretical model. 
We examine a panel with 19 out of Italian regions (Valle d’Aosta is therefore not included in 
the sample) and we investigate this relationship in terms of both economic and functional 
classification. Secondly, our classification allows us to investigate six governmental functions 
and to consider capital and current expenditure items separately. The rationale behind this, is 
that some current spending items are crucial to promote the profitability of investments in 
some government functions such as education and health. Since these functional expenditures 
embody both capital and current expenditures, the aggregate effect estimated may be 
insignificant either of them has a significant growth effect. Third, we employ different checks 
of robustness of our results. In this context, we also apply alternative estimation methods and 
extent our analysis taking into account spatial dependence among the regions under scrutiny. 
The most relevant result is that implementing spatial lag models, some functional components 
that seemed do not influence economic growth gained significance, highlighting the 
importance to take into account spatial dependence among the units of our panel.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical model 
used here; Section 3 describes the dataset we analyze; Section 4 discusses some issues relating 
to the methodology we employ; Section 5 is devoted to the regression analysis; Section 6 
presents some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Model 
2.1   Optimal Fiscal Policy 
The endogenous growth literature seems to agree on that fiscal policy has potentially 
important effects on the long-run growth rate of the economy. In this context, the distinction 
between productive and unproductive government spending is crucial. In his seminal paper, 
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Barro (1990) models the productive government spending in terms of public services. This is a 
flow variable, whitin the production function.of the economy. Devarajan et al. (1996) also 
investigates the relationship between the composition of government expenditure and 
growth. In their theoretical model, they consider two productive services (which are both flow 
variables) in a CES production function; one more productive than another. Importantly, they 
obtain that a shift in favour of an objectively more productive type of expenditure may not 
raise the growth rate, if its initial share is "excessively high". Devarajan et al. (1996) suggest 
that an attempt to study optimal fiscal policy, instead of taking the government's decision as a 
given, could be a fruitful extension of their model. Drawing on this, Ghosh and Gregoriou 
(2008) have attempted to extend the model. Within a decentralized economy set-up, these 
authors characterize the welfare-maximizing fiscal policy for a benevolent government (i.e. the 
second-best outcome). This government chooses the fiscal instruments at its disposal to 
maximize the representative agent's utility. Ghosh and Gregoriou’s model solves the problems 
relating to the three key endogenous variables, which are the optimal expenditure shares of 
the two services, the optimal tax rate and the optimal growth rate. They do this by applying 
the key technological and behavioural parameters of the model. In Devarajan et al.’s (1996) 
model, the economy's growth rate is expressed in terms of the tax rate and expenditure 
shares, which are both exogenous; in Ghosh and Gregorious’s (2008) model, the optimal 
growth rate is expressed in terms of optimal values of the same two variables. 
The model start from a CES production function 
 
𝑦 = 𝑓 𝑘,𝑔1 ,𝑔2 =  𝛼𝑘
−ζ + 𝛽g1
−ζ
+  𝛾g2
−ζ
   (1) 
 
where 𝑦 is output, 𝑘 is private capital, 𝑔1, 𝑔2 are two types of government spending, and 
𝛼 > 0,𝛽 ≥ 0, 𝛾 ≥ 0,𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 = 1, ζ ≥ −1.  
The government budget constraint is 
 
𝑔1 + 𝑔2 = 𝜏𝑦  (2) 
 
where 𝜏 is the (constant over time) income tax rate. 
The shares of government expenditure that go towards 𝑔1 𝜙  and 𝑔2 1−𝜙  are given by 
 
𝑔1 = 𝜙𝜏𝑦     𝑎𝑛𝑑     𝑔2 =  1 −𝜙  𝜏𝑦 (3) 
 
where 0 ≤ 𝜙 ≤ 1. 
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The representative agent's utility function is isoelastic, utility is derived from private 
consumption  𝑐  and is given by 
 
𝑈 =  
𝑐1−𝜎−1
1−𝜎
∞
0
𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝑑𝑡 (4) 
 
 where 𝜌  > 0  is the rate of time preference. 
The agent's budget constraints is  
 
𝑘 =  1− 𝜏 𝑦 − 𝑐  (5) 
 
Devarajan et al. (1996) derive an expression for the ratio, 
𝑔
𝑘
, given by 
𝑔
𝑘
=  
𝜏ζ−𝛽𝜙−ζ−𝛾 𝜙 −ζ
𝛼
 
1
ζ
  (6) 
and of the economy’s (endogenous) growth rate, 𝜆, given by 
 
𝜆 =
𝛼 1−𝜏  𝛼𝜏ζ/ 𝜏ζ−𝛽𝜙−ζ−𝛾 1−𝜙 −ζ   
− 1+ζ /ζ
−𝜌
𝜎
  (7) 
 
The objective of this model is to characterize the optimal fiscal policy. Equations (1)-(5) are 
exactly as proposed by Devarajan et al. (1996). The representative agent’s problem is to 
choose 𝑐 and 𝑘  to maximize utility, as given by equation (4), subject to the budget constraint 
(5), taking 𝜏, 𝑔1 and 𝑔2, and also 𝑘0 as a given. The first order condition gives rise to the Euler 
equation: 
 
𝜆 ≡
𝑐 
𝑐
=  1− 𝜏 
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑘
− 𝜌  (8) 
 
Thus, the consumption’s growth rate is proportional to the difference between marginal 
productivity of capital, net of the tax rate, 𝜏, and the rate of time preference, 𝜌.  
The objective of the government in a decentralized economy is to run the public sector in the 
nation’s interest, thus taking the private sector’s choice as a given. In other words, the 
government’s problem is to choose 𝜏, 𝑔1 and 𝑔2 to maximize the representative agent’s utility 
subject to (2), (5) and (8), and taking 𝑘0 as given. The first order conditions with respect to 𝜏, 
𝑔1 and 𝑔2 respectively yield 
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑔1
=
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑔2
= 1, from which we can obtain the optimal ratio of the 
two public goods when we have a benevolent government: 
41 
 
 
𝑔1
𝑔2
 
∗
=  
𝛽
𝛾
 
1
ζ+1
  (9) 
 
The value of 
𝑔
𝑘
 is given in (6) above. Hence, using (9), we can obtain the individual values of 
𝑔1
𝑘
  
and 
𝑔2
𝑘
: 
 
𝑔1
𝑘
=  
 𝛽/𝛾  1/ 1+ζ  
 𝛽/𝛾  1/ 1+ζ  +1
 ∙  
𝜏ζ−𝛽𝜙−ζ−𝛾 1−𝜙 −ζ
𝛼
 
1/ζ
  (10) 
 
 
𝑔2
𝑘
=  
1
 𝛽/𝛾  1/ 1+ζ  +1
 ∙  
𝜏ζ−𝛽𝜙−ζ−𝛾 1−𝜙 −ζ
𝛼
 
1/ζ
  (11) 
 
From 
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑔1
= 1, we obtain 
 
𝑔1
∗ = 𝛽
1
1+ζ
 
∙ 𝑦  (12) 
 
and from  
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑔2
= 1, we obtain 
 
𝑔2
∗ = 𝛾
1
1+ζ
 
∙ 𝑦  (13) 
 
We are now in a position to find an expression for the optimal tax rate for the decentralized 
economy under a benevolent government. From the government budget constraint given by 
(2), and given the optimal shares (of output) of the two productive inputs given by (12) and 
(13) above, the optimal tax rate is given by 
 
𝜏∗ = 𝛽
1
ζ+1
 
+ 𝛾
1
ζ+1
 
  (14) 
 
Finally, the optimal share of the first public service from a welfare-maximizing point of view is 
obtained by combining equations (3), (12), and (14): 
 
𝜙∗ =
𝛽1/ ζ+1  
𝛽1/ ζ+1 +𝛾1/ ζ+1 
  (15) 
 
Clearly, the optimal share of the second public services obtained by combining equations (3), 
(13), and (14) is: 
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1− 𝜙∗ =
𝛾1/ ζ+1  
𝛽1/ ζ+1 +𝛾1/ ζ+1 
  (16) 
 
Combining (9), (15) and (16), we obtain the following equation: 
 
 
𝑔1
𝑔2
 
∗
=
𝜙∗
1−𝜙∗
=  
𝛽
𝛾
 
1
ζ+1
  (17) 
 
Finally, one can derive an expression for the growth rate that could be achieved in an economy 
where a benevolent government chooses its fiscal instruments, 𝜏, 𝑔1 and 𝑔2, to maximize the 
welfare of the representative agent. This optimal growth rate expression can be obtained by 
combining equation (7) with equations (14), (15) and (16), and it is given by 
 
𝜆∗ =
𝛼 1 − 𝜏∗  𝛼𝜏∗ζ/ 𝜏∗ζ − 𝛽𝜏∗−ζ − 𝛾 1− 𝜙∗ −ζ  
− 1+ζ /ζ
− 𝜌
𝜎
 
 
=
𝛼−1/ζ  1−𝛽1/ ζ+1 −𝛾1/ ζ+1  
 1+2ζ /ζ
−𝜌
𝜎
 (18) 
 
Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) have thus analytically characterized optimal fiscal policy in 
Devarajan et al.’s (1996) model. As it appears clear from equations (14)-(18) above, we obtain 
closed-form solutions of all the important fiscal variables in terms of the key technological and 
behavioural parameters of the model. The implications for policy are interesting in the case 
where the government formulates fiscal policy in the attempt to maximizing the welfare of the 
representative agent, rather than taking as “given” the tax rate and expenditure shares on the 
two public goods under scrutiny.  
 
 
2.2  Comparative statics 
In this section we investigate how the key variables respond to a change in the productivity 
parameter, 𝛽, where 𝛽 is the share in the production function of the, a priori, more productive 
public good  𝛽 > 𝛾 . The variables are the optimal growth rate  𝜆∗ , the optimal tax rate  𝜏∗ , 
and the ratio of the optimal shares of the two public services  𝜙∗/ 1− 𝜙∗  . First, from 
equation (18), 𝑑𝜆∗/𝑑𝛽: 
𝑑𝜆∗
𝑑𝛽
=
1
𝜎
∙
𝛼−1/ζ
1+ζ
∙  
1+2ζ
ζ
  1− 𝛽1/ 1+ζ − 𝛾1/ 1+ζ  
 1+ζ /ζ
∙ 𝛾−ζ/ 1+ζ − 𝛽−ζ/ 1+ζ   (19) 
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Clearly, 
𝑑𝜆∗
𝑑𝛽
> 0 𝑖𝑓 𝛽 > 𝛾. 
If 𝛽 = 𝛾 (the two components of public spending are equally productive), then a rise in 𝛽 at 
the margin does not affect the optimal growth rate. Yet, if component  𝑔1  is more productive 
than  𝑔2  , then an increase in the productivity of that input will raise the growth rate (𝛽 is the 
input and the share of 𝑔1 in the production function). Hence, it is important to identify which 
input is the more productive, as an increase in the share in the production function would 
bolster growth. Conversely, an increase in the share of the less productive input in the 
production function will have an adverse effect on growth. 
Subsequently, from equation (14), 𝑑𝜏∗/𝑑𝛽: 
 
𝑑𝜏∗
𝑑𝛽
=
1
1+ζ
 
1
𝛽 ζ/ 1+ζ 
−
1
𝛾 ζ/ 1+ζ 
   (20) 
 
Clearly,  
𝑑𝜏∗
𝑑𝛽
< 0 𝑖𝑓 𝛽 > 𝛾. 
Again, if 𝛽 = 𝛾, the marginal effect of an increase in the productivity of one of the public 
goods will not make a difference to how the optimal tax rate behaves. However, if 𝛽 > 𝛾, then 
an increase in the share of the more productive input in the production function will reduce 
the optimal tax rate. This is due to higher productivity that translates into higher output. In 
turn, this generates higher tax revenues, which thereby require a lower tax rate to balance the 
government budget. Henceforth, from a welfare-maximizing perspective, an increase in the 
productivity of the more productive public good leads to a fall in the optimal tax rate. 
Finally, from equation (17), we find 𝑑 𝜙∗/ 1− 𝜙∗  /𝑑𝛽: 
 
𝑑 𝜙∗/ 1−𝜙∗  
𝑑𝛽
=
1
1+ζ
  𝛽−ζ𝛾 
1/ 1+ζ 
+ 𝛽𝛾−ζ 
1/ 1+ζ 
 
𝛾2/ 1+ζ 
  (21) 
 
Clearly, 
𝑑 𝜙∗/ 1−𝜙∗  
𝑑𝛽
≻ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝛽 + 𝛾 ≻ 0. 
We know that 𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 = 1, and 0 ≺ 𝛼 ≺ 1. From this follows that 𝛽 + 𝛾 ≻ 0 ⟹
 𝑑 𝜙∗/ 1− 𝜙∗  /𝑑𝛽 ≻ 0.  
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3. Data 
 
3.1     The Regional Public Accounts (RPAs)    
In the early 1980s, Italy’s faced the pressing need to fill the existing gap in public finance 
statistics. Moreover, many scholars engaged in a debate concerning the territorial distribution 
of public financial flows, which had been a common feature of all studies into the development 
of southern Italy. 
Nowadays, the Regional Public Accounts (RPAs) is a sound, consolidated tool to allocate public 
sector cash flows to the different geographical area of the country. This tool supports the work 
of analysts and policymakers at both national and regional level. It has filled a longstanding gap 
regarding the sources of information available in Italy and concerning the regional distribution 
of revenues and expenditure, thus making it planning more knowledgeable and aware. At the 
same time, it has also played a prominent role in the theoretical debate and is the focus of 
considerable attention at international level. Relying on a sound understanding of the 
characteristics of government action as it unfolds, RPAs have brought the process of measuring 
the events and the effects of economic policy back to the heart of the decision-making 
process. 
In the early 1990s, the development of a structural solution to the problem of the territorial 
distribution of government cash flows did not seem  to be based on rational ground. The main 
issue was that it was not backed by adequate resources or political will, or supported by a well-
developed methodological foundation. Rather, it was a stubborn decision (at times relying on 
volunteers effort) to create an information system that met the needs of territorial planning 
and analysis. Moreover, it was seen as a way to forge a network of data generating entities 
that could later support it.  
The attempts to develop methodology skills and build information sources was made all the 
more challenging by the lack of a consolidated literature or empirical experience, either 
nationally or internationally. The institutional design of the data producers network was 
simultaneously weakened by an insufficient awareness of the tool’s potential. Also, it suffered 
from the inconsistent level of administrative skills from region to region, which were mainly 
due to the numerous and persistent gaps in the Regional Teams network. 
Therefore, developing an adequate methodology became a process of iterative 
approximations. Approximately, ten years after the project started, the government felt the 
need to completely revise the Regional Public Accounts time series. This helped systematize 
the various methodological decisions that, over time, had replaced the original approaches and 
significantly expanded the universe of entities involved.  
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The Department for the Development and Economic Cohesion (DPS – Dipartimento per lo 
Sviluppo e la Coesione Economica) invested a great deal an effort in the Regional Public 
Accounts project. They believed that the administrative and fiscal decentralization taking 
placeat the time in Italy could not ignore the need for an accurate qualification of the regional 
distribution of revenues and expenditure. Most importantly, the held the view that making 
decisions in the interests of society at large implied making assessments based on knowledge, 
and therefore accessible, timely, transparent and high-quality data.  
 
 
3.2  The Reference Universe and the Nature of the Data   
Consolidate public finance accounts refer to the aggregation of the revenues and expenditure 
flows of the various entities that make up a given reference universe, which are net of any 
flows between those entities. In measuring the cash flows of each individual region, the 
Regional Public Accounts generate data concerning the public sector universe. Selecting a 
different aggregate of entities requires a different approach to consolidating the data surveyed 
by the RPAs5. The public sector consists of general government and non-general government 
entities (at both the central and local/sub-regional level). They include entities under public 
control (i.e. public enterprises) that general government pixies to deliver certain public 
services to the public on a market services basis (e.g. telecommunications, electricity, and so 
on). The definition adopted for general government essentially coincides with that of the 
Italian National Accounts6. It includes those entities that prevalently provide non-market 
services. Also, they are funded primarily by various mandatory payments made by entities and 
parties in the private sector (e.g. taxes, duties, contributions, etc.) and/or those entities that 
perform a redistributive function. The number of entities that make up these two different 
universes, and the precise boundary between general government and non-general-
government, can vary over time. Their number is also directly connected with the legal nature 
of the entities themselves and the laws that govern the various sectors of public action. 
For each public sector entity, the RPAs database reconstructs expenditure and revenue flows 
at the regional level on the basis of the final accounts of the entity, but (in principle) without 
any reclassification. This helps the reconstruction of the accounts for each region. The RPAs 
                                                          
5
 In the RPAs database, each entity is considered as a final expenditure unit, using consolidation 
techniques to eliminate flows between the various levels of government. Particularly, in the transition 
from public sector to general government, the current account and capital transfers to public 
enterprises that are eliminated in the public sector consolidated accounts are included are in the 
general government consolidated accounts, given that the final expenditure of public enterprises is not 
included in the general government sub-universe.  
6
 The definition adopted for the RPAs does not currently consider certain minor general government 
entities that are included in the ISTAT classification.  
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are therefore financial in nature: the flows measured are structured by item in a manner 
similar to that one used for the preparation of the financial statements of public entities that 
make use of “financial accounting”. Again, this allows reconstructing a complete framework of 
all transactions carried out by each entity that generate cash movements. Like the accounts of 
entities prepared on a financial accounting basis, the RPAs do not consider certain operations 
such as revaluations and writedowns of assets and liabilities or accruals to provisions and 
reserves. Financial accounting measures the financial effects of an entity’s activity and reports 
the revenues and expenditures that are expected to arise on the basis of the obligations 
assumed or rights acquired by the entity. The accounts compiled according to this procedure 
are termed assessments for revenues and commitments for expenditures. They are employed 
to ascertain (at either the budget or outturn stage) the ability of the entity to meet its funding 
requirements. Assessments and commitments are recognized when the legal entitlement 
accrues contracts or other legal instruments giving rise to the entitlement. This is due to the 
fact that they are generally determined on the basis of the statutory provisions. The RPAs uses 
cash accounting for its financial accounting. Cash accounting recognizes the cash settlements 
of the transactions, measuring monetary outlays (payments) and inflows (collections) at the 
time they occur rather than at the time the legal entitlement arises. 
The selection of a cash accounting approach for the RPAs was prompted by the conviction that 
this is essential to delineating the context in which public action at the regional level takes 
place. Moreover, it was motivated by the fact that financial data are an integral part of the 
decision-making process and the formation and management of the public sector budget. In 
line with this approach, the RPAs project recognizes as a single account (for expenditure and 
revenues) both economic (broken down into current items and non-financial capital account 
items) and financial items (divided into items in respect of financial assets, receivables and 
equity investments, and financial liabilities, i.e. the entity’s debts). In addition, as regards to 
the budget outturns of the entities, the RPAs emphasize the recognition of transactions on a 
cash basis. Accordingly, data on revenues and expenditure are registered at the time the 
payments and collections occur. 
However, the decision to select such a broad universe as the public sector makes it necessary 
to account for the fact that some entities use one form of accounting and others use the 
other7. This requires the application of a carefully thought-out methodology for converting the 
                                                          
7
 This refers not only to all public enterprises in the non-general-government segment of the public 
sector but it also involves certain public sector entities that, under regulations in force since the turn of 
the new millennium, also adopt accruals accounting (for example, ANAS, State Road Agency, and 
Patrimonio dello Stato SpA, state assets, at the central government level, local health authorities and 
chambers of commerce at the local level). The current debate suggests that in the future the public 
sector may adopt accruals accounting alongside financial accounting. Title III of Legislative Decree 
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accrual-basis accounts of entities in the RPA universe that use this approach to financial 
accounting. Within the landscape of the various sources of statistical information available in 
Italy, the RPAs therefore stand out if compared to other official data (such as those provided 
by the ISTAT’s National Accounts). This happens precisely because of the nature of the data 
considered and the absence of reclassification. One of the special characteristics of this 
approach is the ability to use sectoral breakdowns of expenditure. Another special feature is 
the use of the cash accounting for the RPAs, which supplements and completes the 
information resources available to users, who can access data on an accrual basis for ISTAT and 
more extensive data regarding certain expenditure segments in the publications of other 
institutions. The RPAs data, together with their breakdown by economic items, are available 
for expenditure with a level of sectoral detail that identifies the main areas of action on the 
part of public entities by purpose. 
The basic criterion of the territorial division of the expenditure in the Regional Public Accounts 
is mainly the location of the public’s intervention in terms of financial flows as managed by the 
Italian regions. 
 
 
3.3  Economic and Functional Classifications 
The Regional Public Accounts (RPAs) classification of government expenditure follows two 
main lines: 1) the economic classification that is based on the type or economic characteristics 
of revenues and expenditures and, 2) the functional classification that is based on the purpose 
or the function towards which the expenditure is directed. The former is grouped according to 
of the type of outlay (Table A1 in Appendix): a) Capital Expenditure covers payments for the 
purchase or production of new or existing durable goods (i.e., goods of over one year life 
cycle), and b) Current or Recurrent Expenditure, which in turn includes wages and salaries, 
other goods and services, interest payments, and subsidies.  
We estimate the effect of each economic component on the growth rate and then grouped the 
sub-categories of capital and current expenditures as follows: 
- Capital expenditures (cap_exp): capital account transfers (cap_transf), and financial 
and non-financial assets (fin_assets and n_fin_assets).  
The cap_transf variable  includes capital transfers to households, private-sector companies and 
other social institutions; fin_assets and n_fin_assets comprise financial assets, which includes 
expenditures on real estate assets and works, movables, machinery, and other unclassified 
                                                                                                                                                                          
279/97 charged the State Accountant General Office with introducing analytical accounting by cost 
centres in the public accounting system. 
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capital expenditures, as well as non-financial assets that covers expenditures on equity 
investment contributions and loans. 
- Current expenditures (curr_exp): current account transfers (curr_transf), and other 
current expenditures (other_curr).  
The curr_transf variable includes current transfers to households, private-sector companies 
and other social institutions, while other_curr includes expenditures on personnel, purchases 
of goods and services, items correcting and offsetting revenues, interest expenses and 
unclassified current expenditures. 
The sector classification underlying the consolidated RPAs, broken down into 308 items 
that can be assembled with the Classification of the functions of Government (COFOG)9, has 
been determined bearing two main objective in mind: on the one hand, it seeks to represent in 
a more detailed way the diversity of sectors of public intervention as a whole. On the other 
hand, it aims to take into account those items public budget, which sometimes may differ 
significantly. This is where RPAs data initially started.  
Anyway, for the scope of this analysis, we aggregate the sectoral classification underlying the 
consolidated Territorial Public Accounts, into six types of public investment with economically 
distinct roles (cf. Table A2 in Appendix).  
 
 
3.4  Dataset and Selection of Variables 
For this study, we use an extremely well balanced panel data set covering 19 Italian regions10, 
which accounts for the period 1996-2007. Choosing this period has been determined by the 
availability of the data11.  
The fiscal variables (namely the economic and functional components of government 
expenditure) are the key variables of the model. They have all been derived from the data 
issued by Department for the development and economic cohesion (DPS – Dipartimento per lo 
Sviluppo e la Coesione Economica). They are better explained in the next section. 
                                                          
8
 The 30 sectors under scrutiny and included in the functional classification are: General administration, 
Defence, Public order, Justice, Education, Training, Research and development, Culture and Recreational 
Services, Residential Building and Urban Development, Health, other social affairs (Support and Charity), 
Water, Sewers and Water Treatment, Environment, Waste Disposal, other health and sanitation 
services, Labour, Pensions and Wage Supplementation, Roads, other Transport, Telecommunications, 
Agriculture, Marine Fishing and Aquaculture, Tourism, Wholesale and Retail Distribution, Industry and 
Artisans, Energy, other public works, other economic sectors, unclassified expenditure.   
9
 COFOG is the official classification of expenditures incurred by Public Administrations according to the 
purposes, set by the ONU and adopted by international institutions. 
10
 In the empirical analysis, we exclude Valle d’Aosta because it is an outlier.   
11
 We overlooked the economic crisis period (which started in 2008). 
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The economic and functional component of public expending are also expressed as a share of 
total government expenditure, while the total government spending is expressed as a share of 
GDP at constant prices (year 2005). An important feature of the present analysis is that this 
data set is strongly balanced. In the literature, many empirical works on the relationship 
between growth and components of government expenditure exist. However, most of them 
use an unbalanced data set. The dependent variable is chosen here as the per capita real GDP 
growth rate (natural log difference of GDP per capita in millions of euro, constant prices 2005).  
Another important determinant of growth rate is the ratio of private stock and public capital 
(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘), which is derived from Ghosh and Gregoriou’s (2008) theoretical model, as 
illustrated in Section 2. The data about capital stock have been kindly provided by Montanaro 
et al. (2012b). This variable is also expressed as a ratio of total government spending. 
Our dataset also contains few macroeconomic variables, included as control variables. They 
seek to capture the factors affecting economic growth and have been obtained from the Italian 
National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). One key control variable incorporates the percentage of 
population aged 24 to 35 having completed tertiary education. It is used in our reference 
regressions in order to take into account the growth effects of human capital in the researched 
regions. Thus, the estimated coefficients of the fiscal variables measure the growth impact of 
policies beyond their effect on physical and human capital accumulation. In addition, we also 
make use of the percentage of total population aged 65 and over as control. Another control 
used in our robustness checks includes the employment growth variable (𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕) so as 
to control for business cycles effects on growth12. Most empirical panel data studies on growth 
existing in literature have been carried out for periods of approximately 30 years, with five-
year averaged observations that help isolating business cycles influences on growth (Devarajan 
et al., 1996, Kneller et al., 1999, Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2008). However, this firstly this implies 
loss of information and efficiency of estimates. Secondly, the lack of synchronicity in country 
business cycles does not filter five-year averages from cyclical effects (Bassanini et al., 2001).  
We estimate the following equations, including the economic classification of public 
expenditures: 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑕𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑝𝑜𝑝_65𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   (22) 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Benos (2009) also used this variable to determine the relationship between fiscal policy and economic 
growth. 
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𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑕𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑝𝑜𝑝_65𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   (23) 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑓𝑖𝑛_𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑛_𝑓𝑖𝑛_𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡   
+ 𝛽5𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑕𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑝𝑜𝑝_65𝑖𝑡  + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   (24) 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟_𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽4𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑕𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑝𝑜𝑝_65𝑖𝑡  + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   (25) 
 
where 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote the cross-sectional and time series dimensions respectively; 𝑎𝑖  captures 
the time-invariant unobserved country-specific fixed effects, and 𝑏𝑡  captures the unobservable 
individual-invariant time effects. 𝐺𝑖𝑡  is the per capita real GDP growth rate, 𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  is total 
government expenditure, 𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  and 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  are public the capital and current 
expenditure shares, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑖𝑡  is the private stock and 𝑕𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡  and 𝑝𝑜𝑝_65𝑖𝑡  are the 
control variables, as already explained above. 
Regarding functional classification, we estimate the following equations: 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑔𝑒𝑛_𝑝_𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑒𝑐_𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽5𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑠𝑜_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑕𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽10𝑝𝑜𝑝_65𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (26) 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑔𝑒𝑛_𝑝_𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽4𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑒𝑐_𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑠𝑜_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 
𝛽8𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑕𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑝𝑜𝑝_65𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (27) 
 
where 𝑔𝑒𝑛_𝑝_𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣, 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛, 𝑒𝑐_𝑎𝑓𝑓, 𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑕, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐 and 𝑠𝑜𝑐_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡 are the capital and current 
shares of general public spending, defence, economic affairs, health, education and social 
protection expenditures. The remaining variables are as defined in the previous set. 
 
 
3.5  Descriptive Analysis of Data 
Before proceeding with a formal regression analysis on government expenditure composition 
and growth, it seems important to describe the dataset from various angles. Firstly, by pooling 
together all regions, we can examine the basic descriptive statistics, for the variables used in 
the estimations, as displayed in Table A4 in Appendix 1 and together with a spatial maps 
representation. 
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These maps show the real GDP pc growth rates and total government expenditure across 
Italian regions (average values, period 1996-2007). Figure 1, picture 1 shows that having a 
neighbouring country with particularly high level of GDP produces a positive spillover for the 
rich regions. During the period under consideration, the regions which grew at higher rates 
were located in the South of Italy (e.g. Molise, Campania, Basilicata, Calabria). Liguria 
demonstrates to be an exceptionto this as it scores high rates (on average) but is located in the 
North of Italy.  As for the remainder of the regions analysed, the results seems to be coherent 
with the convergence hypothesis.  
The regions with the lowest levels of GDP pc rate were Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardy, 
Trentino Alto-Adige and Umbria (between 0.21 percent and 0.94 percent).  
Total public spending as percentage of GDP registered a significant change across the Italian 
regions, but it is characterized by small variations in the period under consideration. The 
average size in Italian regions is about 53.24 percent of GDP, ranging between 34.50 percent in 
Veneto in 2007, and 75.26 percent in Calabria in 1996. Figure 1, picture 2 shows that, during 
the same period, Valle d’Aosta, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia had the higher level of 
total expenditure as percentage of GDP (between 59.5 and 68 percent). The lowest levels of 
total expenditure were in Piemonte, Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia Romagna and Marche 
(between 36 and 46.5 percent). 
 
Figure 1. Regional distribution of main variables  
0  
 
 1.  2. 
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Notes: Average values 1996-2007. Expenditure on Economic and Functional Classifications are % shares 
on total expenditure. 
 
The map reported in Figure 1, picture 3 shows the distribution of total revenues deriving from 
tax and no tax sources. Overall, revenues from taxation are higher than those from other 
sources of revenue in all regions (more than three-quarters of the total). The same steady-  
pattern of total spending is displayed by the two economic components, namely current and 
capital expenditure. Some variability can be found among regions, but during twelve years it 
has remained substantially unchanged. On average, the first component represents the 84 
percent of total spending, and it ranges between 72 percent in Basilicata in 1996 and about 91 
percent in Lombardy in 2007. The capital component is about the 16 percent of total spending. 
It ranges between 8 percent in Lombardy in 1997 and 28 percent in Basilicata in 1996. Figure 1, 
picture 4 shows the Economic Classification of total expenditure. Capital and current 
expenditures are expressed as percentages of total, and the diagram sizes are proportional to 
the total level of spending as percentage of GDP. All regions devote at least three-quarters of 
their public resources to current expenditure (e.g. compensation to employees, current 
transfers, interests on debt, etc.). Yet, the highest levels of capital expenditure are in Valle 
d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, Molise, Basilicata, Calabria and Sardinia. Among the  
subcategories considered here, the greater shares of expenses are allocated to current 
transfers (about 38 percent of total spending) and other unclassified current expenditures, (47 
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percent of total spending). The last item examined here includes interest on debt (about 8 
percent of total spending on average), compensation and other expenditures related to 
personnel working in service at public administrations along with purchases of goods and 
services. Regarding capital subcomponents, expenditures on real estate assets, movables and 
machinery (hence non-financial assets) absorb about 6 percent of total spending. Basilicata, 
Calabria, Molise, Trentino Alto Adige and Sardinia are the regions with the highest values. 
These regions  also score the greatest levels of capital transfers (over 4 percent). Financial 
assets cover about 6 percent of total spending. The map reproduced in picture 5 highlights the 
capital expenditure sub-components as percentage of total spending. The map shows that the 
regions with biggest diagram size are those with highest level of capital expenditure.  
As regards its composition, Valle d’Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige demonstrate to devote about 
fifty percent of capital resources on non-financial assets. The regions in the South part of Italy 
devote a good amount of capital spending to transfers to households, private-sector 
companies and other social institutions (especially Basilicata and Molise).  
Furthermore, it seems interesting to note that Lazio is the only region with more than fifty 
percent of capital expenditure on financial assets (i.e. expenditures on equity investment 
contributions and loans). This seems to be related to the high number of interweaved 
subsidiaries in this region. 
The maps reported in pictures 7 and 8 show the functional classification of government 
expenditure based on six items. They include capital and current shares, respectively. Among 
the capital components, expenditure on economic affairs absorbs the greater amount, which is 
about 8.5 percent of total spending. The smallest component is devoted to health spending 
(about 0.5 percent of total spending). Looking at picture 8, it becomes clear that, among the 
current components analysed, social protection takes the largest share, while almost all Italian 
regions devoted a smaller amount of resources to defence. 
 
 
4. Methodology 
In this section, we discuss the estimation strategy applied in our analysis. It contains two 
subsections: in Subsection 1, we report on the traditional estimation methodologies to capture 
the effects of public spending components and economic growth. To this end, we take into 
account the endogeneity issue. In Subsection 2, we analyses the spatial dependence issue in 
relation to the regions investigated here.  
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4.1 Traditional FE, IV-FD, Difference-GMM and System-GMM-Estimators 
In order to estimate consistently the equation reported in (22) to (27), we must apply a panel 
technique. In the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, the pooled OLS model will be biased 
and inconsistent. When government revenue and expenditure shares are exogenously given, 
the effects of fiscal policy can be adequately captured by the OLS fixed effects model13. 
However, from an optimal fiscal policy perspective, the within estimates of the relationship 
will be biased. For this reason, a Generalized Method of Moments (IV-GMM) approach is 
needed to account for the endogeneity aspects.  
The endogeneity problem derives directly from the theoretical model, which considers all fiscal 
variables as endogenous. Although Instrumental Variables (henceforth, IV) methods were first 
developed to cope with the problem of endogeneity in a simultaneous system, the correlation 
of regressor and error may also arise for other reasons. Generally speaking, the presence of 
measurement error in a regressor will cause the same correlation between regressor and 
error. Even if we assume that the magnitude of the measurement error is independent of the 
true value of the covariate (which has often demonstrated to be an inappropriate assumption), 
measurement error will cause biased and inconsistent parameter estimates of all parameters, 
not only for the mis-measured regressor. Another commonly encountered problem involves 
unobservable factors. Mathematically speaking, this is the same problem caused by 
endogeneity or measurement error.  
Heteroskedasticity is a recurrent problem in empirical investigations. The conventional IV 
estimator (though consistent) is inefficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Nowadays, 
when facing unknown heteroshedasticity, scholars tend to use the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM), as introduced by Hansen (1982). The advantages of GMM over the IV 
approach are obvious. If heteroskedasticity is present, then the GMM estimator is more 
efficient than the simple IV estimator. Conversely, if heteroskedasticity is not present, the 
GMM estimator is asymptotically no worse than the IV estimator (Baum et al., 2003).  
We can consider the model: 
𝑦 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢,           𝑢~(0,𝛺)  (30) 
                                                          
13
 We also estimated the model by applying the random effects (RE) model. However, the Hausman 
specification test suggests that the fixed effects (FE) model is more appropriate for our case. The FE 
model is generally more appropriate than a RE approach for two reasons. Firstly, if the individual effects 
represent omitted variables, it is likely that these country-specific characteristics are correlated with the 
other regressors. Secondly, it is also likely that a typical macro panel will contain most countries of 
interest and, thus, is not likely to be a random sample from a much larger universe of countries. Judson 
and Owen (1999) show that with balanced panel data set, LSDV with Kiviet’s (1995) correction can 
perform well. Yet, it requires a large time dimension of the panel (e.g. T=30) and all exogenous 
explanatory variables. With a smaller time dimension, LSDV does not dominate the alternatives for the 
GMM approach.  
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with 𝑋(𝑁 × 𝐾) and define a matrix 𝑍(𝑁 × 𝐿) where 𝐿 ≥ 𝐾. This is the Generalized Method of 
Moments IV (IV-GMM) estimator. It is assumed here that the instruments 𝑍 are exogenous 
and can be expressed as 𝐸 𝑍𝑖𝑢𝑖 = 0. The 𝐿 instruments give rise to a set of 𝐿 moments: 
 
𝑔𝑖(𝛽 ) =  𝑍𝑖
′𝑢 𝑖 = 𝑍𝑖
′ 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖𝛽  ,          𝑖 = 1,… . . ,𝑁(31)  
 
where each 𝑔𝑖  is an 𝐿-vector. The method of moments approach considers each of the 𝐿 
moment equations as a sample moment, which we may estimate by averaging over 𝑁: 
 
𝑔 (𝛽) =
1
𝑁
  𝑍𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  𝑦𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖𝛽  =
1
𝑁
𝑍′𝑢   (32) 
 
The intuition behind the GMM approach is to choose an estimator for 𝛽 that solves 
𝑔 𝛽 𝐺𝑀𝑀 = 0. 
If 𝐿 = 𝐾, the equation to be estimated is said to be exactly identified by the order condition for 
identification. Put more simply, there as many excluded instruments as included right-hand 
endogenous variables. The problem of the method of moments is then 𝐾 equations in 𝐾 
unknowns. A unique solution exists and it is equivalent to the standard IV estimator: 
 
𝛽 𝐼𝑉 =  𝑍
′𝑋 −1𝑍′𝑦  (33) 
 
In the case of overidentification, we may define a set of 𝐾 instruments: 
 
𝑋 = 𝑍′ 𝑍′𝑍 −1𝑍′𝑋 = 𝑃𝑍𝑋  (34) 
 
where 𝑃𝑍  is the projection matrix 𝑍 𝑍
′𝑍 −1𝑍′ , which gives rise to the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimator 
 
𝛽 2𝑆𝐿𝑆 =  𝑋 
′𝑋 
−1
𝑋 ′𝑦 =  𝑋′𝑃𝑍𝑋 
−1𝑋′𝑃𝑍𝑦  (35) 
 
which, despite its name, is computed by this single matrix equation. In the 2SLS method with 
over-identification, the 𝐿 available instruments “boil down” to the 𝐾 needed to define the 
𝑃𝑍matrix. In the IV-GMM approach, that reduction is not necessary. All 𝐿 instruments are used 
in the estimator. Furthermore, a weighting matrix is employed so that we may choose 𝛽 𝐺𝑀𝑀 . 
Consequently, the elements of 𝑔 𝛽 𝐺𝑀𝑀  are as close to zero as possible.  
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If the equation is overidentified (and 𝐿 > 𝐾), we have more equations than we have 
unknowns. In general, it will not be possible to find a 𝛽  that exactly sets all 𝐿 sample moment 
conditions to zero. In this case, we take an 𝐿 × 𝐿 weighting matrix  𝑊 and use it to construct a 
quadratic form in the moment conditions. In this case a criterion function that weights them 
appropriately is used to improve the efficiency of the estimator. The GMM estimator 
minimizes the criterion: 
 
𝐽 𝛽 𝐺𝑀𝑀 = 𝑁𝑔 𝛽 𝐺𝑀𝑀 
′
𝑊𝑔 𝛽 𝐺𝑀𝑀   (36) 
 
where 𝑊 is a 𝐿 × 𝐿 symmetric weighting matrix. Solving the set of FOCs, we derive the IV-
GMM estimator of an overidentified equation: 
 
𝛽 𝐺𝑀𝑀 =  𝑋
′𝑍𝑊𝑍′𝑋 −1𝑋′𝑍𝑊𝑍′𝑦  (37) 
 
which will be identical for all  𝑊 matrices that differ by a factor of proportionality. The optimal 
weight matrix, as Hansen (1982) shows, chooses 𝑊 = 𝑆−1 where 𝑆 (an 𝐿 × 𝐿 matrix) is the 
covariance matrix of the moment conditions to produce the most efficient estimator: 
 
𝑆 = 𝐸 𝑍′𝑢𝑢′𝑍 = 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑁→∞𝑁
−1 𝑍′𝛺𝑍   (38) 
 
with a consistent estimator of 𝑆 derived from 2SLS residuals, we define the efficient IV-GMM 
estimator as: 
 
𝛽 𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑀 =  𝑋
′𝑍𝑆−1𝑍′𝑋 −1𝑋′𝑍𝑆−1𝑍′𝑦  (39) 
 
where 𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑀 refers to the efficient GMM estimator with asymptotic variance 
 
𝑉 𝛽 𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑀  =
1
𝑁
 𝑄𝑋𝑍
′ 𝑆−1𝑄𝑋𝑍 
−1  (40) 
 
The derivation makes no mention of the form of Ω, which is the variance-covariance matrix 
(vce) of the error process 𝑢. However, the efficient GMM estimator is not yet a feasible 
estimator, because the matrix S is not known. To be able to implement the estimator, we need 
to estimate S. To do this, we need to make some assumptions about 𝛺.  
The IV-GMM estimator is merely the standard IV (or 2SLS) estimator. In the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, the IV estimator is inefficient but consistent, whereas the standard 
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estimated IV covariance matrix is inconsistent. Yet, asymptotically correct inference is still 
possible. In these circumstances the IV estimator is a GMM estimator with a suboptimal 
weighting matrix. Hence, the general formula for the asymptotic variance of a general GMM 
estimator still holds. 
If there is heteroskedasticity of unknown form, we usually compute robust standard errors to 
derive the consistent estimate of the vce: 
 
𝑆 =
1
𝑁
 𝑢 𝑖
2𝑍𝑖
′𝑍𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  (41)  
 
where 𝑢  is the vector of residuals from any consistent estimator of 𝛽 (e.g., the 2SLS residuals).  
For an overidentified equation, the IV-GMM estimates computed from this estimate of 𝑆 will 
be more efficient than the 2SLS (Two Stage Least Square) estimates.  
If we estimate that an overidentifying model allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity by using 
the GMM two-step estimator, we will obtain different point estimates because we attempt to 
solve a different optimization problem. The problem is in the L-space of the instruments (and 
moment conditions) rather than in the 𝐾-space of the regressors, and 𝐿 > 𝐾. We will also 
obtain different standard errors as the IV-GMM estimator is more efficient. This does not 
imply, however, that summary measures of fit will improve. 
In the panel context, it may be reasonable to assume that observations on the same cluster in 
two different time periods are correlated, but observations on two different individuals are 
not. 
If errors are considered to exhibit arbitrary intra-clusters in a dataset with M clusters, we may 
derive a cluster-robust IV-GMM estimator using 
 
𝑆 =  𝑢 𝑗
′𝑀
𝑗=1 𝑢 𝑗         𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑒         𝑢 𝑗 =  𝑦𝑗 − 𝑥𝑗𝛽  𝑋
′𝑍 𝑍′𝑍 −1𝑧𝑗    (42) 
 
The IV-GMM estimates employing this estimate of 𝑆 will be both robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity and intra-cluster correlation. 
The main problem regarding instrumental variables estimator is that we need to find variables 
(instruments) that, at the same time, are directly correlated with the explanatory variables and 
indirectly correlated with the dependent variable. "Good instruments" should be both relevant 
and valid. They should be correlated to the included endogenous regressors and at the same 
time orthogonal to the errors (i.e. namely, the excluded instruments must be distributed 
independently from the error process). To test the first assumption, we should consider the 
goodness-of-fit of the “first stage” regressions and relate each endogenous regressor to the 
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entire set of instruments. Test of overidentifing restrictions address the second assumption. If 
and only if the equation is overidentified, a test should always be performed, which is known 
as Hansen-J test. It allows us to evaluate the validity of the instruments.  
The ability of first differencing to remove unobserved heterogeneity also underlies the family 
of estimators that have been developed for Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) models. These models 
contain one or more lagged dependent variables, thus allowing for the modelling of a partial 
adjustment mechanism. 
A serious difficulty arises with the one-way fixed effects model in the context of a dynamic 
panel data model, and particularly in the "small T and large N" context. As Nickell (1981) 
shows, the inconsistency of the within estimator is due to the correlation between the 
individual effect and the lagged dependent variable. By subtracting the mean of every variable, 
the error term becomes correlated to the lagged dependent variable. This means that the 
orthogonality condition between the regressor and the error term is violated. The resulting 
correlation creates a bias in the estimate of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
which is not mitigated by increasing N, meaning the number of individual units. Furthermore, 
the inclusion of additional regressors does not remove this bias. Indeed, if to some extent, the 
regressors are correlated with the lagged dependent variable, their coefficient may be 
seriously biased as well. It is important to point out that this bias is not caused by an 
autocorrelated error process. The same bias arises even if the error process is i.i.d., and in that 
case, if the error process is autocorrelated, the problem is even more severe, given the 
difficulty of deriving a consistent estimate of the auto regressive parameters in that context. 
The same problem affects the random effects model. Interestingly, according to Nickell (1981) 
and Hsiao (1986), the correlation between the error term and the regressor in the simple OLS 
case produces an upward bias of the estimate; the opposite is true for the within group 
estimator. Therefore, as Bond et al. (2001) note, determining that the estimated parameters 
are between those extremes appears to be a reasonable test for the validity of results. 
To overcome the violation of the orthogonality condition, an instrumental estimation in first 
difference was proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and applied to the growth context by 
Caselli et al. (1996). The general strategy is to instrument the differenced variable with its 
lagged levels. However, as shown by Bond et al. (2001), even this estimator in first differences 
is problematic within the context of growth models. Using the lagged levels as instruments for 
the first differences might cause a weak instruments problem. In particular, within the context 
of growth regressions, the time series are typically persistent and the number of time periods 
is small, which leads to a low correlation between the instruments and the instrumented 
variables. Instead, Bond et al. (2001) suggest applying a System-GMM approach. 
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The Arellano-Bond (1991) and Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) dynamic panel 
estimators are designed for situations with: 
1. “small T, large N” panels, meaning few time periods and many individual units; 
2. a linear functional relationship; 
3. a single left-hand-side variable that is dynamic, depending on its past 
realizations; 
4. independent variables that are not strictly exogenous, meaning correlated 
with past and possibly current realizations of the error; 
5. fixed individual effects, implying unobserved heterogeneity; 
6. heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals, but not across them. 
Arellano-Bond estimation starts by transforming all regressors, usually by differencing, and 
uses the Generalized Method of Moments (Hansen, 1982), and so is called “difference GMM”. 
The difference GMM method (Holtz-Eakin-Newey-Rosen, 1988 and Arellano-Bond, 1991) 
treats the model as a system of equations, one for each time period. The equations differ only 
in their instruments/moment condition sets. The predetermined and endogenous variables in 
first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels. Strictly exogenous 
regressors, as well as any other instruments, enter the instrument matrix in a conventional 
instrumental variables fashion: in first differences, with one column per instrument.  
In standard 2SLS, including Anderson-Hsiao approach, the twice-lagged level appears in the 
instrument matrix as  
 
𝑍𝑖 =  
.
𝑦𝑖 ,1
⋮
𝑦𝑖 ,𝑇−2
   (43) 
 
where the first row corresponds to 𝑡 = 2, given that the first observation is lost in applying the 
first difference transformation. The missing value in the instrument for 𝑡 = 2 causes that the 
observation for each panel unit be removed from the estimation. 
If we also included the thrice-lagged level 𝑦𝑡−3 as a second instrument in the Anderson-Hsiao 
approach, we would lose another observation per panel, so that: 
 
𝑍𝑖 =
 
 
 
.
𝑦𝑖 ,1
𝑦𝑖 ,2
⋮
𝑦𝑖 ,𝑇−2
     
.
.
𝑦𝑖 ,1
⋮
𝑦𝑖 ,𝑇−3
   
 
 
 
  (44) 
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So that the first observation available for the regression is that dated 𝑡 = 4. 
To avoid this loss of degrees of freedom, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) construct a set of 
instruments from the second lag of 𝑦, one instrument pertaining to each time period: 
 
𝑍𝑖 =
 
 
 
0
𝑦𝑖 ,1
0
⋮
0
     
0
0
𝑦𝑖 ,2
⋮
0
   
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋯
     
0
0
0
⋮
𝑦𝑖 ,𝑇−2 
 
 
  (45) 
 
The inclusion of zeros in place of missing values prevents the loss of additional degrees of 
freedom, in that all observations dated 𝑡 = 2 and later can now be included in the regression. 
Although the inclusion of zeros might seem arbitrary, the columns of the resulting instrument 
matrix will be orthogonal to the transformed errors. The resulting moment conditions 
correspond to an expectation that should hold:  
 
𝐸 𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡−2𝜀𝑖𝑡
∗  = 0  (46) 
 
where 𝜀∗ refers to the first difference transformed errors. 
It would also be valid to “collapse” the columns of this 𝑍 matrix into a single column, which 
embodies the same expectation, but conveys less information as it will only produce a single 
moment condition. In this context, the collapsed instrument set will be the same implied by 
standard IV, with a zero replacing the missing value in the first usable observation: 
 
𝑍𝑖 =  
0
𝑦𝑖 ,1
⋮
𝑦𝑖 ,𝑇−2
   (47) 
 
Give this solution to the trade-off between lag length and sample length, we can adopt Holtz-
Eakin et al.’s suggestion and include all available lags of the untransformed variables as 
instruments. For endogenous variables, lags 2 and higher are available. For predetermined 
variables that are not strictly exogenous, lag 1 is also valid, as its value is only correlated with 
errors dated 𝑡 − 2 or earlier. 
Using all available instruments gives rise to an instrument matrix such as  
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𝑍𝑖 =
 
 
 
0
𝑦𝑖 ,1
0
0
⋮
0
0
𝑦𝑖 ,2  
0
⋮
0
0
𝑦𝑖 ,1
0
⋮
0
0
0
𝑦𝑖 ,3
⋮
0
0
0
 𝑦𝑖 ,2
⋮
0
0
0
 𝑦𝑖 ,1
⋮
0⋯
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋱  
 
 
  (48) 
 
In this setup, we have different numbers of instruments available for each time period: one for 
𝑡 = 2, two for 𝑡 = 3, and so on. As we move to the later time periods in each panel’s time 
series, additional orthogonality conditions become available, and taking these additional 
conditions into account improves the efficiency of the Arellano-Bond estimator. One 
disadvantage of this strategy should be apparent. The number of instruments produced will be 
quadratic in 𝑇, the length of the time series available. If  𝑇 < 10, that may be a manageable 
number, but for a longer time series, it may be necessary to restrict the number of past lags 
used. As consequence, a proliferation of the number of instruments can results in a over-
identification problem when time dimension is moderately large and relative to the number of 
regions14. 
However, while the GMM approach yields consistent estimators, the difference GMM method 
developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano-Bond (1991) may suffer from finite sample 
biases. These biases arise if the time series are persistent, thus in turn letting instruments 
become weak. As Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) point out, these biases are likely to be 
large in the context of empirical growth models since output tends to be a largely persistent 
variable. In this case, the authors recommend to use the alternative system-GMM estimators 
developed by Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond(1998). 
The Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998) estimator augments Arellano-Bond (2001) by 
making an additional assumption, that first differences of instrumenting variables are 
uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This allows the introduction of more instruments, and can 
dramatically reduce the imprecision associated to the single equation estimator and improve 
efficiency.    
The System-GMM contains a level and a difference equation, so that the original equations in 
levels are added to the system. In the level equation, the lagged dependent variable is 
instrumented by the first difference, and the vice versa, in the difference equation, the first 
differences are instrumented by the lagged levels (Blundell and Bond, 1998). In these 
equations, predetermined and endogenous variables in levels are instrumented with the 
suitable lags of their own first differences. Instead of transforming the regressors to expunge 
the fixed effects, System-GMM differences the instruments to make them exogenous to the 
fixed effects. The main assumption is that the unobserved group effects are not correlated 
                                                          
14
 The rule of thumb is to keep the number of instruments less than or equal to the number of regions. 
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with changes in the instrumented variables; in other terms, the covariance between the two is 
consistent over time. Blundell and Bond (1998) show with simulations that the System-GMM 
has much greater precision in estimating autoregressive parameters using persistent time 
series. Therefore, the weak instruments problem can be minimized. 
Bond et al. (2001) show that the System GMM estimator performs better than a range of other 
methods of moment estimators. Unfortunately, from a practical point of view, within the 
context of a dynamic panel data setting, a straightforward test of weak instruments is not 
available. For consistency, in the System-GMM approach, the relevant moment conditions 
must hold. Firstly, to ensure the validity of the lagged levels as instruments for the first 
differences, the error terms in the original level equation must be serially uncorrelated. 
Secondly, to allow the lagged differences to serve as instruments in the level equation, the 
initial condition (the deviations of the initial output from the steady-state) must not 
systematically correlate with the individual effects (Durlauf et al., 2005).  
Moreover, the System-GMM is also appropriate in our regional growth context because it 
allows other endogenous regressors to be included in the model (such as tax and no tax 
revenues, government expenditure components and private capital stock). The endogenous 
variables are instrumented using own lagged levels and differences. Hence, we can address not 
only the endogeneity related to the dependent variable but also those related to other crucial 
variables in the model.  
The consistency of GMM estimators depends on whether the lagged values of the explanatory 
variables are a valid set of instruments and whether the error term is not serially correlated. 
We undertake the Sargan's instruments validity test (applicable to single equation GMM) and 
the Difference-Sargan test (applicable to System-GMM) to establish the validity of the 
instruments set.  
Another important diagnostic is the AR test autocorrelation of the residuals. By construction, 
the residuals of the differenced equation should possess serial correlation, but if the 
assumption of serial independence in the original errors is warranted, the differenced residuals 
should not exhibit significant AR(2) behaviour. If a significant AR(2) statistic is encountered, the 
second lags of endogenous variables will not be appropriate instruments for their current 
values. 
 
 
4.2  Spatial Dependence Models 
Conventional regression models commonly used to analyze cross-section and panel data 
assume that units are independent of one another. This interdependence complicates the 
estimation of such models (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). Within the last ten years, it has 
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becomes standard to account for spatial dependence in empirical regional growth models 
(LeSage and Fischer, 2008). According to Anselin (1988), spatial dependence is defined as the 
“existence of a functional relationship between what happens at one point in space and what 
happens elsewhere”.  
Spatial regression methods allow us to account for dependence between observations, which 
often arises when observations are collected from points or regions located in space. The 
observations could represent income, employment or population levels, tax rates, and so on, 
for European Union regions delineated into NUTS regions, countries, postal or census regions. 
It is commonly observed that sample data collected for regions or points in space are not 
independent, but rather spatially dependent, which means that observations from one 
location tend to exhibit values similar to those from nearby locations.  
There are different theoretical reasons for the observed dependence between nearby 
observations. Ertur and Koch (2007) use the notion of “spatial diffusion with friction” to 
provide a motivation for a spatial lag, which takes the form of an average of neighbouring 
regions. Another reason is that observed variation in the dependent variable may arise from 
unobserved or latent influence. Latent unobservable influences related to culture, 
infrastructure, recreational amenities and a host of other factors for which we have no 
available sample data that can be accounted for by relying on neighbouring values taken by 
the dependent variable. This happens when the latent influences change across regions. 
Furthermore, during last decades countries have experienced an economic and financial 
integration, which implies strong interdependencies between cross-sectional units.  
There exist three ways through which taking into account for possible interaction effects 
among different units. The first model includes a spatially lagged dependent variable term, 
where its coefficient is called spatial autoregressive coefficient. This model is known as “spatial 
lag model” or “Spatial Autoregressive model” (SAR). According to Anselin et al. (2008), “the 
spatial lag model is typically considered as the formal specification for the equilibrium 
outcome of a spatial or social interaction process, in which the value of the dependent variable 
for one agent is jointly determined with that of the neighbouring agents”. The second model, 
the spatial interaction effect is accounted not only for the spatially lagged dependent variable 
term, as the first model, but also by the inclusion of spatially lagged exogenous variables. Such 
last terms control for possible correlation among the dependent variable of a spatial unit with 
the level of explanatory variables in neighbouring units. For example, the dependent variable 
of a region might depend on its own specific covariates and by the neighbouring regions. 
When both interaction effects (the spatial autoregressive coefficient and the spatially lagged 
exogenous variables) are included in the model, the spatial econometric literature labels it as 
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“Spatial Durbin model” (SDM). The third model incorporates the spatial interaction effect by 
assuming that the error term is spatially autocorrelated. This model is used to handle spatial 
dependence due to omitted variables or errors in measurements through the error form.       
According to LeSage and Pace (2009), “the cost of ignoring spatial dependence in the 
dependent variable and/or in the independent variables is relatively high since the 
econometrics literature has pointed out that if one or more relevant explanatory variable are 
omitted from a regression equation, the estimator of the coefficients for the remaining 
variables is biased and inconsistent. In contrast, ignoring spatial dependence in the 
disturbance, if present, will only cause a loss of efficiency; furthermore, the spatial Durbin 
model produces unbiased coefficient estimates, if the true data generation process is a spatial 
lag or a spatial error model. The SDM model does not ignore spatial dependence in the 
disturbance, but implies a different type of specification for error dependence from that in the 
true SAC”. 
We decided to consider a spatial lag model that incorporates spatial dependence explicitly by 
adding a “spatial lagged” dependent variable on the right-hand side of the regression 
equation. This model goes by different names, Anselin (1988) calls this the Spatial 
Autoregressive model, and its main feature is the presence of a spatially lagged dependent 
variable among the covariates. The possible existence of residual spatial autocorrelation in the 
error term is checked by means of a series of tests. The spatially lagged 𝑦 model is appropriate 
when we believe that the values of 𝑦 in one unit 𝑖 are directly influenced by the values of 𝑦 
found in 𝑖’s “neighbors”. This influence is above and beyond other covariates specific to 𝑖. Our 
broader interest here is in what influences economic growth and the spatial dependence 
among our units, not just estimating the association between of a region’s public spending 
components on its per capita GDP growth rate. If a region’s level of economic growth appears 
to be associated with its neighbour’s economic growth, this tell us something important about 
the distribution of per capita GDP growth rate itself and provides an opportunity for learning 
something about possible influences from spatial dependence on prospects and constraints on 
economic growth.   
According to Anselin and Rey (1991) two basic types of spatial effects must be distinguished: a 
nuisance and a substantive. The first type typically stems from the arbitrariness of the 
administrative boundaries of spatial units. The problem of measurement errors arises in this 
context. In contrast, the second type refers to substantial spatial interactions between 
(neighbouring) locations. Here, economic factors or the economic outcome of one region exert 
an influence on the outcome in other locations. 
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Here, a more plausible and interesting approach is to consider the spatial association as a 
substantive feature of economic growth rather than as a statistical nuisance. The spatial 
association observed here (see Figure 1 in Section 3.3) suggests that we have dependence 
among observations such that the expected value of per capita GDP growth rate for a region 𝑖 
differs notably depending on the per capita GDP growth rate in neighbouring regions 𝑗. Instead 
of letting expected per capita GDP growth rate for a region 𝑖 depend on just the expenditure 
components, we devise a model where the dependent variable is a function of both its own 
public spending components and the per capita GDP growth rate among neighbours, defined 
by 𝑤𝑖𝑦𝑖  where the entries of the connectivity vector 𝑤𝑖  (i.e., row 𝑖 from matrix W) acquire 
nonzero values for all regions 𝑗 that are defined as connected to 𝑖15.   
The general spatially lagged dependent variable model form is the following: 
 
𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽𝑠𝑋𝑖 ,𝑚 ,𝑡
𝑠
𝑚=1 +  𝛽𝑝𝑋𝑖,𝑛 ,𝑡
𝑝
𝑛=1 + 𝜌𝑊𝑦𝑖 ,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (49) 
 
where 𝛼𝑖  are the regional fixed effects to account for common shocks affecting the pooled 
regions; 𝑊𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the spatially lagged dependent variable with 𝑤 the normalized weight matrix; 
 𝜃𝑡  are the time effects. Furthermore, 𝑋𝑚𝑡  is a vector of 𝑚 public spending components and 
𝑋𝑛𝑡  is a vector of 𝑛 control variables.  
A positive value for the parameter associated with the spatial lag  𝜌  indicates that regions are 
expected to have higher per capita GDP growth rates if, on average, their neighbours have high 
per capita GDP growth rates. 
In estimating this model we need to deal with an important issue: the endogeneity of the 
regessors, which comes from two sources. First of all, an “intrinsic” endogeneity of the 
spatially lagged term included into the model, which induces a two-way causality in the 
neighbour relation in space. Secondly, the endogeneity related to the explanatory variables, 
arising directly from the relationship we are analysing. If we need to take into account just the 
first kind of endogeneity, that arising from the inclusion of the spatial term, we can use the 
maximum likelihood method, two-stage least square (2SLS) or spatial Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM - Kapoor et al., 2007; Elhorst et al., 2010), based on the inclusion of 
instrumental variables, to get consistent estimators. In the growing empirical literature on 
spatial models great care has been devoted to tackling this problem, while the potential 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables has often been overlooked, particularly in the panel 
data context. 
                                                          
15
 The W connectivity or spatial matrix is row standardized so that each row in W sums to 1.  
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The impact of cross-sectional dependence in dynamic panel estimators is even more severe. In 
particular, Phillips and Sul (2003) show that if there is sufficient cross-sectional dependence in 
the data and it this ignored, the decrease in estimation efficiency can become large. Sarafidis 
and Robertson (2006) show that if there is cross-sectional dependence in the disturbances 
(specifically with short dynamic panel-data models), all estimation procedures that rely on IV 
and GMM (Generalized Methods of Moments, such as Anderson-Hsiao (1981), Arellano-Bond, 
(1991), and Blundell-Bond (1998) are inconsistent as N (cross-sectional dimension) grows large, 
for fixed T (the panel’s time dimension). This outcome is important given that the desirable N-
asymptotic properties of these estimators rely upon this assumption.  
In comparison with traditional estimation methodologies, the spatial approach is better not 
because of the heuristics it produces alone, but because it specifies a plausible form of the 
feedback or dependency among observations. 
The coefficient estimates have different interpretations. Because the effect of an increase of 
real GDP growth rate in region 𝑖 disperses, in the first step, to the neighbouring regions and, in 
a second step, to the neighbours’ neighbours and, therefore, back to the origin region, the 
initial increase of the dependent variable is only a part of the induced effects in the other 
regions 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 as well as in the own region 𝑖. To account for these additional spatial spillovers 
when interpreting the parameters, we rely on the concepts developed by LeSage and Page 
(2009). Basically, LeSage and Page distinguish between the direct and indirect effect of changes 
in the variables. The direct effect measures the increase in the dependent variable 𝑦 in the 
region 𝑖 induced by an increase in the explanatory variables in region 𝑖. Note that this effect 
also includes feedback loops running via the initial impact of region 𝑖 on its neighbour 𝑗 
followed by the return effect of region 𝑗 on its neighbour 𝑖. The total effect includes the entire 
outcome of an increase of each explanatory variable in region 𝑖 in this region and in region 
𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. To calculate these measures, one must rely on the product of the parameter of interest 
and the spatial multiplier matrix 𝛽𝑖  *  𝐼 −𝑊𝜌 
−1. The main diagonal of the matrix contains 
the direct effect for every region; the sample size standardized trace of the diagonal is a 
suitable measure of the direct effect. The other cells contain the indirect effects resulting from 
a change of 𝛽 in 𝑖 on the outcome in region 𝑗. The sample size standardized row sum of the 
matrix, therefore, can be interpreted as the total effect of a change in  𝛽 in region 𝑖. 
The presence of spatial dependence is formally tested by means of the cross-section 
dependence test proposed by Pesaran (2004) and the Moran’s I test (1948). Although no direct 
test of spatial dependence in the context of a dynamic panel model is available, Pesaran (2004) 
designed a test for general forms of cross-section dependence (Pesaran CD test) in the case 
with many cross-sectional units and few time-series observations. Moscone and Tosetti (2009) 
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state that, among a number of alternative tests, none perform better than Pesaran’s CD test. 
To test for the presence of spatial autocorrelation we employ the following global Moran’s 
Index (𝐼𝑡) (1948) for each cross-section: 
 
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1  Basic Models 
In this section, we discuss the results of the relationship between economic and functional 
components of public spending and economic growth. Our first focus is on capital and current 
expenditures. Tables 1 to 6 display the results of the FE16, IV-FD, Difference-GMM and System-
GMM estimations, but not accounting for spatial effects. In general, the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) performs quite poorly. 
Table 1 shows that there is a positive relationship between capital component of government 
expenditure and economic growth. The result is also statistically significant with fixed effects 
and GMM-sys estimation, at five and ten percent respectively. It is coherent with expectation 
and with the existing literature on developed countries. Aschauer (1989) study examines the 
United States’ situation to find that a unit increase on “core infrastructure” as streets, 
highways, airports, mass transit, and other public capital, is associated with an increase of 0.4 
percentage points in the output level,thus favouring the costs reduction and promoting the 
private investment over a long run period. Devarajan et al. (1996) find the same result for a 
sample of 21 developed countries. In this analysis, we investigate 19 Italian regions, as they 
belong to a developed country. Hence, the expected results should be similar to Devarajan et 
al.’s (1996). It is worth noting that, our estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as 
elasticities as the variables are not expressed in logarithms. The application of the Fixed Effects 
model demonstrates that there is an increase in the ratio of public capital to total public 
spending and per capita real GDP growth by 0.118 percentage points (cf. Table 1, specification 
1). Using the IV-GMM, GMM-diff and GMM-sys techniques returns the same positive results, 
even though the coefficient size is larger.  
As for to instrumentation, total expenditure, expenditure shares and stock of private capital 
are treated as endogenous when we implement GMM techniques are used. Therefore, the 
relative small number of regions implies a reduction in the maximum number of lags. This also 
                                                          
16
 We estimate the model with fixed and random effects. The application of the Hausman test helps us 
to strongly reject the null of no correlation between explanatory variables and individual effects. 
Another major advantageof using panel data is that it potentially helps to obtain consistent parameter 
estimates in the presence of this given type of unobserved heterogeneity. In this case, a first-
differencing kind of transformation is required to eliminate the individual effects from the transformed 
equations, which in turns helps to obtain valid moment conditions (Bond, 2002).  
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helps to maintain the number of instruments at a minimum17. For the same reason, we also 
collapse the instrument set. According to this procedure, the number of instruments is slightly 
larger than the number of regions analysed by means of the GMM-sys approach. 
Unfortunately, there is no definitive answer to the question posed by Roodman (2009) “on 
how many instruments is too many”. Empirical research has generally accepted to report the 
instrument count after estimates. Yet, Hansen specification test  confirms that the instruments 
are valid for each case. Such a test cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments. 
Furthermore, the Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation does not reject the null 
indicating that the error term is not serially correlated, thus supporting the use of the GMM 
technique. We further conduct two difference Hansen tests to verify on the validity of 
particular subsets of instruments. The first test examines the validity of the exogeneity of the 
extra instruments used in the level part of the system as a whole. The second difference test 
investigates the exogeneity of the lagged output used as an instrument in the level part. 
Roodman (2009a) proposed this type of testing while pointing out that a lagged dependent 
variable is often problematic among the sets of instruments used in the level part. Overall, the 
corresponding p-values validate the use of system as the preferred estimation strategy, rather 
than GMM-difference estimator18.  
All reported p-values are based on the standard errors corrected for the heteroskedatsicity; 
time dummies are included in each regression. Furthermore, both GMM-diff and GMM-sys are 
applied with the option “two step” as more efficient than one step estimator. 
As for the estimation results, the theoretical model used here turns the optimal value of the 
ratio of private capital to public services, which is one of the key endogenous variables of the 
model (Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2008). We expect this optimal value to be positive, given that 
public services augment the productivity of the private capital. However, even if statistically 
significant at ten percent level, this sign is negative. Interestingly, human capital is never 
significant in all regressions. 
The effect of total public spending to GDP is negative using all methodologies and in almost all 
specifications. It is statistically significant only when the Fixed Effects estimation is 
implemented. Ghosh and Gregoriou’s theoretical model includes the share of total 
government spending in GDP19 to control for level effects and to estimate the effects of 
                                                          
17
 The first lag is correlated with the current error term. Hence, a second lag is needed. 
18
 As for the GMM-sys estimates, Bond et al. (2001, p. 18) claim that the two step estimator is more 
efficient than the one step estimator. However, they also observed that and in a finite sample, the 
associated standard errors are heavily biased downwards and unreliable as far as inference is 
concerned. Hence, we opted to run the same regressions using the one step option, thus getting very 
similar results.  
19 In Section 5.3, we analyse the revenue side of the government budget constraint in more detail by 
considering tax, no tax revenues and also the government budget deficit/surplus.
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financing government expenditure on growth. Devarajan et al. (1996) find this share to be 
positive but insignificant. Conversely, Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) find it to be positive and 
statistically significant. In general, the positive sign of this share is expected, since the desirable 
condition is that the productivity of public spending (which is financed by income taxes) 
exceeds the deadweight loss associated with distortionary taxation. Interestingly though, our 
case returns coefficients that are not statistically significant when both the IV and GMM 
methodologies are used. In contrast, the negative effect of total spending could not come as a 
surprise, considering the short-term under scrutiny. 
 
TABLE 1 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE WITHOUT SPATIAL EFFECTS 
Variable Fixed Effects 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-SYS 
(4) 
tot_exp 
 
    -0.253*** 
(0.001) 
-1.316 
(0.437) 
-0.972 
(0.142) 
-0.158 
(0.263) 
cap_exp 
 
 0.118** 
(0.014) 
0.233 
(0.809) 
0.371 
(0.286) 
0.371* 
(0.097) 
private_k 
 
-0.711* 
(0.056) 
-3.122 
(0.700) 
-2.328 
(0.163) 
-0.256 
(0.706) 
human_cap 
 
-0.051* 
(0.080) 
-0.001 
(0.987) 
-0.330 
(0.157) 
-0.063 
(0.473) 
pop_65 
 
-0.806** 
(0.045) 
-0.771 
(0.726) 
-3.892 
(0.184) 
-0.309 
(0.603) 
     
Obs/No. of regions 228/19 171/19 209/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var 
Lags endog. vars used 
as instruments 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
  
 
 
 
1.481 
(0.687) 
18 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
25 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) (p-
value) 
  -2.98 
(0.003) 
-3.23 
(0.001) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
(p-value) 
  -0.53 
(0.599) 
0.28 
(0.778) 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
 0.451 
(0.798) 
0.09 
(0.958) 
2.22 
(0.973) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for levels (p-
value) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for levels (p-
value) 
   2.09 
(0.911) 
0.02 
(0.999) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth rate at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.  
 
 
Table 2 shows the results regarding current public spending; the other variables remain 
generally unchanged (cf. Table 1). The coefficient of public spending is negative and 
statistically significant when analysed according to Fixed Effects and GMM-sys specifications. 
This means that, the Italian regions investigated here follow a trend similar to other developed 
countries. It essentially implies expenditures on personnel, purchases of goods and services 
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along with interests on debt. As for the coefficient size of OLS Fixed Effects and IV-DIFF, it 
appears to be equal to the reported sizeof capital expenditure. This is hardly surprising since 
we are dealing with a balanced panel data set where both economic components (i.e. capital 
and current) count as one20. 
Tables 3 and 4 include capital and current expenditure shares respectively. The aim of this 
further disaggregation of capital and current public spending is to explore the effects of the 
main subcategories on per capita GDP growth rate. By doing so, we seek to investigate how 
sub-components influence the behaviour of capital and current expenditures. Again, the 
results are statistically significant when using the FE estimation. Conversely, results appear to 
be inconclusive when applying the GMM methodology, which allows us to detect endogeneity 
issues. These results reflect those previously found for aggregate capital and current 
expenditures. 
The existing literature on the relationship between public spending composition and economic 
growth focuses on some functional components, but it does not distinguish between capital 
and current items (Devarajan et al., 1996; Ghosh and Greogiou, 2008; Acosta-Ormachea and 
Morozumi, 2013). Unlike previous empirical research, this work is different also from this point 
of view, as we analyzes the decomposition of expenditures in capital and current as we did for 
the economic ones. The driving reason in this case is that sectoral spending also includes 
expenditures on personnel along with other general expenses and investments. Overall, public 
capital and current expenditure may show a positive or negative relationship regarding 
growth, but some functional components may act differently when contributing to growth. 
This also avoids an a priori classification of the functional components of government spending 
as productive and unproductive. Although we have subsumed government sectoral 
expenditure under six categories, we have opted to focus on two of them, namely health and 
education expenditure (see tables 5 and 6). This helps us to reduce the otherwise high number 
of endogenous variables and instruments21.  
Again, the results obtained by means of the GMM approach are not significant. The only 
exception is the capital spending component of expenditure on education, which returns a 
positive and statistically significant sign when the Fixed Effects estimator is used. In general, it 
seems safe to conclude that, during the period under scrutiny, economic and functional 
components of public spending play no role in augmenting the economic growth of the Italian 
regions.  
                                                          
20
 Devarajan et al. (1996) find the same results. Not all empirical works on the relationship between 
government spending and growth return this result because they do not consider all expenditure items.  
21
 As Roodman (2009a) states, large instrument collection can over-fit endogenous variables. We also 
estimate the same equations by means six functional components but the results have not been 
statistically significant. 
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TABLE 2 
CURRENT EXPENDITURE WITHOUT SPATIAL EFFECTS 
Variable Fixed Effects 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-SYS 
(4) 
tot_exp 
 
   -0.253*** 
(0.000) 
-1.316 
(0.437) 
-0.972 
(0.142) 
-0.144 
(0.275) 
curr_exp 
 
 -0.118** 
(0.014) 
-0.233 
(0.809) 
-0.371 
(0.286) 
0.359* 
(0.053) 
private_k 
 
  -0.711* 
(0.056) 
-3.122 
(0.700) 
-2.328 
(0.163) 
-0.311 
(0.635) 
human_cap 
 
-0.051* 
(0.080) 
-0.001 
(0.987) 
-0.330 
(0.157) 
-0.057 
(0.440) 
pop_65 
 
 -0.806** 
(0.045) 
-0.771 
(0.726) 
-3.892 
(0.184) 
-0.343 
(0.513) 
     
Obs/No. of regions 228/19 171/19 209/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var 
Lags endog. vars used as 
instruments 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
  
 
 
 
1.481 
(0.687) 
18 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
25 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) (p-
value) 
  -2.98 
(0.003) 
-3.23 
(0.001) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
(p-value) 
  -0.53 
(0.599) 
0.30 
(0.761) 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
 0.451 
(0.798) 
0.09 
(0.958) 
2.23 
(0.973) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for levels (p-
value) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for levels (p-
value) 
   2.10 
(0.910) 
0.36 
(0.948) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.  
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TABLE 3 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE SUB-COMPONENTS WITHOUT SPATIAL EFFECTS 
Variable Fixed Effects 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-SYS 
(4) 
tot_exp 
 
    -0.261*** 
(0.000) 
-0.771 
(0.290) 
2.043 
(0.915) 
0.167 
(0.609) 
cap_transf 0.113* 0.401 0.397 0.106 
 (0.059) (0.605) (0.291) (0.766) 
n_fin_assets 0.064 0.384 6.141 1.314 
 (0.482) (0.541) (0.867) (0.750) 
fin_assets   0.175** -0.682 3.100 0.911 
 (0.028) (0.775) (0.867) (0.631) 
private_k 
 
-0.726* 
(0.052) 
-5.086 
(0.496) 
28.042 
(0.889) 
-0.807 
(0.726) 
human_cap 
 
-0.054* 
(0.063) 
0.043 
(0.610) 
-1.023 
(0.832) 
0.069 
(0.706) 
pop_65 
 
 -0.824** 
(0.047) 
-1.608 
(0.549) 
25.469 
(0.897) 
0.121 
(0.909) 
     
Obs/No. of regions 228/19 171/19 209/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var 
Lags endog. vars used as 
instruments 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
  
 
 
 
1.797 
(0.876) 
20 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
28 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) (p-
value) 
  -0.22 
(0.826) 
-1.12 
(0.263) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
(p-value) 
  -0.33 
(0.742) 
-0.27 
(0.784) 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
 1.096 
(0.578) 
0.51 
(0.775) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for levels (p-
value) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for levels (p-
value) 
   -0.22 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.   
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TABLE 4 
CURRENT EXPENDITURE SUB-COMPONENTS WITHOUT SPATIAL EFFECTS 
Variable Fixed Effects 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-SYS 
(4) 
tot_exp 
 
    -0.249*** 
(0.000) 
-1.906 
(0.271) 
-0.990 
(0.202) 
-0.117 
(0.381) 
curr_transf -0.093 0.273 -0.143 -0.433 
 (0.318) (0.821) (0.841) (0.238) 
other_curr     -0.121*** 0.212 -0.417 -0.011 
 (0.008) (0.761) (0.329) (0.981) 
private_k 
 
-0.760* 
(0.057) 
-6.078 
(0.495) 
-2.570 
(0.128) 
2.533 
(0.402) 
human_cap 
 
-0.050* 
(0.078) 
-0.013 
(0.884) 
-0.341 
(0.170) 
-0.012 
(0.921) 
pop_65 
 
-0.826* 
(0.053) 
-1.578 
(0.507) 
-3.617 
(0.220) 
1.324 
(0.441) 
     
Obs/No. of regions 228/19 171/19 209/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var.  
Lags endog. vars used 
as instruments 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
  
 
 
 
3.823 
(0.430) 
19 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
26 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) (p-
value) 
  -3.16 
(0.002) 
-2.28 
(0.022) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
(p-value) 
  -0.46 
(0.643) 
0.06 
(0.952) 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
 0.426 
(0.808) 
0.26 
(0.879) 
1.17 
(0.997) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for levels (p-
value) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for levels (p-
value) 
   1.08 
(0.993) 
-1.39 
(1.000) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.  
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TABLE 5 
FUNCTIONAL (CAPITAL) EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS WITHOUT SPATIAL EFFECTS 
Variable Fixed Effects 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-SYS 
(4) 
tot_exp 
 
     -0.222*** 
(0.001) 
-0.239 
(0.595) 
-1.230 
(0.423) 
0.247 
(0.481) 
cap_health 
 
cap_educ 
 
-0.001 
(0.996) 
      0.613*** 
(0.001) 
-0.738 
(0.403) 
2.974 
(0.126) 
-1.195 
(0.462) 
3.533 
(0.438) 
-1.877 
(0.960) 
3.693 
(0.839) 
private_k 
 
 -0.606* 
(0.094) 
-0.818 
(0.643) 
-4.024 
(0.417) 
3.453 
(0.379) 
human_cap 
 
-0.039 
(0.168) 
-0.009 
(0.955) 
0.301 
(0.505) 
0.114 
(0.731) 
pop_65 
 
   -0.924** 
(0.019) 
-1.173 
(0.393) 
-6.333 
(0.368) 
1.201 
(0.600) 
     
Obs/No. of regions 228/19 171/19 209/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var.  
Lags endog. vars used 
as instruments 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
  
 
 
 
9.066 
(0.170) 
18 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
26 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) (p-
value) 
  -2.29 
(0.022) 
-2.39 
(0.017) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
(p-value) 
  -0.26 
(0.792) 
0.05 
(0.959) 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
 5.581 
(0.998) 
0.07 
(0.785) 
0.32 
(1.000) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for levels (p-
value) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for levels (p-
value) 
   0.12 
(1.000) 
0.04 
(0.978) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.  
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TABLE 6 
 FUNCTIONAL (CURRENT) EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS WITHOUT SPATIAL EFFECTS 
Variable Fixed Effects 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-SYS 
(4) 
tot_exp 
 
      -0.197*** 
(0.001) 
-0.682 
(0.102) 
-0.324 
(0.702) 
0.223 
(0.481) 
curr_health 
 
curr_educ 
 
-0.033 
(0.763) 
0.075 
(0.683) 
0.509 
(0.262) 
-0.389 
(0.567) 
-0.618 
(0.569) 
0.648 
(0.621) 
-0.009 
(0.984) 
2.032 
(0.264) 
private_k 
 
-0.530 
(0.119) 
-1.550 
(0.391) 
0.484 
(0.816) 
 4.833* 
(0.062) 
human_cap 
 
-0.039 
(0.112) 
-0.038 
(0.765) 
-0.179 
(0.620) 
-0.287 
(0.291) 
pop_65 
 
    -0.875** 
(0.013) 
-0.839 
(0.554) 
-1.757 
(0.439) 
2.881 
(0.147) 
     
Obs/No. of regions 228/19 171/19 209/19 228/19 
No. of  instruments 
Lags dep. var.  
Lags endog. vars used 
as instruments 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
  
 
 
 
7.656 
(0.264) 
19 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
26 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) (p-
value) 
  -3.48 
(0.001) 
-2.16 
(0.031) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
(p-value) 
  -0.42 
(0.674) 
-0.27 
(0.789) 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
 5.025 
(0.999) 
3.53 
(0.171) 
0.01 
(1.000) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for levels (p-
value) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for levels (p-
value) 
   -1.19 
(1.000) 
-2.20 
(1.000) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.  
 
 
5.2  Implementing Spatial Dependence 
As a first step of the spatial empirical analysis, we have attempted toverify the general the 
assumption that the cross-section members’ are independent. This condition is likely to be 
violated by units such as those in our panel data. We expect the Italian regions to be 
economically, fiscally and politically integrated. This idea is confirmed by the results reported 
in Table A16 in Appendix 3. The application of Pesaran’s (2004) cross-dependence test to our 
data demonstrates that cross-sectional independence is rejected for all variables. This type of 
correlation may be due to common global shocks, which have a heterogeneous impact across 
regions- Alternatively, it can be the result of local spillover effects between them. Although no 
direct test of spatial dependence in the context of a dynamic panel model is available 
(Bouayad-Agha and Védrine, 2010), we employ the global and local Moran’s Indices for the 
dependent variable. A global index of spatial autocorrelation expresses the overall degree of 
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similarity between spatially close regions observed in a given area and in relation to a specific 
dependent variable (Pfeiffer et al., 2008). Table A17 in Appendix 3 reports the results of global 
indices of spatial autocorrelations. The Moran’s I22 index is applied to each cross-section and 
the results show evidence of spatial global autocorrelation from 1997 to 2001 for real per 
capita GDP growth. This index summarizes the phenomenon investigated here according to a 
single value. Consequently, this index is not strictly intended identify specific spatial clusters, 
but to detect the possible presence of a general tendency of clustering within the sample. The 
greater the number of regions that are similar with respect to the variable under consideration 
are spatially close, the greater the value taken by the global index of spatial autocorrelation. In 
addition, we apply a local measure of spatial correlation to the dependent variable, which 
shows a different association among regions in different years (see Fig. A1, Appendix 3). Global 
and Local spatial autocorrelation tests on the dependent variable are unconditional, and 
therefore, represent only an indication about the spatial correlation that can be found in the 
estimations.  
As for the spatial model, we estimate each specification by means of the Spatial Panel 
Arellano-Bond Linear Dinamic approaches: GMM-diff and GMM-sys. The GMM-diff 
specification tests are somehow less favourable and efficient than those carried out via the 
GMM-sys technique. We report both results, but our preferred approach is the GMM-sys. The 
tests for the absence of spatially correlated residuals and for the absence of general spatial 
autocorrelation cannot be rejected. The spatial lagged variable (the spatial autoregressive 
coefficient, 𝜌, in equation (49) above) have proved to be positive but not statistically 
significant in all regressions. Hence, this shows evidence of absence of spatial dependence 
among contiguous areas23. However, our results are slightly improved when compared the 
basic model. 
Overall, the results seem to confirm our expectations. The capital spending has a positive 
effect on economic growth, while current spending has a negative and statistically significant 
sign when the GMM-sys approach is used at 10 percent level (see Table 7). Anyway, this effect 
vanishes when we introduce 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕 as control variable. The significance of the 
estimates appears to be the same as that for the estimates reported in Tables 1 and 2, 
obtained without taking into account for spatial dependence. Among capital sub-components, 
capital transfer and financial assets expenditures have a positive and statistically significant 
influence on growth when GMM-sys is employed, at 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
                                                          
22
 This test requires a weight matrix for capturing spatial interconnections among regions to be 
specified. We use a 19×19 row standardized distance matrix.  
23
 It is worth noting that, if time dummies from 1997 to 2003 are included, spatial dependent variable 
gains statistical significance. Yet, the Sargan test does not allow rejecting the null hypothesis of validity 
for the Over Identification Restriction. 
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Among current sub-components, 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟_𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡, that includes expenditures on personnel, 
purchases of goods and services, items correcting and offsetting revenues, interest expense 
and unclassified current expenditures, has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
economic growth at 5 percent level (see Table 8). These results are confirmed with the 
inclusion of the employment growth rate. They appears to be slightly different from those 
reported in Tables 3 and 4 above, without spatial interactions, where both capital and current 
sub-components seem not to have any influence on growth rate. Among functional 
expenditure, we include all six components because the results differ according to each 
variable (see Table 9). Both capital and current general public services have a negative effect 
on economic growth at 5 percent level. Some growth models state that these types of 
spending contribute to the protection of property rights increasing the probability that the 
citizens retain these rights to their goods and services24. Therefore, such models argue, the 
higher spending on public order-safety and defence are, the stronger the incentive agents have 
to accumulate human/physical capital and this enhances growth. In our estimated equations, 
expenditure on defence (which includes defence, public order-safety and justice) has a not 
significant influence on growth. Poot (2000) and Devarajan et al.(1996) report insignificant or 
negative influence of defence spending on growth. Conversely, Bleaney et al. (2001) find a 
positive and statistically significant effect. The capital component of public spending on 
economic affairs has a positive and statistically significant impact on growth. This is expected, 
since it includes among other outlays on transportation, communication, roads and energy. 
These kinds of spending imply positive externalities to private producers, which also raise their 
productivity, and therefore enhance economic growth according to the theoretical models 
(Barro, 1990). Our results are also consistent with evidence from Easterly and Rebelo (1992), 
Kneller et al. (1999), who found a positive correlation of this kind of expenditure with growth. 
Concerning capital spending components on health and education, they do not seem to affect 
growth in a statistically significant way. These results are consistent with the difficulty of 
Devarajan et al. (1996) to obtain statistically significant estimates for health and education 
spending. Among current components, expenditure on health has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on growth.  
The evidence regarding social spending show that this variables has no significant influence on 
growth. This is consistent with the mixed conclusions of both theoretical and empirical works 
on this subject. Specifically, many growth models predict that redistributive policies have a 
depressing effect on physical capital accumulation and growth (Feldstein, 1974), while others 
imply that social security expenditure may positively influence savings, the level and 
                                                          
24
 Defence expenditures are considered to contribute towards protection of property rights of a 
country’s citizens as a whole. 
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productivity of physical and human capital investment, employment, international 
competitiveness and growth (Cashin, 1995, Lau et al. (2001)  and Van Der Ploeg, 2003). 
Atkinson (1999) in a survey on the literature concluded that the evidence on the relationship 
between the size of the welfare state and growth is mixed and Kneller et al. (2001) including 
social expenditure in unproductive spending estimated an insignificant growth effect.  
Equations 3 and 6 in Table 7, 8 and 9 include 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕 as control variable. This is 
expected and controls for business cycles effects on growth, so we can be reasonably 
confident, that the estimated growth effects of the rest of the variables included in our model 
are not contaminated by short-run factors. Moreover, private capital is estimated to have not 
any significant effect on growth with GMM-sys. Concerning human capital, it has statistically 
insignificant growth impact in most cases, which is similar to results of other research (Sianesi-
Van Reenen, 2003; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). This implausible finding theoretically (Lucas, 
1988; Romer, 1990, Grossman-Helpan, 1991) can be explained in several ways. Human capital 
presents serious measurement problems (Krueger-Lindhal, 2000). Specifically, it embraces 
complex characteristics that are difficult to quantify accurately. Furthermore, educational 
measures are not often compatible across regions due to differences in schooling quality.   
The choice of the spatial weighted matrix and its normalization are fundamental in spatial 
model estimation. Due to its economic, rather than pure statistical content, the normalization 
of the 𝑊 matrix has recently received increasing interest from scholars in the field. We use a 
matrix which elements are the inverse of distance across regions. Firstly, we consider a 𝑊 
matrix normalized with respect to the largest eigenvalue. Unlike the roe standardization, this 
matrix allows preserving the symmetry of weights. Alternatively, as per the robustness check, 
we can consider a 𝑊 row-standardized matrix where each row sums to unity. According to this 
procedure, the impact of all other regions on a particular region i  is given by the weighted 
average of all regions’ impacts. In addition, this implicitly implies that only relative rather than 
absolute distance matters (see next section). 
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TABLE 7 
CAPITAL AND CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPENDITURE WITH SPATIAL EFFECTS 
Variable GMM-
DIFF 
(1) 
GMM-
SYS 
(2) 
GMM-
SYS 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
gdp_pc_growth(-1) -0.050 
(0.500) 
0.015 
(0.837) 
0.001 
(0.989) 
-0.050 
(0.500) 
0.015 
(0.837) 
0.001 
(0.989) 
tot_exp -0.471*** 
(0.000) 
-0.054 
(0.235) 
-0.041 
(0.361) 
-0.471*** 
(0.000) 
-0.054 
(0.235) 
-0.041 
(0.361) 
cap_exp 0.239*** 
(0.003) 
0.143* 
(0.063) 
0.114 
(0.134) 
  
 
curr_exp 
  
 -0.239*** 
(0.003) 
-0.143* 
(0.063) 
-0.114 
(0.134) 
dep. var. spatial  lag  0.084 
(0.584) 
0.044 
(0.792) 
0.116 
(0.476) 
0.084 
(0.584) 
0.044 
(0.792) 
0.116 
(0.476) 
private_k -1.453*** 
(0.005) 
0.183 
(0.565) 
0.234 
(0.448) 
-1.453*** 
(0.005) 
0.183 
(0.565) 
0.234 
(0.448) 
human_cap -0.044 
(0.218) 
-0.001 
(0.997) 
-0.008 
(0.815) 
-0.044 
(0.218) 
-0.001 
(0.997) 
-0.008 
(0.815) 
pop_65 -1.226** 
(0.027) 
-0.130 
(0.576) 
-0.099 
(0.663) 
-1.226** 
(0.027) 
-0.130 
(0.576) 
-0.099 
(0.663) 
empl_growth 
  
0.181** 
(0.011) 
  
0.181** 
(0.011) 
Obs/No. of regions 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 
Sargan Overid. Test 79.32 
(0.048) 
81.62 
(0.162) 
81.80 
(0.179) 
79.32 
(0.048) 
81.62 
(0.162) 
81.80 
(0.179) 
LM test residual 
spatial autoc. (p-
val) 
0.096 
(0.757) 
0.494 
(0.482) 
0.005 
(0.942) 
0.096 
(0.757) 
0.494 
(0.482) 
0.005 
(0.942) 
Global Moran’s I 
test on Residuals 
(p-val) 
0.019 
(0.667) 
0.042 
(0.387) 
0.004 
(0.865) 
0.019 
(0.667) 
0.042 
(0.387) 
0.004 
(0.865) 
LM SAC (General 
Spatial Autoc.) 
0.105 
(0.949) 
4.285 
(0.117) 
0.920 
(0.631) 
0.105 
(0.949) 
4.285 
(0.117) 
0.920 
(0.631) 
Notes: Dependent variable is GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices; p-values in parentheses *p<0.1, 
**p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included from 1997 to 2006. Lag dependent, spatial lag and all explanatory 
variables are treated as endogenous. Instruments are two lagged values of endogenous variables. An inverse distance 
matrix normalized with respect to the largest eigenvalue is used. Constant is not shown. All regressions run using the 
spregdpd routine for STATA. 
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TABLE 8 
CAPITAL AND CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPENDITURE SUB-COMPONENTS WITH SPATIAL 
EFFECTS 
Variable GMM-
DIFF 
(1) 
GMM-
SYS 
(2) 
GMM-
SYS 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
gdp_pc_growth(-1) -0.082 
(0.257) 
-0.009 
(0.895) 
-0.023 
(0.739) 
-0.040 
(0.587) 
0.007 
(0.918) 
-0.009 
(0.898) 
tot_exp -0.505*** 
(0.000) 
-0.079* 
(0.092) 
-0.067 
(0.146) 
-0.476*** 
(0.000) 
-0.049 
(0.278) 
-0.035 
(0.433) 
cap_transf 0.319*** 
(0.002) 
0.223** 
(0.029) 
0.198** 
(0.046) 
  
 
n_fin_assets -0.020 
(0.888) 
-0.079 
(0.599) 
-0.099 
(0.497) 
  
 
fin_assets 0.323*** 
(0.007) 
0.224* 
(0.059) 
0.193* 
(0.098) 
  
 
curr_transf 
  
 -0.304** 
(0.017) 
-0.069 
(0.530) 
-0.022 
(0.838) 
other_curr 
  
 -0.204** 
(0.016) 
-0.177** 
(0.041) 
-0.155* 
(0.068) 
dep. var. spatial  
lag  
0.065 
(0.662) 
0.024 
(0.881) 
0.090 
(0.575) 
0.084 
(0.583) 
0.065 
(0.693) 
0.144 
(0.376) 
private_k -1.626*** 
(0.002) 
0.126 
(0.697) 
0.178 
(0.570) 
-1.250** 
(0.020) 
-0.071 
(0.865) 
-0.072 
(0.859) 
human_cap -0.056 
(0.112) 
-0.018 
(0.615) 
-0.025 
(0.482) 
-0.044 
(0.224) 
0.023 
(0.946) 
-0.006 
(0.866) 
pop_65 -1.463*** 
(0.008) 
-0.218 
(0.352) 
-0.186 
(0.415) 
-1.113** 
(0.050) 
-0.308 
(0.303) 
-0.315 
(0.280) 
empl_growth 
  
0.167** 
(0.018) 
  
0.190*** 
(0.008) 
Obs/No. of regions 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 
Sargan Overid. Test 87.26 
(0.019) 
87.90  
(0.098) 
89.87 
(0.088) 
81.27 
(0.042) 
82.89 
(0.158) 
83.32 
(0.170) 
LM test residual 
spatial autoc. (p-
val) 
0.000 
(0.996) 
0.212 
(0.645) 
0.017 
(0.897) 
0.009 
(0.925) 
0.577 
(0.447) 
0.016 
(0.901) 
Global Moran’s I 
test on Residuals 
(p-val) 
-0.000 
(0.933) 
0.028 
(0.547) 
-0.008 
(0.955) 
0.006 
(0.847) 
0.046 
(0.351) 
0.008 
(0.820) 
LM SAC (General 
Spatial Autoc.) 
0.000 
(0.999) 
1.994 
(0.369) 
0.283 
(0.868) 
0.012 
(0.994) 
4.060 
(0.131) 
0.615 
(0.735) 
Notes: Dependent variable is GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices; p-values in parentheses *p<0.1, 
**p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included from 1997 to 2006. Lag dependent, spatial lag and all explanatory 
variables are treated as endogenous. Instruments are two lagged values of endogenous variables. An inverse distance 
matrix normalized with respect to the largest eigenvalue is used. Constant is not shown. All regressions run using the 
spregdpd routine for STATA. 
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TABLE 9 
FUNCTIONAL (CAPITAL AND CURRENT) EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS WITH SPATIAL EFFECTS 
Variable GMM-
DIFF 
(1) 
GMM-
SYS 
(2) 
GMM-
SYS 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
gdp_pc_growth(-1) -0.069 
(0.341) 
-0.018 
(0.798) 
-0.028 
(0.685) 
-0.066 
(0.397) 
0.004 
(0.996) 
-0.011 
(0.878) 
tot_exp -0.596*** 
(0.000) 
-0.073 
(0.137) 
-0.060 
(0.215) 
-0.481*** 
(0.000) 
-0.074 
(0.210) 
-0.040 
(0.490) 
cap_gen_p_serv -0.317 
(0.109) 
-0.459** 
(0.023) 
-0.466** 
(0.019) 
  
 
cap_defen 0.114 
(0.839) 
-0.055 
(0.928) 
-0.013 
(0.982) 
  
 
cap_ec_aff 0.251*** 
(0.004) 
0.218** 
(0.013) 
0.191** 
(0.027) 
  
 
cap_health 0.079 
(0.853) 
0.167 
(0.710) 
0.060 
(0.890) 
  
 
cap_educ 0.390 
(0.318) 
0.048 
(0.910) 
0.084 
(0.837) 
  
 
cap_soc_prot -0.692** 
(0.024) 
-0.118 
(0.613) 
-0.129 
(0.571) 
  
 
curr_gen_p_serv 
  
 -0.248*** 
(0.004) 
-0.214** 
(0.015) 
-0.182** 
(0.034) 
curr_defen 
  
 -0.304 
(0.343) 
0.020 
(0.945) 
-0.019 
(0.947) 
curr_ec_aff 
  
 -0.048 
(0.782) 
-0.032 
(0.862) 
-0.029 
(0.869) 
curr_health 
  
 -0.248* 
(0.057) 
-0.252* 
(0.068) 
-0.277** 
(0.040) 
curr_educ 
  
 -0.237 
(0.209) 
-0.172 
(0.383) 
-0.158 
(0.409) 
curr_soc_prot 
  
 -0.277* 
(0.066) 
-0.078 
(0.572) 
-0.001 
(0.995) 
dep. var. spatial  lag  0.091 
(0.559) 
-0.011 
(0.948) 
0.046 
(0.781) 
0.076 
(0.623) 
0.003 
(0.985) 
0.072 
(0.660) 
private_k -2.161*** 
(0.000) 
-0.048 
(0.883) 
0.007 
(0.983) 
-1.501** 
(0.020) 
-0.299 
(0.536) 
-0.238 
(0.612) 
human_cap -0.015 
(0.687) 
0.021 
(0.574) 
0.013 
(0.713) 
-0.043 
(0.234) 
-0.008 
(0.818) 
-0.013 
(0.699) 
pop_65 -1.760*** 
(0.001) 
-0.295 
(0.215) 
-0.254 
(0.274) 
-0.948* 
(0.082) 
-0.264 
(0.431) 
-0.311 
(0.340) 
empl_growth 
  
0.161** 
(0.022) 
  
0.184** 
(0.012) 
Obs/No. of regions 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 
Sargan Overid. Test 80.46 
(0.094) 
86.79 
(0.166) 
86.17 
(0.199) 
90.14 
(0.021) 
86.24 
(0.176) 
86.71 
(0.188) 
LM test residual 
spatial autoc. (p-
val) 
0.133 
(0.716) 
0.601 
(0.438) 
0.140 
(0.708) 
0.016 
(0.898) 
0.830 
(0.362) 
0.124 
(0.725) 
Global Moran’s I 
test on Residuals 
(p-val) 
-0.022 
(0.746) 
0.048 
(0.333) 
0.023 
(0.607) 
0.008 
(0.815) 
0.056 
(0.262) 
0.022 
(0.624) 
LM SAC (General 
Spatial Autoc.) 
0.136 
(0.934) 
2.874 
(0.238) 
0.840 
(0.657) 
0.017 
(0.991) 
3.621 
(0.164) 
0.760 
(0.684) 
Notes: Dependent variable is GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices; p-values in parentheses *p<0.1, 
**p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included from 1997 to 2006. Lag dependent, spatial lag and all explanatory 
variables are treated as endogenous. Instruments are two lagged values of endogenous variables. An inverse distance 
matrix normalized with respect to the largest eigenvalue is used. Constant is not shown. All regressions run using the 
spregdpd routine for STATA. 
 
 
83 
 
5.3  Robustness Check 
To test the reliability of our results, we perform several estimations and apply different 
specifications. We first check the robustness of our results by adding the employment growth25 
as an extra control variable. This variable also captures the business cycles effects. As it is a 
potential determinant of growth, we threat this variable as endogenous (see tables A5-A7 in 
Appendix 2). Interestingly, the dynamic GMM framework allows us to deal with the additional 
endogeneity issues through internal instruments. Yet, by adding more endogenous controls 
would quickly make the estimation results unreliable if the number of instruments is large. 
Interestingly, the results are very similar to those reported in Section 5.1. 
We further check the robustness of these results by changing the timing fiscal policy affects 
growth. We previously assumed previously that fiscal policy suffers not delay in affecting 
growth while simultaneously changing the steady state of the economy. However, one may 
instead assume that fiscal policy affects the economy only with lags. We run the same 
regressions to capture the potentially delayed effect of the public expenditure, also 
considering fiscal variables as having one lag (see tables A8-A10, Appendix 2) . Again, the 
results are consistent with those previously obtained. 
Subsequently, we attempt to verify whether our empirical results change when including 
government revenues (see tables A11-A15, Appendix 2). From an empirical standpoint, we 
could choose not to incorporate fully the government budget constraint into the analysis. 
However, this could have resulted in obtaining parameter estimatesthat are similar to 
systematic omitted variable biases. The first part of our analysis focuses almost entirely on the 
expenditure rather than the revenue side of the government budget constraint. According to 
some researches (e.g., Kneller et al., 1999 and Bose et al., 2007), this could lead to biased 
coefficient estimates. Ideally, one simultaneously takes into account both the sources and the 
uses of funds when evaluating fiscal policy effects on growth. In order to achieve a more 
detailed understanding of the budget government constraint, we incorporate tax and no tax 
revenues, along with the government budget deficit/surplus, as also suggested in Ghosh and 
Gregoriou (2008). The final objective is to compare these results against our benchmark 
specification, where the ratio of total public spending on GDP (a proxy for the tax rate) was the 
only variable on the revenue side. We run these regressions for robustness check, although we 
are aware of the fact this may further extent the large number of instruments included in the 
GMM-sys specification. Once again, these estimations do not return any remarkable 
difference.   
                                                          
25
 We have estimated the same specifications by adding inflation as the control variable and found that 
the results remain unchanged. 
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In order to test the reliability of results obtained through spatial models, we attempt to verify 
the sensitivity of our analysis in relation to the spatial weights matrix used (see Appendix 3, 
Tables A18-A20). Rather than employing an inverse distance matrix normalized with respect to 
the largest eigenvalue, we implement a row standardized inverse distance matrix. Again, the 
modified specification does not affect results, at least in terms of coefficient size and statistical 
significance. A more detailed investigation of the residual test on each estimated regression 
reveals that, using the row standardized inverse distance matrix, residuals are still spatially 
autocorrelated. As a result, the residual specification tests are somehow less favourable. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have attempted to examine the relationship between composition of 
government spending and economic growth within an endogenous growth framework with 
two public goods, and one being a priori more productive than the other (Gosh and Gregoriou, 
2008). The theoretical model is an extension of Devarajan et al.’s (1996) model in an optimal 
fiscal policy perspective. Consequently, the model addresses the fiscal policy issue in terms of 
the changes of the key endogenous fiscal variables being directly linked to the productivity 
parameters of the model. The added value of this work is mainly empirical, since it focuses on 
panel data regarding 19 Italian regions. It tries to understand which (and how) components of 
government spending affect economic growth rate. We have considered a double classification 
of government spending related to the public budget structure. The first classification is based 
on the type, or economic characterization, of expenditures. The second classification is based 
on the purpose or function expenditures have. We have grouped the thirty sectoral items of 
expenditure (based on the available data), into six main categories (i.e. general public services, 
defence, economic affairs, health, education and social protection), according to the 
Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG). This work additionally contributes to 
distinguish between capital and current components among functional expenditures. 
From a methodology point of view, the characterization of optimal fiscal policy (where 
theoretically all key variables are endogenously determined) can be captured by the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimators, as developed by Holtz-
Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1990) and Arellano and Bond (1991). Furthermore, we have used the 
GMM-sys approach, as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), 
to tackle the finite sample biases caused by the use of difference-GMM estimators. These 
estimators help us to handle the bias from unobserved country-specific effects, and to deal 
with potential endogeneity problems. The property allowed by these estimators is important 
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in this context as it entails potential reverse causality between the shares of each expenditure 
in total spending and economic growth. 
In general, it is difficult to find statistically significant and robust associations of compositional 
changes in government expenditure with growth. Basic results show only a weak effect of 
aggregate capital and current expenditure on economic growth when using System-GMM 
technique. Conversely, functional components seem not to have any significant effect on 
growth. Results slightly improve when we have used a spatial lag model to account for spatial 
correlation. Although there is no evidence of spatial autocorrelation in our specifications, the 
results show that the capital and current expenditure behaviour is driven by capital transfers 
and financial assets. Also, it depends on current expenditure on personnel, purchases on goods 
and services, interest expense and other unclassified current expenditures. Among functional 
components, capital expenditure on economic affairs, such as infrastructures, play an 
important role in augmenting the economic growth rate of the Italian regions and within the 
short period under scrutiny. Current expenditure on health, and capital and current 
expenditure on general public services had a negative effect on growth. Other functional 
categories have no substantial effect on growth. Furthermore, diagnostic tests show evidence 
of absence of autocorrelation in the error term. Results are also robust regarding different 
specifications. These results have implications on how governments ought to allocate their 
expenditures on different types of public goods. If fiscal policies are pursued optimally, then 
expenditure shares are directly linked to the productivity of such goods. When statistically 
significant, the results generally confirm expectations and are coherent with existent empirical 
results on developed countries.  
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Appendix 1 – Further Data Description 
 
Table A1. Classification of Expenditure by Economic Category 
CURRENT EXPENDITURE 
Economic category Description 
 
 
Personnel 
It includes gross compensation of personnel in 
service, i.e. net compensation, pension and social 
contributions charged to the institution, tax 
withholdings, overtime payments, special 
compensation, mission allowance, termination 
indemnity, contributions towards pension funds. 
 
 
 
Social Security Contributions 
This is one of the two specific items of the Personnel 
category as envisaged in the RPA survey schedule. It 
covers pension and social contributions charged to 
the entity. Since it can be treated as a transfer to 
social security institutions, the item is eliminated in 
consolidation. The data sources do not always report 
a breakdown of gross compensation that enables the 
separation of this item. 
 
 
IRPEF Withholdings 
This is the second of the two specific items for 
personnel expense, which can generally be extracted 
from the “transfer items” section in the accounts of 
public entities. The same measurement issues for 
social contributions apply here. 
 
Purchases of Goods and Services 
The item reports expenditure for purchases of goods 
and services used as input in the production process, 
but excluding those treated as fixed capital as they 
can be used in production for over one year. 
Current Account Transfers 
Current account transfers to households and social    
institutions 
Current account transfers to private-sector 
companies 
Current account transfers to national public 
enterprises 
Current account transfers to public entities 
   Current account transfers to the State 
Currents account transfers to other central 
government entities       
Current account transfers to regions and 
autonomous provinces 
Current account transfers to provinces and 
metropolitan cities 
Current account transfers to municipalities 
Current account transfers to local health 
authorities, hospitals and research hospitals 
Current account transfers to consortia and 
associations 
Current account transfers to  firms, institutions, 
companies and foundations controlled by local 
authorities 
Current account transfers to mountain 
communities and other local authority unions 
Current account transfers to subordinate entities 
Current account transfers to other local 
government entities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This includes unilateral transfers, i.e. transfers with 
no direct corresponding performance, of a recurrent 
nature. They are not intended to support 
investments made towards other public or private 
entities. The recipients of the transfers are broken 
down into these categories in the RPA survey 
schedule. 
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Interest Expense This covers all outlays for payment of interest on 
financial liabilities (i.e. loans, bonds and other 
securities and deposits, such as those issued by the 
State to those entities having deposits at the central 
treasury); it includes default interest for payments in 
arrears. In some statements, the “financial expense” 
item includes bank commissions, which should 
instead be reported under “Purchases of goods and 
services” if identifiable.  
Items Correcting and Offsetting Revenues These expenditures adjust the value of improperly 
registered revenues, or expenditures with 
corresponding revenues both in terms of the nature 
of the item and amount. However, these do not 
represent true transfer items. Where depreciation 
and amortization are included and specified, they are 
estimated as they are pure accounting entities. They 
are not computed in consolidated accounts.  
Unclassified Current Expenditure This category includes current expenditure items that 
cannot be allocated to one of the previous sections. 
They include, for example, payment of taxes and 
duties.  
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
Economic Category Description 
Real Estate Assets and Works The category includes expenditure on construction, 
extraordinary maintenance (e.g. refurbishment, 
completion, adaptation) or acquisition of buildings 
and other real estate assets, including civil 
engineering works (e.g. roads, ports, airports, 
reclamation works, land consolidation, etc.)  
Movables, Machinery, etc. This covers expenditure for the direct acquisition of 
movables (e.g. machinery and equipment, office 
machinery, communications devices, furnishings etc.) 
used by an entity to achieve investment goals, i.e. 
using them in the production process for  one year. 
Movables included in this category must therefore be 
durable and hold the potential to generate income 
for a period beyond the fiscal year. Accordingly, such 
assets also include expenditure on software and  
scientific research. The acquisition of government or 
private sector securities that are not intended to 
provide financing to companies, entities or other 
organizations (which are recorded under equity 
investments) are included in this category . They do 
not give any ownership rights to their holders and do 
not represent interest-bearing financial instruments.   
Capital Account Transfers 
Current account transfers to households and social    
institutions 
Current account transfers to private-sector 
companies 
Current account transfers to national public 
enterprises 
Current account transfers to public entities 
   Current account transfers to the State 
Currents account transfers to other central 
government entities       
Current account transfers to regions and 
autonomous provinces 
Current account transfers to provinces and 
metropolitan cities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This category includes allocations, contributions and 
subsidies for the acquisition of movable assets or the 
execution of investment works. It also comprises all 
non-recurrent unilateral transfers, such as transfers 
to cover accumulated losses. The breakdown by 
beneficiary is the same as that for transfers on 
current account. Therefore, itincludes the items 
indicated to the left. 
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Current account transfers to municipalities 
Current account transfers to local health 
authorities, hospitals and research hospitals 
Current account transfers to consortia and 
associations 
Current account transfers to  firms, institutions, 
companies and foundations controlled by local 
authorities 
Current account transfers to mountain 
communities and other local authority unions 
Current account transfers to subordinate entities 
  Current account transfers to other local government 
entities 
Equity Investments and Contributions Equity investments refer to the acquisition of 
portions of the capital of companies limited by 
shares, while contributions are equity holdings 
acquired by means of financial contributions to the 
capital or endowments of entities, companies and 
other enterprises. These instruments give rise to the 
right to share in the profits of the enterprises. Also, 
they receive a portion of the assets of such 
enterprises upon their liquidation.   
Loans, etc. This includes all expenditure relating to loans, 
advances and other financing procedures to be used 
by the recipients for investment purposes. In general, 
unlike bonds, shares and other securities, these 
instruments are not marketable. 
Unclassified Capital Expenditure Like the corresponding item under the Current 
Expenditure Category, this category includes capital 
expenditure that, owing to its specific features or 
cross-cutting nature, cannot be allocated to one of 
the previous categories. The analyst’s skill 
demonstrated in their ability to limit the size of this 
item during consolidation.  
REPAYMENT OF LOANS 
Economic Category Description 
Repayment of Loans This comprises outlays regarding the repayments of 
the principal on loans, advances and other liabilities 
to third parties.  
Source: Regional Public Accounts, UVAL (Public Investment Evaluation Unit) (DPS, Department for Development 
Policies)  
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Table A2. Classification of Expenditure by Functional Category 
Aggregation RPAs Classification 
01 – General Public Services General Administration 
Unclassified Expenditure 
02 – Economic Affairs Labour 
Other Transport 
Telecommunications 
Agriculture 
Marine Fishing and Aquaculture 
Tourism 
Wholesale and Retail Distribution 
Industry and Artisans 
Energy 
Other Public Works 
Other Economic Sectors 
Roads 
Sewers and Water Treatment 
Environment 
Waste Disposal 
Residential Building and Urban Development 
Water  
03 – Health Health 
Other Health and Sanitation Institutes 
04 – Education Education 
Training 
Research and Development 
Culture and Recreational Services 
05 – Social protection Pensions and Wage Supplementing 
Other Social Affairs (e.g. Suppport and Charity) 
06 - Defence Defence 
Public Order 
Justice 
 
 
 
Table A3. Entities included in General Government for the Regional Public Accounts 
GENERAL 
GOVERNMENT 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
State 
Patrimonio dello Stato SpA (State Assets) 
ANAS (State Road Agency) 
Social Security institutions 
Other central government entities 
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT  
Regions and Autonomous Provinces  
Entities subordinate to Regional Governments 
Local Health Authorities, Hospitals and Research Hospitals 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Provinces and Metropolitan Cities 
City Councils  
Mountain Communities and other Local Authority Unions 
Chambers of Commerce  
Universities 
Entities subordinate to Local Governments  
Port Authorities and other Entities 
Source: Regional Public Accounts, UVAL (DPS) 
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Description of variables used in the analysis 
 
gdp_pc_growth: growth rate of real GDP per capital equal the natural log difference in millions 
of euro (constant prices 2005) 
tot_exp: share of total spending (as % of GDP) 
cap_exp: share of capital spending (as % of total spending) 
cap_transf: share of expenditure on capital transfers (as % of total spending) 
n_fin_assets: share of expenditure on non financial assets (as % of total spending) 
fin_assets: share of expenditure on financial assets (as % of total spending) 
curr_exp: share of current spending (as % of total spending) 
curr_transf: share of expenditure on current transfers (as % of total spending) 
other_curr: share of expenditure on other current (as % of total spending) 
cap_gen_p_serv: capital share of expenditure on general public services (as % of total 
spending) 
cap_defen: capital share of expenditure on defence (as % of total spending) 
cap_ec_aff: capital share of expenditure on economic affairs (as % of total spending) 
cap_health: capital share of expenditure on capital health (as % of total spending) 
cap_educ: capital share of expenditure capital education (as % of total spending) 
cap_soc_prot: capital share of expenditure on social protection (as % of total spending) 
curr_gen_p_serv: current share of expenditure on general public services (as % of total 
spending) 
curr_defen: current share of expenditure on defence (as % of total spending) 
curr_ec_aff: current share of expenditure on economic affairs (as % of total spending) 
curr_health: current share of expenditure on current health (as % of total spending) 
curr_educ: current share of expenditure on current education (as % of total spending) 
curr_soc_prot: current share of expenditure on social protection (as % of total spending) 
private_k: private capital stock (as % of total spending) 
human_cap: percentage population aged between 24 and 35 years old with high level of 
education 
pop_65: percentage of population over 65 years old over the total 
empl_growth: employment growth. Annual percentage change in total employed population  
tax_rev: share of tax revenue (as % of GDP) 
n_tax_rev: share of revenue not from taxation (as % of GDP) 
def_surp: share of deficit/surplus (as % of GDP) 
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Table A4. Summary statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
gdp_pc_growth 1.247 1.537 -3.018 5.372 
tot_exp 53.243 8.881 34.501 75.263 
cap_exp 15.652 4.521 8.098 27.948 
curr_exp 84.348 4.521 72.052 91.902 
cap_transf 4.440 2.579 1.346 14.658 
n_fin_assets 5.502 2.244 2.624 15.032 
fin_assets 5.710 1.879 2.918 15.584 
curr_transf 37.761 4.787 26.759 47.394 
other_curr 46.587 3.373 38.524 56.122 
cap_gen_p_serv 1.439 0.745 0.193 5.481 
cap_defen 0.265 0.180 0.056 1.655 
cap_ec_aff 8.461 3.505 3.289 20.564 
cap_health 0.485 0.292 0.099 2.276 
cap_educ 1.251 0.560 0.451 3.528 
cap_soc_prot 3.752 1.270 1.751 10.037 
curr_gen_p_serv 15.926 5.040 9.011 34.302 
curr_defen 4.631 1.432 2.265 8.585 
curr_ec_aff 6.787 1.898 3.344 11.040 
curr_health 11.350 1.999 6.448 16.506 
curr_educ 9.508 1.792 5.924 13.542 
curr_soc_prot 36.147 4.909 25.188 46.269 
private_k 9.287 1.466 5.583 13.714 
human_cap 37.137 12.073 17.68 82.69 
pop_65 18.414 2.908 11.934 25.835 
empl_growth 0.813 1.462 -3.142 4.288 
tax_rev 42.454 3.097 34.905 51.883 
n_tax_rev 7.022 1.692 3.933 13.668 
def_surpl -3.767 9.767 -32.514 20.191 
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Appendix 2 – Robustness Check without Spatial Effects 
 
Robustness check with employment growth as additional control variable 
 
TABLE A5 
CAPITAL AND CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPENDITURE WITHOUT SPATIAL EFFECTS AND WITH 
EMPL_GROWTH 
Variable IV-DIFF 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
tot_exp 
 
-0.595 
(0.382) 
-0.595 
(0.382) 
-0.949 
(0.134) 
-0.949 
(0.134) 
0.427 
(0.357) 
0.073 
(0.707) 
cap_exp 
 
0.635 
(0.281) 
 0.302 
(0.499) 
 -0.152 
(0.717) 
 
curr_exp  -0.635 
(0.281) 
 -0.302 
(0.499) 
 -0.331 
(0.389) 
private_k 
 
-0.197 
(0.960) 
-0.197 
(0.960) 
-2.314 
(0.113) 
-2.314 
(0.113) 
-5.496 
(0.263) 
0.323 
(0.835) 
human_cap 
 
0.017 
(0.761) 
0.017 
(0.761) 
-0.324 
(0.166) 
-0.324 
(0.166) 
0.679 
(0.273) 
0.086 
(0.411) 
pop_65 
 
empl_growth 
 
-0.287 
(0.844) 
-0.152 
(0.720) 
-0.287 
(0.844) 
-0.152 
(0.720) 
-3.945 
(0.142) 
0.096 
(0.840) 
-3.945 
(0.142) 
0.096 
(0.840) 
-3.467 
(0.229) 
-0.883 
(0.321) 
0.118 
(0.882) 
-0.370 
(0.551) 
       
Obs/No. of regions 171/19 171/19 209/19 209/19 228/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var 
Lags endog. vars 
used as instr. 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
 
 
 
 
1.96 
(0.743) 
 
 
 
 
1.96 
(0.743) 
19 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
19 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
26 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
26 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(1) (p-value) 
  -2.95 
(0.003) 
-2.95 
(0.003) 
1.92 
(0.055) 
-2.98 
(0.003) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) (p-value) 
  -0.50 
(0.617) 
-0.50 
(0.617) 
-0.37 
(0.709) 
-0.13 
(0.894) 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
0.87 
(0.646) 
0.875 
(0.646) 
0.05 
(0.974) 
0.05 
(0.974) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
0.03 
(1.000) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for 
levels (p-val) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for 
levels (p-val) 
    -0.42 
(1.000) 
-0.11 
(1.000) 
-0.27 
(1.000) 
-0.23 
(1.000) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.  
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TABLE A6 
CAPITAL AND CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPENDITURE SUB-COMPONENTS WITHOUT SPATIAL 
EFFECTS AND WITH EMPL_GROWTH 
Variable IV-DIFF 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
tot_exp 
 
-0.724 
(0.321) 
-0.729 
(0.291) 
-0.223 
(0.883) 
-0.323 
(0.904) 
0.051 
(0.713) 
2.172 
(0.265) 
cap_transf 0.409  0.149  0.007  
 (0.641)  (0.700)  (0.979)  
n_fin_assets 0.414  -0.055  -3.073  
 (0.617)  (0.977)  (0.315)  
fin_assets -0.853  0.060  -1.692  
 (0.742)  (0.952)  (0.443)  
curr_transf 
 
 0.249 
(0.778) 
 0.154 
(0.882) 
 0.375 
(0.721) 
other_curr  -0.003 
(0.995) 
 0.270 
(0.895) 
 3.861 
(0.229) 
private_k 
 
-5.455 
(0.511) 
-1.500 
(0.750) 
-0.070 
(0.995) 
0.681 
(0.950) 
2.447 
(0.314) 
2.768 
(0.516) 
human_cap 
 
0.053 
(0.557) 
0.021 
(0.759) 
-0.153 
(0.523) 
-0.204 
(0.796) 
0.358 
(0.435) 
1.607 
(0.224) 
pop_65 
 
empl_growth 
 
-1.569 
(0.605) 
0.016 
(0.974) 
-0.918 
(0.584) 
0.310 
(0.479) 
-1.920 
(0.861) 
0.268 
(0.614) 
-2.817 
(0.651) 
0.306 
(0.754) 
-0.795 
(0.453) 
-0.871 
(0.520) 
2.689 
(0.238) 
6.883 
(0.247) 
       
Obs/No. of regions 171/19 171/19 209/19 209/19 228/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var 
Lags endog. vars 
used as instr. 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
 
 
 
 
       2.15 
    (0.906) 
 
 
 
 
2.82 
(0.727) 
20 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
19 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
30 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
28 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(1)  (p-value) 
  -3.29 
(0.001) 
-2.87 
(0.004) 
-0.82 
(0.414) 
-0.65 
(0.514) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) (p-value) 
  0.97 
(0.334) 
0.16 
(0.872) 
-0.84 
(0.400) 
. 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
0.87 
(0.646) 
1.57 
(0.457) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for 
levels (p-val) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for 
levels (p-val) 
    0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. The evidence related 
to the serial correlation of errors based on the AR(2) test is not available due to the insufficient number of panel 
periods. Constant is not shown. 
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TABLE A7 
FUNCTIONAL (CAPITAL AND CURRENT) EXPENDITURE  COMPONENTS WITHOUT SPATIAL 
EFFECTS AND WITH EMPL_GROWTH 
Variable IV-DIFF 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
tot_exp 
 
-0.482 
(0.252) 
-0.589 
(0.247) 
-0.591 
(0.716) 
-4.128 
(0.659) 
0.672 
(0.343) 
0.279 
(0.159) 
cap_health 
 
cap_educ 
 
-0.321 
(0.678) 
2.386 
(0.199) 
 -1.759 
(0.316) 
1.890 
(0.589) 
 26.794 
(0.378) 
-11.325 
(0.467) 
 
curr_health  0.538 
(0.349)  
 -0.592 
(0.900) 
 -1.937 
(0.394) 
curr_educ  -0.410 
(0.599) 
 3.701 
(0.684) 
 -2.525 
(0.118) 
private_k 
 
-1.607 
(0.336) 
-1.285 
(0.527) 
-2.566 
(0.478) 
-5.610 
(0.762) 
-13.252 
(0.512) 
-1.319 
(0.530) 
human_cap 
 
-0.078 
(0.607) 
-0.038 
(0.795) 
-0.137 
(0.771) 
-1.711 
(0.638) 
0.982 
(0.471) 
0.704* 
(0.068) 
pop_65 
 
empl_growth 
 
-1.394 
(0.321) 
0.486 
(0.156) 
-0.628 
(0.662) 
-0.252 
(0.594) 
-3.849 
(0.512) 
0.326 
(0.654) 
-17.055 
(0.644) 
-0.630 
(0.844) 
-6.041 
(0.480) 
0.949 
(0.525) 
-4.095 
(0.102) 
-1.663 
(0.331) 
       
Obs/No. of regions 171/19 171 209/19 209/19 228/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var.  
Lags endog. vars 
used as instr. 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
 
 
 
 
8.96 
(0.255) 
 
 
 
 
7.30 
(0.399) 
19 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
19 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
28 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
28 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(1)  (p-value) 
  -2.47 
(0.014) 
-0.60 
(0.546) 
-0.52 
(0.604) 
-1.23 
(0.217) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) (p-value) 
  -0.01 
(0.995) 
-0.52 
(0.604) 
-0.38 
(0.705) 
- 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
4.83 
(0.998) 
3.71 
(0.999) 
0.02 
(0.882) 
0.02 
(0.876) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for 
levels (p-val) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for 
levels (p-val) 
    0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown. The evidence related to the serial correlation of errors based on the AR(2) test is not available due to the 
insufficient number of panel periods. 
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Robustness check with lagged fiscal variables 
 
TABLE A8 
CAPITAL AND CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS WITHOUT SPATIAL 
EFFECTS AND WITH LAGGED VARIABLES 
Variable IV-DIFF 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
tot_exp(-1) 
 
-0.406 
(0.407) 
-0.406 
(0.407) 
-0.604 
(0.163) 
-0.604 
(0.163) 
-0.026 
(0.880) 
-0.037 
(0.821) 
cap_exp(-1) 
 
0.270 
(0.641) 
 0.496 
(0.298) 
  0.003 
(0.994) 
 
curr_exp(-1)  -0.270 
(0.641) 
 -0.496 
(0.298) 
 -0.751 
(0.994) 
private_k 
 
-2.744 
(0.216) 
-2.744 
(0.216) 
-2.869 
(0.175) 
-2.869 
(0.175) 
0.179 
(0.899) 
0.202 
(0.889) 
human_cap 
 
0.039 
(0.571) 
0.039 
(0.571) 
-0.159 
(0.476) 
-0.159 
(0.476) 
0.027 
(0.716) 
-0.011 
(0.902) 
pop_65 
 
0.028 
(0.986) 
0.028 
(0.986) 
-3.766 
(0.172) 
-3.766 
(0.172) 
-0.219 
(0.601) 
-0.075 
(0.892) 
       
Obs/No. of regions 152/19 152/19 190/19 190/19 209/19 209/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var 
Lags endog. vars 
used as instr. 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
 
 
 
 
        1.26 
      (0.739) 
 
 
 
 
        1.26 
      (0.739) 
17 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
17 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
23 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
23 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(1) (p-value) 
  -2.01 
(0.045) 
-2.01 
(0.045) 
-2.68 
(0.007) 
-2.62 
(0.009) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) (p-value) 
  1.30 
(0.194) 
1.30 
(0.194) 
0.72 
(0.473) 
0.51 
(0.613) 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
3.68 
(0.159) 
3.68 
(0.159) 
0.80 
(0.670) 
0.80 
(0.670) 
5.23 
(0.632) 
4.93 
(0.668) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for 
levels (p-value) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for 
levels (p-value) 
  
 
 4.65 
(0.590) 
-1.33 
(1.000) 
4.35 
(0.630) 
-1.76 
(1.000) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.  
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TABLE A9 
CAPITAL AND CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPENDITURE SUB-COMPONENTS WITHOUT SPATIAL 
EFFECTS AND WITH LAGGED VARIABLES 
Variable IV-DIFF 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
tot_exp(-1) 
 
1.232* 
(0.071) 
1.589** 
(0.019) 
-0.418 
(0.408) 
-0.559 
(0.467) 
0.266 
(0.579) 
-0.066 
(0.842) 
cap_transf(-1) -1.569  0.345  0.124  
 (0.448)  (0.472)  (0.687)  
n_fin_assets(-1) 0.039  0.015  0.079  
 (0.965)  (0.995)  (0.809)  
fin_assets(-1) -1.570  0.920  0.141  
 (0.138)  (0.639)  (0.882)  
curr_transf(-1)  2.195* 
(0.067) 
 -0.481 
(0.540) 
 -0.006 
(0.994) 
other_curr(-1)  -0.110 
(0.845) 
 -0.520 
(0.281) 
 -0.135 
(0.767) 
private_k 
 
2.412 
(0.306) 
-1.637 
(0.728) 
-1.538 
(0.552) 
-2.780 
(0.199) 
-0.368 
(0.660) 
0.002 
(0.998) 
human_cap 
 
0.004 
(0.968) 
0.029 
(0.772) 
-0.133 
(0.543) 
-0.162 
(0.438) 
0.096 
(0.728) 
0.006 
(0.966) 
pop_65 
 
-2.401 
(0.381) 
-1.633 
(0.439) 
-1.330 
(0.807) 
-3.610 
(0.221) 
-0.353 
(0.366) 
-0.235 
(0.719) 
       
Obs/No. of regions 152/19 152/19 190/19 190/19 209/19 209/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var 
Lags endog. vars 
used as instr. 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
 
 
 
 
9.36 
(0.09) 
 
 
 
 
6.84 
(0.144) 
19 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
18 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
27 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
25 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(1)  (p-value) 
  -2.42 
(0.016) 
1.80 
(0.072) 
-1.90 
(0.058) 
-2.43 
(0.015) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) (p-value) 
  0.08 
(0.938) 
1.27 
(0.205) 
-0.81 
(0.421) 
0.74 
(0.460) 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
3.83 
(0.147) 
3.08 
(0.214) 
1.14 
(0.564) 
0.97 
(0.616) 
0.09 
(1.000) 
5.75 
(0.675) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for 
levels (p-val) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for 
levels (p-val) 
    -0.82 
(1.000) 
-0.47 
(1.000) 
5.06 
(0.653) 
0.72 
(0.699) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.   
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TABLE A10 
FUNCTIONAL (CAPITAL AND CURRENT) EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS WITHOUT SPATIAL 
EFFECTS AND WITH LAGGED VARIABLES 
Variable IV-DIFF 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
tot_exp(-1) 
 
0.086 
(0.583) 
0.332 
(0.200) 
-0.458 
(0.242) 
-0.684 
(0.19) 
0.271 
(0.602) 
-0.132 
(0.529) 
cap_health(-1) 
 
cap_educ(-1) 
 
0.264 
(0.747) 
-1.523 
(0.425) 
 0.754 
(0.538) 
0.921 
(0.598) 
 -0.844 
(0.938) 
1.217 
(0.735) 
 
curr_health(-1)  -0.629 
(0.260) 
 0.514 
(0.547) 
 0.218 
(0.839) 
curr_educ(-1)  0.886 
(0.163) 
 -0.249 
(0.853) 
 0.538 
(0.396) 
private_k 
 
   2.782** 
(0.025) 
      
3.640*** 
(0.004) 
-2.109 
(0.297) 
-2.086 
(0.409) 
-0.500 
(0.368) 
-0.419 
(0.856) 
human_cap 
 
-0.143 
(0.312) 
-0.195 
(0.272) 
-0.034 
(0.818) 
-0.064 
(0.766) 
0.177 
(0.277) 
0.030 
(0.824) 
pop_65 
 
0.665 
(0.632) 
0.310 
(0.848) 
-3.935* 
(0.061) 
-3.449 
(0.166) 
-0.615 
(0.401) 
-0.329 
(0.625) 
       
Obs/No. of regions 152 152 190/19 190/19 209/19 209/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var.  
Lags endog. vars 
used as instr. 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
 
 
 
 
5.42 
(0.491) 
 
 
 
 
11.83 
(0.066) 
18 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
18 
(2 3) 
(2 2) 
25 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
25 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(1)  (p-value) 
  -2.16 
(0.031) 
-1.92 
(0.054) 
-1.84 
(0.066) 
-2.89 
(0.004) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) (p-value) 
  1.45 
(0.148) 
1.51 
(0.130) 
-0.80 
(0.426) 
0.89 
(0.373) 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
10.47 
(0.915) 
8.59 
(0.968) 
2.29 
(0.319) 
1.30 
(0.523) 
2.85 
(0.943) 
2.33 
(0.969) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for 
levels (p-val) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for 
levels (p-val) 
    1.71 
(0.974) 
-2.16 
(1.000) 
0.75 
(0.998) 
1.25 
(0.534) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.  
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Robustness check with government budget constraint in full 
 
TABLE A11 
CAPITAL ECONOMIC EXPENDITURE WITHOUT SPATIAL EFFECTS AND WITH FULL BUDGET 
CONSTRAINT 
Variable FE 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-SYS 
(4) 
tax_rev 
 
  -0.252*** 
(0.005) 
0.658 
(0.608) 
0.411 
(0.570) 
2.300 
(0.526) 
ntax_rev 
 
-0.050 
(0.677) 
0.562 
(0.681) 
0.604 
(0.586) 
0.361 
(0.779) 
def_surpl 
 
  0.251*** 
(0.001) 
-0.069 
(0.934) 
0.036 
(0.928) 
-0.809 
(0.523) 
cap_exp 
 
0.120* 
(0.056) 
0.232 
(0.788) 
0.382 
(0.373) 
0.470 
(0.508) 
private_k 
 
-0.606 
(0.108) 
3.516 
(0.548) 
0.412 
(0.829) 
0.680 
(0.638) 
human_cap 
 
-0.047* 
(0.095) 
0.119 
(0.806) 
0.092 
(0.724) 
0.551 
(0.465) 
pop_65 
 
-0.692** 
(0.045) 
-0.331 
(0.871) 
-0.436 
(0.898) 
-0.489 
(0.625) 
     
Obs/No. of regions 228/19 171/19 209/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var.  
Lags endog. vars used 
as instruments 
Endogeneity test 
p-value 
  
 
 
 
3.04 
(0.693) 
19 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
28 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) p-
value 
  -2.53 
(0.011) 
-1.14 
(0.252) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
p-value 
  0.87 
(0.385) 
0.36 
(0.722) 
Hansen J-test 
p-value 
 0.43 
(0.808) 
0.10 
(0.754) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for levels (p-
value) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for levels (p-
value) 
   -0.10 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
Note: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.  
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TABLE A12 
CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPENDITURE WITHOUT SPATIAL EFFECTS AND WITH FULL BUDGET 
CONSTRAINT 
Variable FE 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-SYS 
(4) 
tax_rev 
 
-0.252*** 
(0.005) 
0.658 
(0.608) 
0.411 
(0.570) 
0.942* 
(0.067) 
ntax_rev 
 
-0.050 
(0.677) 
0.562 
(0.681) 
0.604 
(0.586) 
0.737 
(0.492) 
def_surpl 
 
0.251*** 
(0.001) 
-0.069 
(0.934) 
0.036 
(0.929) 
-0.068 
(0.682) 
curr_exp 
 
-0.120* 
(0.056) 
-0.232 
(0.788) 
-0.382 
(0.373) 
-0.286 
(0.149) 
private_k 
 
-0.606 
(0.108) 
3.516 
(0.548) 
0.412 
(0.829) 
2.471 
(0.157) 
human_cap 
 
-0.047* 
(0.095) 
0.119 
(0.806) 
0.092 
(0.725) 
0.162 
(0.209) 
pop_65 
 
-0.692** 
(0.045) 
-0.331 
(0.871) 
-0.436 
(0.898) 
0.048 
(0.931) 
     
Obs/No. of regions 228/19 171/19 209/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var.  
Lags endog. vars used 
as instruments 
Endogeneity test 
p-value 
  
 
 
 
3.04 
(0.693) 
19 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
28 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) p-
value 
  -2.53 
(0.011) 
-2.87 
(0.004) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
p-value 
  0.87 
(0.385) 
1.17 
(0.241) 
Hansen J-test 
p-value 
 0.43 
(0.808) 
0.10 
(0.754) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for levels (p-
value) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for levels (p-
value) 
   -0.12 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.   
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TABLE A13 
CAPITAL ECONOMIC EXPENDITURE SUB-COMPONENTS WITHOUT SPATIAL EFFECTS AND 
WITH FULL BUDGET CONTSTRAINT 
Variable FE 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-SYS 
(4) 
tax_rev 
 
-0.258*** 
(0.004) 
1.265 
(0.674) 
0.395 
(0.913) 
0.011 
(0.956) 
ntax_rev 
 
-0.035 
(0.780) 
1.380 
(0.669) 
-1.379 
(0.963) 
0.001 
(1.000) 
def_surpl 
 
0.258*** 
(0.001) 
-0.362 
(0.846) 
-0.147 
(0.987) 
-0.166 
(0.675) 
cap_transf 0.143* 0.118 0.394 -0.122 
 (0.062) (0.943) (0.968) (0.864) 
n_fin_assets -0.007 -0.415 -1.649 -0.281 
 (0.960) (0.846) (0.967) (0.779) 
fin_assets 0.163 -0.342 1.051 0.615 
 (0.110) (0.855) (0.950) (0.328) 
private_k 
 
-0.612 
(0.106) 
4.010 
(0.637) 
-1.758 
(0.961) 
-0.216 
(0.720) 
human_cap 
 
-0.049* 
(0.085) 
0.014 
(0.922) 
0.103 
(0.914) 
0.003 
(0.983) 
pop_65 
 
-0.698** 
(0.045) 
-0.928 
(0.776) 
-0.348 
(0.974) 
0.073 
(0.873) 
     
Obs/No. of regions 228/19 171/19 209/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var.  
Lags endog. vars used 
as instruments 
Endogeneity test 
p-value 
  
 
 
 
3.72 
(0.811) 
21 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
32 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) p-
value 
  -0.12 
(0.907) 
2.26 
(0.024) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
p-value 
  0.22 
(0.824) 
0.94 
(0.347) 
Hansen J-test 
p-value 
 0.27 
(0.874) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for levels (p-
value) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for levels (p-
value) 
   0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.   
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TABLE A14 
CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPENDITURE SUB-COMPONENTS WITHOUT SPATIAL EFFECTS AND 
WITH FULL BUDGET CONSTRAINT 
Variable FE 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-SYS 
(4) 
tax_rev 
 
-0.201** 
(0.023) 
-0.849 
(0.636) 
0.809 
(0.538) 
-2.953 
(0.291) 
ntax_rev 
 
-0.009 
(0.940) 
-1.069 
(0.518) 
0.799 
(0.445) 
4.598 
(0.249) 
def_surpl 
 
0.193** 
(0.011) 
0.750 
(0.460) 
-0.399 
(0.786) 
2.064 
(0.226) 
curr_transf -0.008 -1.717 -0.212 1.996 
 (0.938) (0.303) (0.803) (0.146) 
other_curr -0.101 -1.575 0.274 0.711 
 (0.103) (0.342) (0.901) (0.422) 
private_k 
 
-0.679* 
(0.088) 
-0.504 
(0.947) 
4.068 
(0.722) 
9.808 
(0.164) 
human_cap 
 
0.048* 
(0.086) 
0.021 
(0.778) 
0.142 
(0.629) 
-0.127 
(0.143) 
pop_65 
 
-0.831** 
(0.016) 
0.632 
(0.787) 
0.623 
(0.892) 
3.366 
(0.164) 
     
Obs/No. of regions 228/19 171/19 209/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var.  
Lags endog. vars used 
as instruments 
Endogeneity test 
p-value 
  
 
 
 
4.84 
(0.564) 
20 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
30 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) p-
value 
  -3.05 
(0.002) 
-0.53 
(0.595) 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) 
p-value 
  0.77 
(0.442) 
0.38 
(0.704) 
Hansen J-test 
p-value 
 0.27 
(0.871) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.000 
(1.000) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for levels (p-
value) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for levels (p-
value) 
   0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. Constant is not 
shown.  
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TABLE A15 
FUNCTIONAL (CAPITAL AND CURRENT) EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS WITHOUT SPATIAL 
EFFECTS AND FULL BUDGET CONSTRAINT 
Variable IV-DIFF 
(1) 
IV-DIFF 
(2) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
tax_rev 
 
ntax_rev 
 
def_surpl 
 
0.288 
(0.550) 
0.448 
(0.487) 
0.035 
(0.941) 
0.088 
(0.865) 
0.241 
(0.755) 
0.294 
(0.562) 
-1.373 
(0.822) 
-0.796 
(0.870) 
1.528 
(0.756) 
1.772 
(0.817) 
3.807 
(0.631) 
-0.971 
(0.882) 
0.057 
(0.925) 
-0.784 
(0.681) 
-0.258 
(0.621) 
-1.006* 
(0.096) 
5.498 
(0.164) 
0.285* 
(0.058) 
cap_health 
 
cap_educ 
 
0.191 
(0.901) 
2.524 
(0.281) 
 -1.675 
(0.466) 
3.550 
(0.465) 
 25.991 
(0.226) 
-8.644 
(0.219) 
 
curr_health 
 
curr_educ 
 0.358 
(0.479) 
-0.171 
(0.844) 
 -1.719 
(0.781) 
-0.968 
(0.844) 
 -3.437 
(0.294) 
-2.954 
(0.327) 
private_k 
 
0.018 
(0.993) 
-0.239 
(0.925) 
-5.309 
(0.780) 
9.338 
(0.539) 
0.691 
(0.562) 
7.318 
(0.229) 
human_cap 
 
0.086 
(0.585) 
0.021 
(0.867) 
-0.275 
(0.837) 
0.120 
(0.970) 
-0.066 
(0.608) 
-0.323 
(0.261) 
pop_65 
 
-1.466 
(0.421) 
-1.138 
(0.515) 
-7.719 
(0.705) 
1.124 
(0.970) 
-0.249 
(0.704) 
0.303 
(0.539) 
       
Obs/No. of regions 171/19 171/19 190/19 209/19 228/19 228/19 
No. of instruments 
Lags dep. var.  
Lags endog. vars 
used as instr. 
Endogeneity test 
(p-value) 
 
 
 
 
12.52 
(0.129) 
 
 
 
 
12.86 
(0.117) 
20 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
20 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
30 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
30 
(2 2) 
(2 2) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(1)  (p-value) 
  -1.36 
(0.173) 
-0.47 
(0.638) 
-1.83 
(0.067) 
-0.89 
(0.376) 
Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) (p-value) 
  0.29 
(0.769) 
0.09 
(0.927) 
-0.66 
(0.510) 
- 
 
Hansen J-test 
(p-value) 
2.84 
(1.000) 
3.93 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
Diff. Hansen 1 for 
levels (p-value) 
Diff. Hansen 2 for 
levels (p-value) 
    0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
0.00 
(1.000) 
Notes: Dependent variable GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices. For IV/FD (all variables are at first 
difference). P-values in parenthesis. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included. The evidence related 
to the serial correlation of errors based on the AR(2) test is not available due to the insufficient number of panel 
periods. Constant is not shown. 
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Appendix 3 – Robustness Check with Spatial Effects 
 
 
Table A16. Cross dependence tests    
Variables CD test (p-value) 
gdp_pc_gr_rate 24.62 (0.000) 
tot_exp 23.45 (0.000) 
cap_exp 13.11 (0.000) 
curr_exp 13.11 (0.000) 
cap_transf 9.79 (0.000) 
n_fin_assets 21.85 (0.000) 
fin_assets 24.80 (0.000) 
curr_transf 20.97 (0.000) 
others_curr 9.31 (0.000) 
cap_gen_p_serv 7.37 (0.000) 
cap_defen 10.84 (0.000) 
cap_ec_aff 24.34 (0.000) 
cap_health 7.56 (0.000) 
cap_educ 19.10 (0.000) 
cap_soc_prot 39.38 (0.000) 
curr_gen_p_serv 14.77 (0.000) 
curr_defen 21.32 (0.000) 
curr_ec_aff 38.09 (0.000) 
curr_health 30.76 (0.000) 
curr_educ 26.41 (0.000) 
curr_soc_prot 30.36 (0.000) 
Note: CD reports Pesaran’s (2004) cross-section dependence statistic that is distributed as a 
normal standard and tests the null hypothesis of cross-section independence. 
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Table A17. Global Moran’s I test for gdp_pc_gr_rate  
YEARS Global Moran’s I test (p-value) 
 Spatial weight matrix A Spatial weight matrix B 
1996 -0.141  (0.101) -0.130 (0.513) 
1997 0.060 (0.021) 0.201 (0.018) 
1998 0.127 (0.000) 0.265 (0.002) 
1999 0.112 (0.001) 0.196 (0.020) 
2000 0.057 (0.027) 0.200 (0.020) 
2001 0.036 (0.072) 0.107 (0.139) 
2002 -0.005 (0.317) 0.003 (0.594) 
2003 -0.031 (0.616) 0.033 (0.402) 
2004 -0.131 (0.111) -0.141 (0.404) 
2005 -0.062 (0.899) -0.180 (0.227) 
2006 -0.010 (0.358) 0.047 (0.338) 
2007 -0.111 (0.213) -0.178 (0.205) 
Note: The null hypothesis is no global autocorrelation. In the first column, we use a row standardized inverse 
distance matrix weighted by eigenvalues (spatial weight matrix A). In the second one, we use a row 
standardized inverse distance matrix (spatial weight matrix B). 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Local Moran’s I test for gdp_pc_gr_rate  
 
 
                       
 1.YEAR 1997          2.YEAR 1998 
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                                       3.YEAR 1999                                                                                                    4. YEAR 2000     
 
 
 
 
 
             5. YEAR 2001     
 
Notes: Local Moran’s I is shown for years with spatial dependence across regions. 
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Robustness check with row standardized inverse distance weighted matrix 
 
TABLE A18 
CAPITAL AND CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPENDITURE WITH SPATIAL EFFECTS 
Variable GMM-
DIFF 
(1) 
GMM-
SYS 
(2) 
GMM-
SYS 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
gdp_pc_growth(-1) -0.054 
(0.447) 
0.014 
(0.842) 
-0.007 
(0.918) 
-0.054 
(0.447) 
0.014 
(0.842) 
-0.007 
(0.918) 
tot_exp -0.462*** 
(0.000) 
-0.053 
(0.242) 
-0.039 
(0.373) 
-0.462*** 
(0.000) 
-0.053 
(0.242) 
-0.039 
(0.373) 
cap_exp 0.250*** 
(0.002) 
0.154** 
(0.046) 
0.124 
(0.102) 
  
 
curr_exp 
  
 -0.250*** 
(0.002) 
-0.154** 
(0.046) 
-0.124 
(0.102) 
dep. var. spatial  lag 0.121 
(0.564) 
0.079 
(0.731) 
0.128 
(0.569) 
0.121 
(0.564) 
0.079 
(0.731) 
0.128 
(0.569) 
private_k -1.440*** 
(0.005) 
0.168 
(0.598) 
0.232 
(0.451) 
-1.440*** 
(0.005) 
0.168 
(0.598) 
0.232 
(0.451) 
human_cap -0.040 
(0.261) 
0.004 
(0.901) 
-0.003 
(0.921) 
-0.040 
(0.261) 
0.004 
(0.901) 
-0.003 
(0.921) 
pop_65 -1.243** 
(0.026) 
-0.124 
(0.593) 
-0.096 
(0.672) 
-1.243** 
(0.026) 
-0.124 
(0.593) 
-0.096 
(0.672) 
empl_growth 
  
0.171** 
(0.016) 
  
0.171** 
(0.016) 
Obs/No. of regions 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 
Sargan Overid. Test 
78.34 
(0.056) 
80.35 
(0.187) 
82.06 
(0.174) 
78.34 
(0.056) 
80.35 
(0.187) 
82.06 
(0.174) 
LM test residual 
spatial autoc. (p-val) 
0.221 
(0.638) 
0.026 
(0.872) 
0.467 
(0.495) 
0.221 
(0.638) 
0.026 
(0.872) 
0.467 
(0.495) 
Global Moran’s I 
test on Residuals (p-
val) 
-0.019 
(0.696) 
-0.007 
(0.962) 
-0.028 
(0.527) 
-0.019 
(0.696) 
-0.007 
(0.962) 
-0.028 
(0.527) 
LM SAC (General 
Spatial Autoc.) 
0.232 
(0.890) 
2.222 
(0.329) 
0.883 
(0.643) 
0.232 
(0.890) 
2.222 
(0.329) 
0.883 
(0.643) 
Notes: Dependent variable is GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices; p-values in parentheses *p<0.1, 
**p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included from 1997 to 2006. Lag dependent, spatial lag and all explanatory 
variables are treated as endogenous. Instruments are two lagged values of endogenous variables. A row weighted 
standardized inverse distance matrix is used. Constant is not shown. All regressions run using the spregdpd routine 
for STATA. 
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TABLE A19 
CAPITAL AND CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPENDITURE SUB-COMPONENTS WITH SPATIAL 
EFFECTS 
Variable GMM-
DIFF 
(1) 
GMM-
SYS 
(2) 
GMM-
SYS 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
gdp_pc_growth(-1) -0.087 
(0.219) 
-0.010 
(0.886) 
-0.030 
(0.652) 
-0.044 
(0.538) 
0.006 
(0.926) 
-0.017 
(0.798) 
tot_exp -0.498*** 
(0.000) 
-0.080* 
(0.089) 
-0.067 
(0.147) 
-0.470*** 
(0.000) 
-0.048 
(0.286) 
-0.033 
(0.448) 
cap_transf 0.341*** 
(0.001) 
0.245** 
(0.018) 
0.214** 
(0.033) 
  
 
n_fin_assets -0.028 
(0.858) 
-0.083 
(0.581) 
-0.097 
(0.507) 
  
 
fin_assets 0.330*** 
(0.006) 
0.231* 
(0.053) 
0.203* 
(0.083) 
  
 
curr_transf 
  
 -0.325** 
(0.011) 
-0.086 
(0.429) 
-0.038 
(0.723) 
other_curr 
  
 -0.213** 
(0.012) 
-0.186** 
(0.033) 
-0.163* 
(0.055) 
dep. var. spatial  lag 0.036 
(0.862) 
0.007 
(0.975) 
0.048 
(0.829) 
0.127 
(0.547) 
0.122 
(0.597) 
0.179 
(0.426) 
private_k -1.628*** 
(0.002) 
0.096 
(0.767) 
0.170 
(0.588) 
-1.223** 
(0.023) 
-0.064 
(0.879) 
-0.056 
(0.891) 
human_cap -0.050 
(0.152) 
-0.013 
(0.714) 
-0.019 
(0.577) 
-0.040 
(0.267) 
0.007 
(0.841) 
-0.001 
(0.982) 
pop_65 -1.446*** 
(0.008) 
-0.214 
(0.361) 
-0.183 
(0.422) 
-1.118** 
(0.050) 
-0.289 
(0.336) 
-0.301 
(0.302) 
empl_growth 
  
0.155** 
(0.026) 
  
0.179** 
(0.011) 
Obs/No. of regions 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 
Sargan Overid. Test 
85.44 
(0.026) 
85.89 
(0.126) 
89.65 
(0.090) 
80.17 
(0.051) 
81.76 
(0.180) 
83.79 
(0.162) 
LM test residual 
spatial autoc. (p-val) 
0.171 
(0.679) 
0.005 
(0.943) 
0.316 
(0.574) 
0.597 
(0.440) 
0.055 
(0.815) 
0.586 
(0.440) 
Global Moran’s I 
test on Residuals (p-
val) 
-0.017 
(0.739) 
-0.003 
(0.960) 
-0.023 
(0.615) 
-0.032 
(0.465) 
-0.001 
(0.896) 
-0.032 
(0.466) 
LM SAC (General 
Spatial Autoc.) 
0.188 
(0.910) 
0.494 
(0.781) 
0.886 
(0.642) 
0.630 
(0.730) 
0.643 
(0.725) 
4.029 
(0.133) 
Notes: Dependent variable is GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices; p-values in parentheses *p<0.1, 
**p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included from 1997 to 2006. Lag dependent, spatial lag and all explanatory 
variables are treated as endogenous. Instruments are two lagged values of endogenous variables. A row weighted 
standardized inverse distance matrix is used. Constant is not shown. All regressions run using the spregdpd routine 
for STATA. 
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TABLE A20 
FUNCTIONAL (CAPITAL AND CURRENT) EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS WITH SPATIAL EFFECTS 
Variable GMM-
DIFF 
(1) 
GMM-
SYS 
(2) 
GMM-
SYS 
(3) 
GMM-
DIFF 
(4) 
GMM-
SYS 
(5) 
GMM-
SYS 
(6) 
gdp_pc_growth(-1) -0.073 
(0.306) 
-0.011 
(0.872) 
-0.027 
(0.691) 
-0.061 
(0.428) 
0.012 
(0.867) 
-0.089 
(0.899) 
tot_exp -0.572*** 
(0.000) 
-0.071 
(0.148) 
-0.058 
(0.231) 
-0.470*** 
(0.000) 
-0.074 
(0.207) 
-0.042 
(0.475) 
cap_gen_p_serv -0.307 
(0.120) 
-0.421** 
(0.038) 
-0.440** 
(0.027) 
  
 
cap_defen 0.127 
(0.819) 
-0.102 
(0.868) 
-0.021 
(0.971) 
  
 
cap_ec_aff 0.255*** 
(0.003) 
0.221** 
(0.011) 
0.196** 
(0.022) 
  
 
cap_health 0.063 
(0.882) 
0.146 
(0.744) 
0.041 
(0.925) 
  
 
cap_educ 0.431 
(0.272) 
0.083 
(0.843) 
0.110 
(0.788) 
  
 
cap_soc_prot -0.607** 
(0.047) 
-0.089 
(0.705) 
-0.106 
(0.643) 
  
 
curr_gen_p_serv 
  
 -0.252*** 
(0.004) 
-0.219** 
(0.014) 
-0.191** 
(0.028) 
curr_defen 
  
 -0.247 
(0.442) 
0.055 
(0.849) 
0.016 
(0.955) 
curr_ec_aff 
  
 -0.060 
(0.728) 
-0.040 
(0.827) 
-0.034 
(0.847) 
curr_health 
  
 -0.260** 
(0.046) 
-0.250* 
(0.068) 
-0.281** 
(0.036) 
curr_educ 
  
 -0.286 
(0.136) 
-0.220 
(0.271) 
-0.192 
(0.321) 
curr_soc_prot 
  
 -0.308** 
(0.041) 
-0.098 
(0.480) 
-0.022 
(0.875) 
dep. var. spatial  lag  0.122 
(0.555) 
0.058 
(0.799) 
0.096 
(0.669) 
0.081 
(0.707) 
0.100 
(0.672) 
0.130 
(0.571) 
private_k -2.107*** 
(0.000) 
-0.055 
(0.866) 
0.002 
(0.995) 
-1.391** 
(0.032) 
-0.273 
(0.576) 
-0.218 
(0.645) 
human_cap -0.012 
(0.740) 
0.023 
(0.530) 
0.016 
(0.658) 
-0.037 
(0.310) 
-0.004 
(0.918) 
-0.009 
(0.793) 
pop_65 -1.786*** 
(0.001) 
-0.286 
(0.230) 
-0.247 
(0.288) 
-0.898 
(0.102) 
-0.246 
(0.465) 
-0.290 
(0.375) 
empl_growth 
  
0.157** 
(0.024) 
  
0.174** 
(0.017) 
Obs/No. of regions 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 209/19 
Sargan Overid. Test 
79.59 
(0.105) 
84.76 
(0.207) 
84.88 
(0.227) 
87.21 
(0.035) 
83.77 
(0.228) 
85.72 
(0.209) 
LM test residual 
spatial autoc. (p-
val) 
0.835 
(0.361) 
0.024 
(0.878) 
0.210 
(0.647) 
0.212 
(0.645) 
0.049 
(0.825) 
0.377 
(0.539) 
Global Moran’s I 
test on Residuals 
(p-val) 
-0.038 
(0.363) 
-0.006 
(0.965) 
-0.019 
(0.693) 
-0.019 
(0.694) 
-0.009 
(0.903) 
-0.026 
(0.567) 
LM SAC (General 
Spatial Autoc.) 
0.894 
(0.639) 
0.061 
(0.970) 
2.015 
(0.365) 
0.240 
(0.887) 
0.717 
(0.699) 
1.950 
(0.377) 
Notes: Dependent variable is GDP per-capita growth at 2005 constant prices; p-values in parentheses *p<0.1, 
**p<0.5, ***p<0.01. Time dummies are included from 1997 to 2006. Lag dependent, spatial lag and all explanatory 
variables are treated as endogenous. Instruments are two lagged values of endogenous variables. A row weighted 
standardized inverse distance matrix is used. Constant is not shown. All regressions run using the spregdpd routine 
for STATA. 
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A Co-integration Analysis of Public Spending Composition for Italy: 
1862-2007 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Whether increasing government expenditure promotes economic growth is a controversial 
topic in growth theory. Although public spending and its composition have been attracting the 
attention of many economists, especially interested in developing countries, the empirical 
evidence seems to be inconclusive. While some researchers have found that the impact of 
government expenditure on economic growth is positive and significant (Devarajan et al., 
1996; Liu, 2008; Ghosh and Gregoriou, 2007, 2008; Alshahrani and Alsadiq, 2014), others have 
found that the impact is negative or not significant (Landau, 1983; Alexander, 1990; Folster 
and Henrekson, 1999; Gupta et al., 2005; Akpan, 2005; Mitchell, 2005; Acosta-Ormaechea and 
Morozumi, 2013). The reasons for these mixed results are multi-fold. For instance, in an 
attempt to finance rising expenditure, a government may increase taxes and/or borrowing. 
Higher income tax discourages individuals from working many hours a day, thus reducing 
income and aggregate demand. Moreover, if a government increases borrowing (especially 
from banks) in order to finance public expenditure, it will crowd-out the private sector, thus 
reducing private investment. On the other hand, government expenditure on education and 
health care would increase labour productivity. Education has been considered to be an 
independent factor of production that is indispensable to achieve high and sustainable 
economic growth rates. Government spending on health could lead to higher economic 
growth rates as long as it leads to higher levels of human capital, which is essential to growth. 
A healthy population is the wealth of a nation and healthy labour force enhances productivity 
and promotes economic growth. For instance, Barro (1991) argues that “expenditures on 
education and defence are more like public investment than public consumption; in particular, 
these expenditures are likely to affect private sector productivity or property rights, which 
matter for private investment”. In addition, government expenditure on infrastructure as 
roads and communications would also boost the rate of private domestic investment, which in 
turn fosters economic growth. 
Since the twentieth century, total government spending has considerably increased in all 
European and Extra-European countries, independently from institutional differences. 
Furthermore, the dynamic and the composition of public spending as a share of GDP have not 
been the same over time. In Italy, government spending represents most of the Public 
administrations’ expenditures. The government’s budget sets expenditures as per ministries, 
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thus aiming to produce services for the community, support other sectors of the economy and 
finance other public administrations. The Ministry of Economy has published some statistics 
showing that in the last 150 years total government spending in Italy has increased rapidly and 
significantly. In 1862 total government spending (including repayment on loans) was 
approximately 183 euro per-capita (expressed at 2009 constant prices). In 2009 it reached  
11.600 euro per-capita. Significant increases have occurred in the 1920s, in the 1930s and 
throughout the period between the 1960s and the 1990s. However, from the 1980s, there was 
an increase in the share of unproductive expenditure, namely the amount of spending devoted 
to repayment of loans, rather than to the production of services and investments. Over the last 
twenty years, total government spending (net of repayment of loans) has remained fairly 
stable at about 8000 euro per-capita.  
In percentage of GDP, total government spending ranged from approximately 14% in 1870 to 
50% in 2009.  
Particularly important has also been the irregular pattern followed by capital spending: it was 
roughly 5% of total after Italy’s Unification, with peaks of 10 percent and more than 20 percent 
between the 1940s and 1960s, to settle around 8 percent by the mid 1990s onwards.  
The significant evolution of the amount of GDP highlights the growing role of the State in the 
economy and the society. In the 150 years since its political Unification, Italy has experienced 
approximately 20 business cycles of varying duration and amplitude. The cyclical behaviour 
exhibited by aggregate demand components conforms quite well to the evidence in the 
standard international business cycle literature, although some exceptions arise during the 
pre-World War II years (Clementi et al., 2014). 
Although several empirical studies have examined the relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth in many countries (and especially developing countries) 
none of them has explored the relationship between different categories of government 
expenditures and economic growth for Italy.  
Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to examine empirically the impacts of different 
components of government expenditure on real per-capita GDP in Italy. To this end, we use an 
ARDL technique to co-integration to estimate the short- and long-run effects of these 
expenditures employing annual data over the period 1862-2007.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
literature. Section 3 gives a brief description of the existing historical data while Section 4 
refers to the theoretical model and data used for this study. Section 5 offers a theoretical 
overview regarding the methodology and Section 6 presents the empirical results. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes this chapter. 
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2. Background 
Given the importance of public expenditure in financing investment and consumption 
activities, Italy’s fiscal policy plays a vital role in its economy. The government expenditures 
can be subsumed under an economic and a functional typology. The former includes capital 
and current expenditures. The latter includes expenditures by sector, such as defence, 
economic affairs, education, health, etc. 
Figure 1 shows the historical path of total government expenditures in Italy in comparison to 
the Euro zone average and the Extra-Euro area average. As can be noted from the figure, total 
spending has increased considerably during the twentieth century in all European and Extra-
European countries. The dynamics and the composition of total government spending as share 
of GDP have not been constant over time. Nonetheless, it is possible to capture the main 
patterns that occurred from Italy’s Unification to 2009.  
 
       Figure 1. Total Government Expenditures: 1870-2009 
 
       Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Italian Ragioneria Generale dello Stato, 2011. 
 
 
On average, Extra-European countries show a ratio of total spending over GDP less significant 
than that of the European countries. Depending on the considered time period, Italy displays 
average values that are either equally distant from the averages of the two other groups or 
higher than that scored by the European countries.  
From 1870 to 1913, total government spending has reached values under 20 per cent of GDP 
(especially, in 1870 we observe values of 13.7 per cent for Italy, 10.4 percent for the European 
countries average and 12.5 percent for the Extra-European countries average). In 1913, 
aggregate government spending in Italy was 17.5 percent of GDP. The weight of public 
spending on GDP was significant during the two world wars and the Great Depression periods, 
when expansionist fiscal policies were stimulated. In the 1920s the first social security system 
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was introduced and during the 1930s (and before the World War II) some countries increased 
their military expenditures in response to the war threat. In 1937, aggregate public spending 
reached 31 percent of GDP, against 23 percent of the European countries average and 22 per 
cent of the Extra-European countries average. From the 1950s up to 1980, when the public 
sector played a major role in Italy’s economy, the government allocated a large portion of its 
budget on aggregate spending to income distribution and cyclical stabilization. At that time, 
the welfare system contributed to increase and reinforce the new State’s role. By 1980, total 
spending in Italy reached 40.6 percent of GDP against 30.1 percent in 1960; on average, the 
other European countries passed from 29.5 percent of GDP in 1960 to 46.8 per cent in 1980; 
the Extra-European countries passed from 24.2 per cent in 1960 to 35.2 per cent in 1980. Since 
the early 1990s, public spending has followed an irregular pattern due to institutional changes. 
In those years, many policies were promoted to attract private capitals to finance public 
infrastructures. Furthermore, many public authorities were created and many resources 
shifted from central to local government.           
The composition of economic classification of government spending changed over the last 
century. The main changes are listed here. For instance, during the 150 years under 
consideration, the current spending, as total percentage, has always been higher than capital 
expenditure level (see Figure 2). 
Since the end of the nineteen century, expenditure directly linked to the production of services 
declined significantly, thus ranging from 35-40 per cent during the 1960s to roughly 15 per 
cent in the last decade. Until the mid-1950s, a substantial stability can be noted about the 
share of personnel expenditure (i.e. salaries and wages; approximately between a half and two 
thirds of expenditure directly related to the production of services). The analysis shows that 
during World War I and II personnel expenditure was much lower. However, this sector cost 80 
percent to 90 percent of all expenditure directly devoted to the production of services in more 
recent years. Capital expenditure accounted for 5 percent of the total expenditure over the 
years immediately following Italy’s Unification. The data shows periods characterized by over 
10 percent peaks, such as between 1882 and 1890, 1905 and 1915 and between 1924 and 
1935; an over 20 percent peak can also be detected between mid-1940s and mid-1960s 
whereas starting from the mid-90s onwards the capital expenditure has settled at 
approximately eight percent. The Italian government allocated a large portion of its budget to 
expenditure on transfers to public administrations, households and businesses. Since the early 
twentieth century this budget was less than 15 percent of total expenditure; it subsequently 
followed a non linear trend to reach the World War II period. After that, it rose to levels 
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between 40 and 55 percent until the beginning of the 1990s and then shrank on values ranging 
from 30 and 40 percent. 
Expenditure on interest repayment accounted for one-third of the total expenditure during the 
first decades of Italy’s Unification; values between 10 and 20 percent were reached in the 
period between World War I and II and they further decreased to 6 percent until the beginning 
of the 1970s. In the early 1990s, expenditure reached a quarter of total spending due to 
inflationary phenomena that also led to significant changes in nominal interest rates. 
Currently, expenditure has further shrunk to a significant, approximate 10 percent value. 
The discontinuous trend in the share of expenditure for the repayment of loans in the first 
hundred years under scrutiny shows values greater than 20 or 30 percent only in some specific 
years. Yet, it began to grow steadily since the 1980s to reach the 25 percent of total spending 
in more recent years. 
 
                       Figure 2. Economic components of total government spending 
 
          Source: This author's elaboration based on data provided by the Italian Ragioneria Generale  
          dello Stato, 2011. 
 
Interestingly, functional components of government spending also underwent important 
changes during the period under scrutiny (cf. Figure 3 that shows these main trends). It will be 
noted that the share of total spending on defence has significantly declined if compared to the 
years immediately following Italy’s Unification. It represented over 30 percent of the total until 
1866 and was constantly around 20 percent until World War II (peaking over 70 percent during 
World War I and over 50 percent during World War II). Starting from the 1980s, spending on 
defence settled around 3 percent. Expenditure on general administration showed a gradual 
decrease until the beginning of the 1970s (halving its share from about 40 to 20 percent of 
total spending). Later, it increased again reaching approximately 35 percent of total spending. 
As for expenditure on education, it accounted for less than 2 percent until the beginning of the 
0,00
20,00
40,00
60,00
80,00
100,00
120,00
1
8
6
2
1
8
7
1
1
8
8
1
1
8
9
1
1
9
0
1
1
9
1
1
1
9
2
1
1
9
3
1
1
9
4
1
1
9
5
1
1
9
6
1
1
9
7
1
1
9
8
1
1
9
9
1
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
8
cap_exp curr_exp rep_loans other_exp
120 
 
twentieth century, but it subsequently reached 15 percent during the period between mid-
1950s and mid-1960s before stabilizing around 8-9 percent. Expenditure on social activities 
(e.g. healthcare) amounted to less than 1 percent until the World War I. It grew rapidly to 30 
percent of total spending in the mid-1980s and it nowadays counts approximately for 15 
percent of total spending. The upward trend of the share of expenditure on economic affairs 
ranged between 10 and 30 percent of total until World War I and II. After that, this component 
of government spending grew again and reached around 8 percent of total until recently. The 
share of spending for justice and public order gradually decreased from values around 6 
percent until the beginning of the 1970s to levels between 3 and 4 percent in more recent 
years. 
 
                   Figure 3. Expenditures by government functions as percentage of total  
 
          Source: This author's elaboration based on data provided by the Italian Ragioneria Generale  
          dello Stato, 2011. 
 
Figure 4 shows the series relating to GDP per capita at 2005 constant prices, which are 
expressed in natural logarithm. This analysis can be interpreted as an approximation of Italy’s 
long-run growth since the time immediately subsequent its political unification in 1861. The 
non-linear trend characterizing the development process of the country over the period 1862-
2007 emerges clearly from Figure 4. Since the end of World War II, Italian per capita GDP 
experienced an intense growth acceleration that began to decline in 1973 with the first oil 
crisis. Interestingly, during the previous ninety year (1862-1951) Italy had just doubled the 
initial GDP level, which reached its peak value only at the eve of the Italian involvement in 
World War II. 
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Figure 4. GDP per capita constant prices (1862-2007) 
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Notes: The X axis refers to years, the Y axis refers to per capita 
GDP in a logarithm scale (thousands of euros at constant 2005 
prices).  
Source: This author's elaboration based on data provided by the 
Baffigi (2011) dataset. 
 
 
3. Literature Review 
Within the framework of the neo-classical growth models, government fiscal policy does not 
have any effect on the growth of national output. Indeed, according to the Solow growth 
model (1956), public expenditure only relates to the equilibrium factor ratios and it assumes 
that public investment does not relate to long-run economic growth. Conversely, the 
Keynesian model argues that increase in government expenditure will lead to higher economic 
growth. Furthermore, the recent argument in favour of the significant relationship between 
long-run economic growth and public expenditures rests on the inclusion of fiscal policies into 
the endogenous growth models with the conclusion that public spending can affect the long-
run economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Fiscal policies can be used to enhance 
efficient allocation of resources by correcting market failures and thus encouraging higher 
human and physical capital productivity. Moreover, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) classify 
expenditures as productive and unproductive and assume that the former has a direct impact 
on the rate of economic growth whereas the latter has an indirect or no effect. Although 
productive public expenditure is expected to boost the steady state growth rate, this argument 
depends on the composition of public spending. Consequently, a trade-off between 
consumption and productive public expenditure will ultimately determine the effects on the 
long-run growth (Kneller et al., 1999). Devarajan et al. (1996) is to our knowledge the most 
comprehensive theoretical endogenous growth model. It has been subsequently extended by 
Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008). They have managed to reveal those conditions under which a 
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change in the composition of public expenditure could enhance the higher steady state growth 
rate of the economy. They have therefore concluded that the generally assumed productive 
expenditures may become unproductive if the amount allocated to them is excessive. 
However, consensus yet in the literature has not yet been reached regarding to which 
expenditure components can be defined as productive or unproductive. 
Empirical studies on the impact of government spending on economic growth may be grouped 
into two stands. One focuses on the effects of total government expenditures on economic 
progress, while the other recognizes that different types of government expenditures may 
have different effects on economic growth. In both cases, the type of analysis that scholars 
carry out differs in terms of empirical methodologies used, sample of countries and period 
analyzed. Hence, results demonstrate to be still inconclusive. Landau (1983) examines a 
sample of 96 countries and finds that an increase in the share of government expenditure’s 
reduces the growth rate of per-capita real GDP. Furthermore, using data on developing 
countries over the period 1960-1980, he finds that government consumption expenditure has 
negative effects on the growth of per-capita output, while the other types of government 
expenditure have little effect on output growth. Barro (1989) finds a significant negative 
relationship between government consumption share and the growth of real per-capita GDP 
thus highlighting the insignificant effects of government investment. Romer (1990) stresses 
that total government spending has a negative impact on economic growth. Alexander (1990) 
and Folster and Henrekson (1999) have obtained similar results and reached the same 
conclusions. 
Devarajan et al. (1996) examine the relationship between the composition of government 
spending and economic growth for a panel of 43 developing countries from 1970 to 1990. They 
find that the share of current expenditure on total spending has a positive and statistically 
significant growth effect, while capital spending has a negative impact on economic growth. 
They also find a reverse relationship for a panel of 21 developed countries. Furthermore, they 
find that government expenditures on health care, transportation and communication have 
positive effects on growth, while expenditures on defence and educations fail to produce such 
a positive impact. 
Using Swiss data from 1950 to 1994, Sing and Weber (1997) find that expenditure on 
education enhances economic growth in the long-run, while expenditure on health has the 
opposite impact. They also observed that expenditure on defence has a negative effect on 
growth rate in the short-run. Colombier (2008) makes use of Swiss data considering the period 
1950-2004 finds that education and transport infrastructures are positively and significantly 
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related to economic growth. He also provides strong evidence for the negative relationship 
between health care expenditure and economic growth. 
Niloy et al. (2003) examine growth effects of government expenditures for a panel of thirty 
developing countries over the period 1970-1980. They show that the share of government 
capital expenditure in GDP is positively and significantly correlated with economic growth, 
while current expenditure is insignificant. 
In his study on Mexico covering 1955-1999, Ramirez (2004) concludes that expenditures on 
transport, communication, education and health (as grouped as a single public infrastructure 
category) can positively affect economic growth. 
Akpan (2005) makes use of a disaggregated approach in order to determine the components of 
government expenditure that enhance growth in Nigeria. His research leads him to concludes 
that is no significant relationship between the components of government expenditure and 
growth. 
Bose et al. (2007) examine the effects of government expenditure by sector on economic 
growth for a panel of thirty developing countries, paying attention to avoid the omission bias 
that may result from ignoring the full implications of the government budget constraint. They 
find that the share of government capital expenditure on GDP is positively and statistically 
correlated with economic growth, while the impact of recurrent expenditure is insignificant for 
the group of countries they investigate. Moreover, they find that education is the key sector 
towards which public expenditure should concentrate in order to promote economic growth. 
This result seems to oppose to the previous findings of negative and insignificant effects of 
education expenditure on economic growth for developing countries as put forward by Landau 
(1986) and Devarajan et al. (1996). Bose et al. also find that public expenditures on defence, 
transport and communication sectors has a significant impact on economic growth but 
becomes insignificant when they incorporate the government budget constraint and other 
sector expenditures into their analysis. 
Olugbenga and Owoye (2007) investigate a sample of thirty countries over the period 1970-
2005. Their findings confirm the existence of a long-run relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth.  
Liu et al. (2008) examine the causal relationship between GDP and public expenditure for the 
US data over the period 1947-2002. The results show that public expenditure raises the US 
economic growth.  
In an analysis of panel data for 15 developing countries over 28 years and applying GMM 
techniques, Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) find that current (capital) spending has positive 
(negative) and significant effects on the growth rate, thus confirming the Devarajan et al.’s 
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(1996) results. Furthermore, the results show evidence of a negative and significant effect of 
health and economic expenditures on economic growth rate. 
Nurudeen and Usman (2010) analyze the impact of government expenditure on economic 
growth in Nigeria over the period 1970-2008. The results reveal that total capital expenditure, 
total recurrent expenditure and expenditure on education have negative effects on growth 
while expenditures on health, transport and communication are growth enhancing. 
Alshahrani and Alsadiq (2014) empirically examine the effects of different types of government 
expenditures on economic growth in Saudi Arabia by employing annual data over the period 
1969-2010. They find that healthcare expenditure stimulates growth in the long-run; 
moreover, spending in the housing sector can also boost short-run production.  
As for the effects of government expenditures on economic growth in Italy, sparse empirical 
evidence can be found in the existing literature. For instance, Dalena and Magazzino (2012) 
examine the long-run equilibrium relationship between government expenditure and revenue 
in Italy from 1862 to 1993 by applying co-integration and causality techniques in the long and 
short-run. The results show that changes in government revenues (taxes) lead to changes in 
government expenditures (the so called Tax-and-Spend hypothesis); in contrast, the interwar 
years are in line with the reverse relation, according to which changes in government revenues 
(taxes) respond to prior changes in government expenditures (displacement effect or Spend-
and-Taxes hypothesis). Finally, the Fiscal Synchronization hypothesis (which argues that 
expenditures and taxes are adjusted simultaneously) in Italy emerged when the Republic was 
established. 
Grisorio and Prota (2015) show evidence of a long-run relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and expenditure composition. The results demonstrate that the level of 
decentralization influences the expenditure composition. Put more simply, it reduces welfare 
spending while it also has a positive effect on the share of expenditure that supports 
productive activities.   
In this light, this study aims to fill the existing gap in the existing literature on Italy. The 
application of an ARDL technique allows us to capture the short-run dynamics and the long-run 
effects of government spending components and economic growth. Matter-of-factly, a very 
small amount of research has been devoted to the analysis of this relationship as far as Italy is 
concerned. Hence, this study examines the effect of public spending composition on economic 
growth in a very long period (1862-2007), using time-series methodologies on stationarity and 
co-integration. Furthermore, due to the significant length of the period under scrutiny, we do 
not take breaks as exogenous. We instead opted for splitting our sample and applying tests 
that could help us determine the breaks endogenously. 
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4. Model Specification 
In this study, we estimate the effects of government expenditure on economic growth for Italy. 
As mentioned earlier, different types of government spending may have different effects. 
Thus, to incorporate this hypothesis in our analysis, we will disaggregate total government 
expenditure in economic (from specification (1) to (4)) and functional components 
(specification (5)). We will use different subsets of these components, both individually and 
simultaneously to better understand how each of them affects on growth. Like Devarajan et al. 
(1996) and Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), we do not classify functional public expenditures as 
being productive and unproductive to begin with, but let the data "speak for itself". 
Furthermore, we will include trade openness as a control variable in our regressions to 
eliminate the effects of changes in trade policies.  
The theoretical model follow is explained in more detail in Chapter two. In this section, we 
therefore estimate the following long-run growth specifications: 
 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   (1) 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   (2) 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑡  + 𝛿5𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 +
𝜀𝑡     (3) 
 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑡  + 𝛾4𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑡 +  𝛾5𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 +
𝜀𝑡    (4) 
 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝜆2def_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝜆3𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝜆4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐_𝑎𝑓𝑓_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝜆5𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑕_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 +
𝜆6𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑡 + 𝜆7𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡  + 𝜀𝑡   (5) 
 
where 𝑦 is the real per capita GDP (at 2005 constant prices), 𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝 is total government 
spending to GDP ratio, which is included in each specification in order to capture the level 
effect on per capita growth. In order to eliminate the effects of changes in trade policies, we 
include trade openness, o𝑝𝑒𝑛, as a control variable measured as the sum of exports and 
imports over the real GDP. A key endogenous variable is the ratio of private capital to public 
services, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘1 (which derives directly from the theoretical model developed by Ghosh 
and Gregoriou, 2008); 𝜀 is the error term. The other fiscal variables are the economic and 
                                                          
1
 Unlike Devarajan et al. (1996), Ghosh ahd Gregoriou (2008) include private capital as a key 
determinant of the optimal growth rate. 
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functional components of government spending: 𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑒𝑥𝑝 and 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑒𝑥𝑝2 are aggregate 
capital and aggregate current spending, respectively; 𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣_𝑒𝑥𝑝 and  𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣_𝑒𝑥𝑝 are 
capital and current components of total spending devoted to public services; 𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓 and 
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓 are capital and current transfers expenditure, respectively. The functional 
components are the following: def_𝑒𝑥𝑝 is expenditure on defence, 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛_𝑎𝑓𝑓_𝑒𝑥𝑝 is the 
expenditure on economic affairs (e.g. investments on infrastructures), 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐_𝑒𝑥𝑝 is 
expenditure on education and 𝑕𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑕_𝑒𝑥𝑝 is expenditure on social affairs (e.g. social 
protection and healthcare spending). All variables are in natural logs and further explained in 
Appendix 1.  
The notation can be simplified by writing the equations above in a generic form as:  
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑚
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡  (6) 
 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖  represents 𝑚 different components of government expenditure (as also defined 
above)3.  
 
 
4.1   Data Source 
In this study, we employ annual data covering the period 1862-2007. Drawing on the 
literature, we use the natural logarithm of real per-capita GDP for the long-run analysis and 
the growth rate of real per-capita GDP for the short-run analysis. We make use of Baffigi’s 
(2011) dependent variable. The data on fiscal variables have been collected by analysis the 
material issued by the Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance – Ragioneria Generale dello 
Stato. These data are expressed as percentage shares of total spending, except for total 
government spending which is expressed as percentage of GDP. Openness to trade is 
measured as the ratio of sum of real exports and imports to the real GDP and it has been 
derived from the reports published by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). Private 
capital is expresses as share of real private capital on real total government spending, as Ghosh 
and Gregoriou’s (2008) suggest. Capital private series have been provided by the Bank of Italy4. 
Data are converted into real terms by the GDP deflator (2005=100) and scaled using a natural 
                                                          
2
 Current expenditure is net of interest spending. 
3
 It is worth remembering the different components of government expenditure: capital and current 
spending, capital and current service expenditure, capital and current transfers and expenditures on 
defence, economic affairs, education and health. 
4
 Reconstruction of public and private capital series by Di Giacinto, Micucci and Montanaro (2012b), the 
Bank of Italy. 
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logarithm. Appendix 1 reports the trend of the variables used in the analysis for the periods 
1862-1969 and 1970-2007, respectively.  
 
 
5. Methodology 
In recent literature, many claim that macroeconomic time series, and especially GDP, can be 
represented by stationary fluctuations around (deterministic) segmented trend. Hence, we 
follow Bai and Perron’s (1998, 2003) suggestion to test for multiple structural breaks at 
unknown dates. Furthermore, we apply Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) and Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) unit root tests with structural breaks to test for the presence of unit root in 
our series. These tests are further detailed in Sub-sections 5.1 and 5.2. Since we are interested 
in estimating the impact of government expenditures on economic growth in the short- and 
long-run, our preferred econometric method is the ARDL model. In the sub-section 5.3, we will 
therefore discuss some technical issues related to this methodology.    
 
 
5.1        Endogenous Breaks Testing Procedure 
Tests for parameters instability and structural change in regression models have been an 
important part of applied econometric work dating back to Chow (1960). He tested for regime 
change at a priori known dates using an F-statistic. In order to avoid such a constraint, Quandt 
(1960) modified Chow’s framework and considered the F-statistic with the largest value and 
over all possible breakdates. Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) derived the 
limiting distribution of the Quandt and related test statistic. More recently, Bai (1997) and Bai 
and Perron (1998, 2003) provided theoretical computational results that further extend the 
Quandt-Andrews framework by allowing for multiple unknown breakpoints.  
With regards to the dating of breaks, it is conventionally assumed that the dating of the 
potential break is an a priori known feature. Test statistics are then conducted by adding 
dummy variables representing different intercepts and slopes, thereby extending the standard 
Dickey-Fuller procedure. Perron’s (1989) influential study tests a null hypothesis of unit root 
under the assumption of known (exogenous, pre-tested) break date in both null and 
alternative hypotheses. However, this standard approach has been criticized. For instance, 
Christiano (1992) argues that this approach invalidates the distribution theory underlying 
conventional testing. Since Perron's work, a number of studies have developed different 
methodologies to endogenously determine dates (cf. for example Zivot and Andrews (1992), 
Lumsdaine and Papell (1997), Vogelsand and Perron (1998) and Bai and Perron (2003)). All 
128 
 
these studies show that determining the time of the structural breaks endogenously, bias in 
the usual unit root tests can be reduced. As for our sample, the hypothesis of one unique 
structural break is too restrictive, due to the large time-span under scrutiny. We therefore 
need to apply a methodology that allows us to determine multiple structural breaks. To this 
end, we apply a multiple break point estimation as suggested by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003).  
Bai and Perron (1998) developed a test for multiple structural changes. According to Lee and 
Strazicich (2003), the minimum Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root test assumes breaks in the 
null hypothesis and allows for more than one endogenous determined structural break in the 
unit root testing. Glynn et al. (2007) confirmed the LM test to be a superior estimation for 
structural breaks. 
Bai and Perron (1998) propose an algorithm (which is based on the principle of dynamic 
programming) for the efficient global minimization of the sum of squared residuals, in which 
the dates, unknown a priori, of multiple breaks are estimated together with the parameters of 
the model. These dates correspond to the partition of the sample that minimizes the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) among all possible points of break that are characterized by a 
certain number of years.  
Bai and Perron’s (1998, 2003) approach (hereafter, the BP approach) to structural breaks 
considers a multiple linear regression with 𝑚 breaks: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡
′𝛽𝑗 + 𝜇𝑡                        𝑡=𝑇𝑗−1+1,…..,𝑇𝑗   𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑗=1,….,𝑚+1  (7) 
 
where 𝑗 is the segment index, 𝑦𝑡  is the observed dependent variable at time 𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 𝑝 × 1  is a 
vector of covariates and 𝛽𝑗  and is the corresponding vector of coefficients. 𝜇𝑡  is the stationary 
disturbance term which may have a different distribution across regimes. It is reasonable to 
assume that there are 𝑚 breakpoints, where the coefficients shift from one stable regression 
relationship to a different one.  𝑇1,… . ,𝑇𝑚   denotes each 𝑚 −partition. The break points 
 𝑇1 ,… . ,𝑇𝑚   are treated as unknown.  
Given an 𝑚−partition 𝑇1 ,… . ,𝑇𝑚  the least square estimates for the 𝛽𝑗  can easily be obtained 
by minimizing the sum of squared residuals: 
 
𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝑇1 ,… ,𝑇𝑚  =  𝑟𝑠𝑠 𝑇𝑗−1 + 1,𝑇𝑗  ,
𝑚+1
𝑗=1  (8) 
 
where 𝑟𝑠𝑠 𝑇𝑗−1 + 1,𝑇𝑗   is the usual minimal residual sum of squares in the 𝑗𝑡𝑕 segment. The 
problem of dating structural changes is to find the breakpoints 𝑇 1 ,… ,𝑇 𝑚  that minimize the 
objective function: 
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  𝑇 1 ,… ,𝑇 𝑚 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 T1 ,…,Tm   𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝑇1 ,… ,𝑇𝑚    (9) 
 
where the minimization is taken over all partitions  𝑇1 ,… ,𝑇𝑚   such that 𝑇𝑖 − 𝑇𝑖−1 ≥ 𝑕 ≥ 𝑞. 
Thus, the breakpoint estimators are global minimisers of the objective function. Finally, the 
regression parameter estimates are obtained using the associated least squares estimates at 
the estimated 𝑚 −partition  𝑇 𝑗  , i.e. 𝛽  = 𝛽    𝑇 𝑗   . Bai and Perron (2003a) offer an efficient 
algorithm to obtain global minimizers of the sum of squared residuals. It is based on the 
principle of dynamic programming. It is important to point out that, in general, 𝑕 does not 
need not be set to 𝑞. Indeed, many instances show that trimming is a choice made 
independently of the number of regressors.  
The main objective of this analysis is to determine the optimal number and location of the 
structural break points by minimizing the within-regime sums of squares5. 
In the case of various structural breaks, there are various ways to obtain the test statistics 
breaks: 
i. Sequential 𝑙 + 1 breaks versus 𝑙 estimation of break points; 
ii. A double maximum test (global 𝑙 versus none), which tests a null hypothesis of no 
structural break against an alternative hypothesis of unknown number of breaks, given 
some upper bound; 
iii. Test of 𝑙 versus 𝑙 + 1 breaks. This considers a null hypothesis of L breaks against an 
alternative that additional break exists, the breaks are obtained by global minimization 
of the sum of squared residuals; 
iv. Global Information Criteria. 
Bai (1997) describes an intuitive approach to detect more than one break. The procedure 
involves the sequential application of breakpoint tests including the full sample. It also 
requires the performance of a test of parameter constancy with unknown break. If the test 
rejects the null hypothesis of constancy, a new test should be carried out to determine the 
breakdate. This is done by dividing the sample into two sub-samples that will undergo 
individual unknown breakpoint tests. Each of these tests may be viewed as an a test of the null 
hypothesis of 𝑙 = 1 breaks versus the alternative of 𝑙 + 1 = 2. A breakpoint whenever a sub-
sample null is rejected should be also added. The procedure can then be repeated until all of 
                                                          
5
 When implementing the BP procedure for structural change, the minimum fraction of observation 𝜀 
(equivalent to the minimum number of observations 𝑕) is allocated to any regime over which the search 
for break points is conducted. This is a parameter each individual researcher should establish. As for our 
data, our search employs a parameter of 𝜀 = 0.15, corresponding to the minimal size of 𝑕 = 15 yearly 
observations; this amounts allow simultaneous calculation for up to 𝑚 = 5 breaks. 
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the subsamples do not reject the null hypothesis, or until the maximum number of breakpoints 
allowed or maximum subsample intervals to test is reached.  
A single test of no breaks against an alternative of 𝑙 breaks assumes that the alternative 
number of breakpoints 𝑙 is pre-specified. In cases where 𝑙 is unknown, we may test the null of 
no structural change against an unknown number of breaks. This type of testing is named  
double maximum since it involves the maximization of both a given 𝑙 and across various values 
of the test statistic for 𝑙. The equal-weighted version of the test, called 𝑈𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 chooses 
selects the alternative that maximizes the statistic across the number of breakpoints. An 
alternative approach, denoted 𝑊𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 applies weights to the individual statistics so that the 
implied marginal p-values are equal prior to taking the maximum. The distribution of these test 
statistics are non-standard, but Bai and Perron (2003b) provide critical value and response 
surface computations for various trimming parameters (i.e. the minimum sample size for 
estimating a break), number of regressors, and number of breaks.  
Bai and Perron (1998) describe a modified Bai (1997) approach in which the breakpoints under 
the null are obtained by global minimization of the sum of squared residuals at each step. This 
approach can be viewed as an 𝑙 + 1 versus 𝑙 test procedure that combines the global and 
sequential testing approaches. 
The global information criteria is based on two different criteria: Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) as suggested by Yao (1988) and a modified Schwarz criterion (LWZ) as suggested 
by Liu et al. (1997). Yao (1988) shows that under relatively strong conditions, the number of 
breaks that minimizes the Schwarz criterion is a consistent estimator of the true number of 
breaks in a breaking mean model. More generally, Liu, Wu and Zidek (1997) propose the use of 
the modified Schwarz criterion to determine the number of breaks in a regression framework. 
LWZ offer theoretical results showing consistency of the estimated number of breakpoints, 
and provide simulation results to guide the choice of the modified penalty criterion. 
Overall, the sequential procedure works best in selecting the number of breaks (Bai and 
Perron, 2004). Nonetheless, Bay and Perron (2004) suggest that the performance of the 
sequential procedure can be improved. In this sense, a useful strategy is to first look at the 
𝑈𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 or 𝑊𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 tests to see whether at least a break is present. The number of breaks can 
subsequently be decided on the basis of an examination of a test for 𝑙 versus 𝑙 + 1 breaks, 
which are constructed using estimates of the break dates obtained from a global minimization 
of the sum of squared residuals. According to Bai and Perron (2004), this is the preferred 
strategy. 
We select a maximum of five breaks and use a trimming of 0.15 to apply break least square 
regression and multiple break points tests. We apply all four tests and then we choose the 
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breaks based upon the test of 𝑙 versus 𝑙 + 1 breaks. From the results reported in Table 1, it is 
possible to note that, the break points correspond to the periods when some major changes 
occurred in Italy. The main breaks are in correspondence of the great depression to the late 
nineteenth century, the economic crisis in 1921-22, the years around the economic miracle 
after World War II, the years of the oil crisis and the end of the 1980 when the public spending 
incidence has increased to 40-50% of GDP. 
Our aim is to investigate the effectiveness of the government composition spending in 
sustaining output growth when different regimes are switching over time. This is because an 
explicit change in a law or in a policy would lead to a change in the behaviour of a series, at the 
time the new regime, comes into effect. 
 
 
Table 1. Multiple breaks tests 
 Sequential 
𝒍+ 𝟏 breaks 𝒗𝒔 
𝒍 
Global 𝒍 breaks 𝒗𝒔 none 
𝒍+ 𝟏 breaks 
𝒗𝒔 global 𝒍 
Global Information 
Criteria 
  UDmax WDmax  Schwarz LWZ 
Model 1 
1896, 1923, 1953, 
1973 
1896, 1923, 
1953, 1973 
1896, 1923, 
1953, 1973 
1896, 1923, 
1953, 1973 
1896, 1923, 
1953, 1973 
1896, 1923, 
1953, 1973 
Model 2 
1892, 1919, 1951, 
1969, 1989 
1892, 1919, 
1951, 1970, 
1989 
1892, 1919, 
1951, 1970, 
1989 
1891, 1927, 
1958, 1988 
1891, 1927, 
1958, 1988 
1891, 1927, 
1958, 1988 
Model 3 
1896, 1923, 1953, 
1973 
1893, 1919, 
1949, 1968, 
1987 
1893, 1919, 
1949, 1968, 
1987 
1893, 1919, 
1949, 1968, 
1987 
1898, 1949, 
1968 
1898, 1949, 
1968 
Model 4 
1895, 1924, 1955, 
1986 
1892, 1919, 
1949, 1968, 
1989 
1892, 1919, 
1949, 1968, 
1989 
1895, 1927, 
1958, 1988 
1927, 1958, 
1988 
1927, 1958, 
1988 
Model 5 
1881, 1920, 1953, 
1984 
1881, 1920, 
1951, 1970, 
1989 
1881, 1920, 
1951, 1970, 
1989 
1881, 1920, 
1951, 1970, 
1989 
1951, 1984 1951, 1984 
Note: The second column starting from the left reports Bai-Perron tests of 𝑙 + 1 𝑣𝑠 𝑙 sequentially 
determined breaks; the second one reports the Bai-Perron tests of 1 to 𝑀 globally determined breaks; 
the third one the Bai-Perron tests of 𝑙 + 1 𝑣𝑠 𝑙 globally determined breaks; and the last one compare 
information criteria for 0 to 𝑀 globally determined breaks. We have select the maximum number of 5 
breaks for each test. Tests are based on the entire sample (1862-2007). We have excluded 
observations close to two World War I and II (i.e. intervals 1914-1918 and 1938-1948) to avoid having 
already known breaks.  
 
 
5.2        Unit Roots Tests with Structural Breaks 
Before testing whether the series are co-integrated, we have investigated the order of 
integration of each series by means of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron 
(PP) unit root tests. Table A7 and A8 summarize the results for both tests. Perron (1989, 1990) 
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demonstrates that if a time-series exhibits stationary fluctuations around a trend or a level 
containing a structural break, then unit root tests will erroneously conclude that a unit root 
exists. Structural breaks occurs in many time series for any number of reasons, including 
economic crises, changes in institutional arrangements, policy changes and regime shifts. It can 
also be changed in economic policies or large economic shocks, such as World War I and II and 
the oil crisis in 1973. In our case, ADF and PP tests statistics may be misleading since several 
series have been subject to structural breaks over the sample period. A well-known weakness 
of the ADF unit root test is that it may fail to reject the unit root hypothesis if the series have a 
structural break6. The ADF test tends to have low power and, although not rejecting the null 
hypothesis, it does not always mean that the series is non-stationary (Perman and Byrne, 
2006). For the series that are found to be I(1), they may be stationary around the structural 
break(s), I(0), but they are erroneously classified as I(1). This implies that a structural break can 
have a permanent effect on the pattern of the time series (Perman and Byrne, 2006). Testing 
the unit root hypothesis allowing for structural breaks has some advantages. Firstly, it prevents 
test results from becoming biased towards unit root. Secondly, it can identify when the 
possible break occurred. Perron (1989)  proposes to allow for a known or exogenous structural 
break in the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Following this development, many authors, 
including Zivot and Andrews (1992) and Perron (1997), propose to “endogenously” from the 
data determine the break point from the data.  
Zivot and Andrews (1992) (henceforth, ZA) transforms Perron’s unit root test (which is based 
upon an exogenously determined break date) into an unconditional unit root test. In other 
words, instead of treating the break date as fixed these authors purpose a test where the 
break date is estimated. This test allows for a single break in the intercept and the trend 
(slope) of the series. They suggest a sequential test using the full sample and a different 
dummy variable for each possible break date (Perman and Byrne, 2006). The estimated model 
takes the following form: 
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜃1𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑇𝑡 +  𝑑𝑗∆𝑦𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑘
𝑗=1   (10) 
 
Here, ∆ is the first difference operator, 𝜀𝑡  is a white noise disturbance term with variance 𝜎
2, 
and 𝑡 = 1,… ,𝑇 is an index of time. The ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑗  term on the right hand side of the above 
equation allows for serial correlation and ensures that the disturbance term is white noise. 
Finally, 𝐷𝑈𝑡  is an indicator dummy variable for a mean shift occurring at time 𝑇𝐵 and 𝐷𝑇𝑡  is 
                                                          
6
 Perron (1989) argues that the power to reject unit root decreases when the stationary alternative is 
true and a structural break is ignored.   
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the corresponding trend shift variable, where 𝐷𝑈𝑡 = 1 and 𝐷𝑇𝑡 = 𝑡 − 𝑇𝐵 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > 𝑇𝐵; 0 
otherwise. As it conventionally occurs in these tests, a “trimming region” *0.15,0.85+ is chosen 
and the break point is selected where the value of 𝑇𝐵 for which the ADF t-statistic is 
minimized. The null hypothesis here is that the series 𝑦𝑡 , is an integrated process without a 
structural break. This goes against the alternative hypothesis that the series is trend stationary 
with a structural break in the trend function, which occurs at an unknown time.  
The ZA strategy also relates to similar tests proposed by Perron-Vogelsang (1992). However, 
one obvious weakness is its inability to deal with more than one break in a time series. 
Addressing this problem, Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998) (henceforth, CMR) propose two 
tests that allow considering one and two events within the observed history of a time series. In 
these tests, the null hypothesis is that the series has a unit root with a structural break(s) 
against the alternative hypothesis that it is stationary with break(s). The null hypothesis is 
rejected if the calculated 𝑡 statistic is grater in absolute value than the critical value. The 
advantage of these tests is that they do not require an a priori knowledge of the structural 
break dates. CMR (1998) unit root tests offer two models: (1) an additive outliers (AO), which 
captures a sudden change in the mean of a series; and (2) an innovational outliers (IO) model, 
which allows for a gradual shift in the mean of the series. This taxonomy of structural break 
follows from Perron and Vogelsang’s (1992) work. The double break additive outlier AO model 
involves the estimation of the following specification: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛿1𝐷𝑈1𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐷𝑈2𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡   (11) 
 
where 𝐷𝑈𝑚𝑡 = 1 for 𝑡 > 𝑇𝑏𝑚  and 0 otherwise, for 𝑚 = 1,2. 𝑇𝑏1 and 𝑇𝑏2 are the breakpoints 
to be located by grid search. The residuals from this regression, 𝑦𝑡 , are then the dependent 
variable in the equation to be estimated. They are regressed on their lagged values, a number 
of lagged differences, and a set of dummy variables needed to make the distribution of the 
test statistic tractable: 
 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝜔1𝑖𝐷𝑇𝑏1,𝑡−𝑖 +  𝜔2𝑖𝐷𝑇𝑏2,𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛼𝑦 𝑡−𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1 +  𝜃𝑖∆𝑦 𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1    (12) 
 
where 𝐷𝑇𝑏𝑚 ,𝑡 = 1 for 𝑡 = 𝑇𝑏𝑚 + 1 and 0 otherwise, for 𝑚 = 1, 2. No intercept is necessary, as 
𝑦 𝑡  is mean zero. This regression is then estimated over feasible pairs of 𝑇𝑏1 and 𝑇𝑏2, searching 
for the minimal 𝑡-ratio for the hypothesis 𝛼 = 1; that is, they are compared with the critical 
values provided by Perron and Vogelsang (1992) as they do not follow the standard Dickey-
Fuller distribution. 
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The equivalent model for the innovational outlier (i.e. gradual change) model expresses the 
shocks to the series (the effects of 𝛿1 , 𝛿2 above) as having the same ARMA representation as 
other shocks to the model, leading to the formulation: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛿1𝐷𝑈1𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐷𝑈2𝑡 + 𝜑1𝐷𝑇𝑏1,𝑡 + 𝜑2𝐷𝑇𝑏2,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝜃𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1   (13) 
 
where again an estimate of 𝛼 significantly less than unity will provide evidence against the I(1) 
null hypothesis. In each of these models, breakpoints 𝑇𝑏1, 𝑇𝑏2 and the appropriate lag order 𝑘 
are unknown. The breakpoints are located by a two-dimensional grid search for the maximal 
(most negative) 𝑡 − statistic for the unit root hypothesis  𝛼 = 1 , while 𝑘 is determined by a 
set of sequential 𝐹 −tests. 
These tests attempt to verify the null hypothesis 𝐻0 against the alternative hypothesis 𝐻1: 
 
𝐻0: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝐷𝑇𝐵1𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐷𝑇𝐵2𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡  (14) 
𝐻1: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑢 + 𝑑1𝐷𝑈1𝑡 + 𝑑2𝐷𝑇𝐵2𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡  (15) 
 
In these equations, 𝐷𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡  is a pulse variable equal to one if 𝑡 = 𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 1  and becomes zero 
otherwise. Further, 𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > 𝑇𝐵1 (𝑖 = 1, 2) and zero otherwise. 𝑇𝐵1 and 𝑇𝐵2 
represents the time periods when the mean is being modified. For simplicity, assume that 
𝑇𝐵𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖𝑇  𝑖 = 1, 2  where 0 < 𝜆𝑖 < 1 and 𝜆2 > 𝜆1 (Clemente et al., 1998). 
If the two breaks belong to the innovational outlier, one can test the unit root hypothesis by 
estimating the following model: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜌𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝐷𝑇𝐵1𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐷𝑇𝐵2𝑡 + 𝑑1𝐷𝑈1𝑡 + 𝑑2𝐷𝑈2𝑡 +  𝑐𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1 ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡   (16) 
 
The minimum value of the simulated t-ratio is obtained from this estimation and this value can 
be used for testing whether the autoregressive parameter is 1 for all break time combinations. 
In order to derive the asymptotic distribution of this statistic, assume that 0 < 𝜆0 < 𝜆1, 
𝜆2 < 1 − 𝜆0 < 1. By implementing the largest possible window, 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 take values in the 
 
 𝑡+2 
𝑇
,  𝑇 − 1 /𝑇  interval. Further, assume that 𝜆2 > 𝜆1 + 1 which implies that cases where 
the breaks occur in consecutive periods are eliminated (Clemente et al., 1998). 
If the shifts are better described as additive outliers, the unit root hypothesis can be tested 
through a two step procedure. First, eliminate the deterministic part of the variable by 
estimating the following model: 
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𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝑑1𝐷𝑈1𝑡 + 𝑑2𝐷𝑈2𝑡 + 𝑦   (17) 
 
The second step involves taking out the test by searching for the minimal t-ratio for the 
hypothesis that 𝜌 = 1 in the following model: 
 
𝑦 𝑡 =  𝜔1𝑖𝐷𝑇𝐵1𝑡−𝑖 +  𝜔2𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=0 𝐷𝑇𝐵2𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜌𝑦 𝑡−1 +  𝑐𝑖∆𝑦 𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=0   (18) 
 
The dummy variable 𝐷𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡  is included in this model to make sure that 
min 𝑡𝜌 
𝐴𝑂 𝜆1,𝜆2  converges to the distribution (Clemente et al., 1998)
7: 
 
min 𝑡𝜌 
𝐴𝑂 𝜆1 ,𝜆2  ⟶ 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝜆=Λ
𝐻
 𝜆1 𝜆2−𝜆1  1−𝜆2  1/2𝐾1/2
  (19) 
 
According to Baum (2005), if the estimates of the CMR unit root tests provide evidence of 
significant additive or innovational outliers in the time series, the results derived from ADF and 
PP tests are doubtful, since this is evidence that the model excluding structural breaks is miss-
specified. Therefore, in applying unit root tests in time series that exhibit structural breaks, 
only the results from the CMR unit root tests are considered. This occurs if the two structural 
breaks indicated by the respective tests are statistically significant at the 5% level. On the 
other hand, if the results of the CMR unit root tests show no evidence of two significant breaks 
in the series, the results from the CMR for one break, or Zivot and Andrews unit root tests are 
considered. If these tests show no evidence of a structural break, the ADF and PP tests can be 
considered.  
 
 
5.3        The ARDL Estimation Approach 
To test the long run relationship among our variables (equations (1)-(5) above), we use the 
robust econometric technique, Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL or Bound testing) model 
originally introduced by Pesaran and Shin (1999) and further extended by Pesaran et al. (2001). 
We have decided to adopt this method for three reasons. Firstly, unlike other multivariate co-
integration methods (e.g. Johansen and Juselius, 1990), the Bounds test is a simple technique 
that allows the co-integration relationship to estimated a single equation by OLS, once the lag 
order of the model is identified8. Secondly, in order to employ a valid standard co-integration 
                                                          
7
 For more technical information see Clemente, Montañés and Reyes (1998). 
8
 It is worth noting that with the ARDL. Variables may have a different optimal number of lags, while 
Johansen’s co-integration procedure does not allow it. 
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testing (such as those carried out by Engle and Granger, or Johansen), we need to ensure that 
all of the series are integrated according to the same order9. The Bounds test allows a mixture 
of I(0) and I(1) variables as regressors, which means that the order of integration of 
appropriate variables may not necessarily be the same10. Therefore, the ARDL technique has 
the advantage that it does not require a specific identification of the order of the underlying 
data. The first step to take in any co-integration technique is to determine the degree of 
integration of each variable in the model. However, this depends on which unit root test one 
uses. Moreover, different unit root tests could lead to contradictory results. Interestingly, the 
ARDL approach is useful as it helps avoiding these problems. Thirdly, this technique is also 
suitable for small or finite sample sizes (Pesaran et al., 2001). The short and long-run 
coefficients of the model are estimated simultaneously and all variables of the model are 
assumed to be endogenous. Johansen’s co-integration technique (which avoids the ARDL 
approach) entails a large set of choices to be taken into consideration. For instance, it involves 
decisions such as the number of endogenous and exogenous variables to be included, the 
treatment of deterministic elements, as well as the order of VAR and the optimal number of 
lags to be used. Most importantly, the estimation procedures are very sensitive to the method 
used to make these choices and take these decisions (Pesaran and Smith, 1998). 
According to Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), the ARDL approach requires the following two steps. 
In the first step, the existence of any long-run relationship among the variables of interest is 
determined using an F-test. The second step of the analysis is to estimate the coefficients of 
the long-run relationship and determine their values. This is followed by the estimation of the 
short-run elasticity of the variables with the error correction representation of the ARDL 
model.  
The unrestricted error correction (UECM) versions of the ARDL model of the functional forms 
explained in the section above are given below: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜌2𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝜌3𝑘_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜌4𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡−1 +  𝜌𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡−1
𝑖 +
𝜂1𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜂2𝛥𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜂3𝛥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜂4𝛥𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡−𝑗 +  𝜂𝑖∆𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡−𝑗
𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡𝑖∈𝜃  (20) 
where 𝑗 is the optimal number of lags; all variables are as defined above and in the Appendix 1. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖  represents 𝑚 different components of government expenditure (as defined above in 
section IV).  Furthermore, 𝜌0 is drift component and 𝜀𝑡  represents the white noise.  
                                                          
9
 Two or more variables are said to be integrated if they contain a stable long-run linkage. Greene (2003) 
elaborates co-integration as pre-test for the avoidance of spurious regression analysis, and explains that 
the integration order of all variables should be the same or greater than I(0); this also mean series 
should be non-stationary at level form. 
10
 It is important that the series are not I(2). 
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Equation (20) indicates that economic growth tends to be influenced and explained by its past 
values. The structural lags are established by using minimum Schwarz Bayesian Information 
Criteria (SBC)11.  
After each regression, the Wald test (F-statistic) is computed to differentiate the long-run 
relationship between the concerned variables. The Wald test can be carried out by imposing 
restrictions on the estimated long-run coefficients. The null and alternative hypotheses 
(according to which all coefficients are jointly equal to zero) are as follows: 
 
𝐻0: 𝜌1 = 𝜌2 = 𝜌3 = 𝜌4 = 𝜌𝑖 = 0  (21) 
 
i.e., there is no co-integration among variables.  
 
𝐻1: 𝜌1 ≠ 𝜌2 ≠ 𝜌3 ≠ 𝜌4 ≠ 𝜌𝑖 ≠ 0  (22) 
 
i.e., there is co-integration among variables. 
The asymptotic distribution of the Wald-test is non-standard under the null hypothesis of no 
co-integration among variables. Consequently, the computed F-statistic value will be evaluated 
with the critical values tabulated in Tables CI of Pesaran et al. (2001). These critical values are 
calculated for different regressors and whether the model contains an intercept and/or a 
trend. According to these authors, the lower bound critical values assume that the explanatory 
variables are integrated of order zero, or I(0), while the upper bound critical values assume 
that the same variables are integrated of order one, or I(1).  
The two sets of critical values provide critical value bounds for all classifications of the 
regressors into purely I(1), purely I(0) or mutually cointegrated. However, these critical values 
are generated for sample size of 500 and 1000 observations and 20000 and 40000 replications 
respectively. Narayan (2004a) and Narayan (2005) argue that existing critical values, due to 
their large sample sizes, cannot be used for small sample sizes12. For this reason, we rely on 
those values reported in Narayan (2005), which calculated for sample sizes ranging from 30-80 
observations.  
Therefore, if the computed F-statistic is smaller than the lower bound value, then the null 
hypothesis is not rejected and we can conclude that there is no long-run relationship between 
economic growth and its determinants. Conversely, if the computed F-statistic is greater than 
                                                          
11
 Pesaran and Smith  (1998) argue that the SBC should be used in preference to other model 
specification criteria because it often has more parsimonious specifications. 
12
 For instance, Narayan (2005) compares the critical values generated with 31 observations and the 
critical values reported in Pesaran et al. (2001). He finds that the upper bound critical value at the 5% 
significance level for 31 observations with four regressors is 4.13 while the corresponding critical value 
for 1000 observations is 3.49, which is 18.3% lower than the critical value for 31 observations.      
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the upper bound value, then capital expenditure and economic growth share a long-run level 
relationship. On the other hand, if the computed F-statistic falls between the lower and the 
upper bound values, then the results are inconclusive.     
In order to find out the short run coefficients, we make use of the following equation (which 
represents the final version of the estimated model): 
 
∆𝑦𝑡  = 𝜌0 + 𝜂1𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜂2𝛥𝑡𝑜𝑡_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜂3𝛥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑘 𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜂4𝛥𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡−𝑗 + 
 𝜂𝑖∆𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑡−𝑗
𝑖 + 𝜔𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡𝑖∈𝜃   (23) 
 
where the 𝜂𝑠 are the short-run dynamic elasticities of the model's convergence to long-run 
equilibrium and 𝜔 is the speed of adjustment. Δ represents the first differences operator and 
the 𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 refers to the one period lagged error correction term. The coefficient of 𝐸𝐶𝑇 
provides the speed with which variables returns to their equilibrium position in the long-run, in 
the event of shocks to the system. The sign of 𝐸𝐶𝑇 should be negative and statistically 
significant. In each equation, changes in the endogenous variables are caused not only by their 
lags, but also by the previous period’s disequilibrium in level.  
In the final step, we apply Hendry and Ericson’s (1991) general-to-specific modelling technique 
to select the preferred ECM. This procedure first estimates the ECM with different lag lengths 
for the differences terms. Subsequently, it simplifies the representation by eliminating the lags 
with insignificant parameters. A correctly indicated ECM model has to pass a series of 
diagnostic tests. These include the Autoregressive LM (Lagrange Multiplier) test and/or the 
Durbin Watson test for serial correlation in residuals and the Jarcque-Bera test for normality 
distribution of residuals. In this study, we also apply the Ramsey RESET specification test. In 
summary, these tests have been conducted to ensure the reliability of results. Stability tests, 
such as CUSUM and CUSUMSQ are also employed to check the stability of the estimated 
coefficients over the time periods. 
 
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1         Unit Roots Tests 
While the presence of a long run relationship among variables remains critical to valid 
estimation and inference, Pesaran et al. (2001) suggest that the ARDL approach remains valid 
regardless of the order of integration of the explanatory variables. The ARDL methodology 
thus has the advantage of not requiring a precise identification of the order of integration of 
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the underlying data. The ARDL approach to co-integration does not require the pre-testing of 
the variables (which are included in the model) for unit root, unlike other techniques such as 
Johansen’s approach (Pesaran et al. (2001)). However, we test for unit roots to eliminate the 
possibility of I(2) variables. In the presence of such variables the computed F-statistics 
provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) are no longer valid because they are based on the 
assumption that the variables are I(0) or I(1).  
To verify the order of integration, this work applies the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
Phillips Perron (PP) unit root tests13 (see Tables A3, A7 and A8 in Appendix 114). The ADF and 
PP unit root tests suggest that each variable is integrated of order one I(1) and stationary I(0). 
However, this analysis is not concerned with the implications of structural breaks on unit roots. 
Given the inability of standard ADF and PP to capture the impact of structural breaks, we firstly 
report the CMR two structural breaks test (see Tables A4, A9 and A11 in Appendix 1). In the 
entire period, most of the variables used in the analysis exhibit two statistically significant 
structural breaks. Total capital spending (in AO and IO models)15 has only one statistically 
significant break. Henceforth, we also test the variables by means of CMR with one structural 
break and ZA tests. Despite the breaks in many of the series under consideration, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected in the AO model. The CMR test with two structural breaks, 
allows to reject the null in many cases, solely in the IO model. In general, the breaks are in 
correspondence to the years between World War I and II, or around the 1970s (i.e. during the 
years of the oil crisis years)16. The CMR (Clemente-Montañés-Reyes) test with one structural 
break allows us rejecting the null in both cases, namely the AO and the IO models. It means 
that in some years the changes took place gradually and in other years they were faster. 
Furthermore, the results of the CMR test with one structural break and the ZA test are very 
similar in terms of rejection of the null. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the sub-sample 
period 1862-1969. 
Regarding the sub-sample period 1970-2007, the AO model with the CMR test with one 
structural break seems to be more appropriate for the variables as they all appear to have 
sudden structural changes rather than gradual shifts. Given the mix in the order of integration 
                                                          
13
 Unless otherwise stated, the tests are based on the default setting of lag length for ADF and 
bandwidth for PP.  
14
 We test for unit roots for the entire sample (1862-2007), and for the two sub-samples under analysis: 
1862-1969 and 1970-2007. 
15
 Bear in mind that in the AO model changes are assumed to take place rapidly, while in the IO model 
changes are assumed to take place gradually. 
16
 These results confirm those found during the multiple breakpoint tests. It is worth noting that the unit 
root test with structural break can be applied only to the series without any missing observation or 
jump. For this reason and in order to apply CMR and ZA tests, we also consider the years during World 
War I and II.  
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of the variables, we have opted to estimate our model specifications by means of an ARDL co-
integration technique. 
 
 
6.2         Co-integration (sample period 1970-2007) 
Since we are interested in estimating the impact of government expenditures on economic 
growth in the short- and long-run simultaneously, the ARDL model becomes our preferred 
econometric method. We apply the ADRL co-integration approach to each specification. The 
empirical results from the estimated ARDL model are presented from table 2 to 5. In the first 
stage, the order of lag length is obtained from an unrestricted vector autoregressive model 
(VAR) through the Schwartz Bayesian Criteria (SBC). The order of lag length appears to be 
different for each specification. Following Pesaran et al.’s (1997) procedure, we first estimate 
an OLS regression for the first differences part of the unrestricted equation and test for the 
joint significance of the parameters of the lagged level variables when added to the first 
regression. According to Pesaran et al. (1997), “this OLS regression in first differences are of no 
direct interest” to the bounds co-integration test. The F-statistic tests the joint null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of the lagged level variables are zero (i.e. they do not share any long-run 
relationship). The results for the computed Wald tests (F-statistics), reported in the last row of 
each table, reveal that the calculated F-statistics is higher than the upper bound critical value 
in all specifications17. As per these results, we can safely conclude that a level long-run co-
integration relationship exists for the estimated ARDL models. 
 
 
6.3         Long-run Analysis  
Once the existence of a long-run relationship has been established, equations (1)-(11) can be 
estimated using the ARDL model. Tables 2 and 3 show the long-run estimated coefficients 
respectively for the economic and functional components. On an aggregate level, total 
government expenditure has played a positive role in augmenting real per capita GDP in Italy. 
This is the level effect of total government spending on per capita GDP. Interestingly, 
Devarajan et al. (1996) have found it to be positive but insignificant; in contrast, Ghosh and 
Gregoriou (2008) have found it to be positive and statistically significant. The result is intuitive 
and coherent with the optimal fiscal policy perspective. Put differently, in order to finance a 
higher level of government spending, higher distortionary taxes are needed. The steady-state 
                                                          
17 According to Narayan (2005), the existing critical values reported in Pesaran et al. (2001) cannot be 
used for small sample size because they are based on large sample sizes. Narayan (2005) provides a set of 
critical values for sample sizes ranging from 30 to 80 observations.  
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GDP growth will increase only if the productivity of that government spending exceeds the 
deadweight loss associated with the taxes required to pay it. This result is robust in all 
specifications. 
The estimated coefficients of the long-run relationship show that there is a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the capital component of public expenditure and 
real per capita GDP, contrary to the a priori theoretical expectation of a positive sign. A similar 
negative relation is obtained by Devarajan et al. (1996) and Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) for 
developing countries. Barro (1990, 1991) finds that consumption expenditure (i.e. current 
expenditure less education and defence expenditure) is associated with lower per-capita 
growth. Public expenditure on capital goods is supposed to add to the country’s physical 
capital (e.g. infrastructure, roads, bridges, dams, ports, etc). Thus, the stock of infrastructure 
capital would complement private-sector productivity and, consequently, have favourable 
effects on growth. To understand better the negative effect of capital spending, we also 
estimate the capital spending sub-components and examine which of them had driven this 
negative effect. As demonstrated in equation (2) in Table 2, we replace capital spending with 
its sub-components, which are capital services and capital transfers expenditures. The results 
show that the first item in the long-run has not significant effects, while the second one has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on the real per-capita GDP. As shown in the 
theoretical model, an increase in the share devoted to the expenditures that are traditionally 
considered to be productive does not need to raise the economic growth. The initial shares 
could be such that this kind of expenditure is there is already too large and its increase 
becomes counterproductive18. Italy may be one of such cases that devote too much resources 
expenditures on capital transfers. Consequently, a unit increase in the ratio of capital transfers 
to total public spending decreases per capita real GDP by 18 percent.  
Equation (4) in Table 2 shows the results for the regression of current public spending to total 
public spending. In the long-run, the coefficient is insignificant. This is also confirmed when its 
sub-components are considered (i.e. current services and current transfers expenditures).  
Both theory and intuition suggest that expenditure ratios and per capita GDP might have a 
nonlinear relationship. From the theoretical model we know that productive expenditures can 
be positively associated with growth when their shares in the budget are low; however, this 
relationship becomes negative when the shares are large. The intuition is that as the share 
keeps rising, decreasing return to scale set in and, eventually, the relationship between the 
two variables turns negative. Equations (3) and (6) in Table 2 report the nonlinear regression 
models respectively with capital and current expenditure. Neither linear nor the squared terms 
                                                          
18
 See Devarajan et al. (1996) pg. 330. 
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are now statistically significant in both cases (i.e. capital and current expenditures). The results 
are basically unchanged for current spending, while it is likely that the linear relationship will 
give a better result for the capital component. Regarding functional components of 
expenditure in the long-run, the only positive significant effect stems from the health 
spending, but only at 10 percent level. Yet, it disappears when the same component is 
estimated without other functional components. The other factors that contribute significantly 
to GDP in Italy are economic affairs and education expenditures. The former has a negative 
effect both in isolation (eq. (9) in Table 3) and when considered with other variables (eq. (7) in 
Table 3). Following Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), this could be associated to the corruption in 
investment projects. When included with other variables, a negative long-run relation is also 
observed between the dependent variable and expenditure in education. 
This results is extremely puzzling. However, it does not seem to be robust because, when 
considering this component alone (cf. eq. (10) in Table 3), its sign becomes positive, even 
though not statistically significant. Devarajan et al. (1996) also find a negative and statistically 
significant relation between education and GDP growth rate for developed countries. 
Alshahrani and Alsadiq (2014) find the same results in the long-run for Saudi Arabia. They 
attribute this result to the lack of emphasis on education in the period under consideration, 
rather than to a negative effect of education on per-capita GDP in the long-run.  A key 
endogenous variable of the theoretical model is the ratio of private capital to public services. 
The coefficient of this variable is positive and statistically significant in all equations, thus 
meaning that as expected, public services augment the productivity of private capital. 
Furthermore, openness to trade has not a significant effect on output in the long-run.   
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Table 2. Long –run coefficients for Economic Classification (1970-2007) 
Variables 
Economic Classification 
Long-run coefficients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
const 
-2.019*** 
(0.571) 
-1.883** 
(0.715) 
-1.814** 
(0.759) 
-5.491*** 
(0.986) 
-3.789*** 
(1.315) 
-0.211 
(3.668) 
tot_exp 
1.437*** 
(0.102) 
1.388*** 
(0.122) 
1.423*** 
(0.125) 
2.152*** 
(0.229) 
1.917*** 
(0.183) 
2.195*** 
(0.241) 
cap_exp 
-0.192*** 
(0.050) 
 -0.301 
(0.370) 
   
cap_serv_exp 
 -0.039 
(0.036) 
    
cap_transf 
 -0.181*** 
(0.051) 
    
cap_exp^2 
  0.022 
(0.077) 
   
curr_exp 
   0.018 
(0.091) 
 -2.846 
(2.135) 
curr_serv_exp 
    -0.202 
(0.210) 
 
curr_transf 
    0.052 
(0.079) 
 
curr_exp^2 
     0.373 
(0.278) 
private_k 
1.229*** 
(0.102) 
1.215*** 
(0.088) 
1.203*** 
(0.156) 
1.940*** 
(0.281) 
1.840*** 
(0.186) 
1.942*** 
(0.283) 
open 
-0.007 
(0.081) 
-0.009 
(0.083) 
-0.012 
(0.070) 
0.045 
(0.082) 
-0.047 
(0.139) 
0.061 
(0.089) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the real per capita GDP, 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Long –run Coefficients for Functional Classification (1970-2007) 
Variables 
Functional Classification 
Long-run coefficients 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
const 
-2.731** 
(1.229) 
-4.865*** 
(0.647) 
-2.867*** 
(0.737) 
-5.684*** 
(0.731) 
-6.048*** 
(1.116) 
tot_exp 
1.531*** 
(0.250) 
2.069*** 
(0.109) 
1.567*** 
(0.177) 
2.172*** 
(0.181) 
2.254*** 
(0.276) 
def_exp 
0.051 
(0.112) 
-0.070 
(0.131) 
   
econ_aff_exp 
-0.124*** 
(0.038) 
 -0.095*** 
(0.033) 
  
educ_exp 
-0.175** 
(0.073) 
  0.080 
(0.120) 
 
health_exp 
0.091* 
(0.053) 
   0.063 
(0.065) 
private_k 
1.443*** 
(0.030) 
1.947*** 
(0.270) 
1.319*** 
(0.179) 
1.883*** 
(0.272) 
2.087*** 
(0.377) 
open 
0.074 
(0.122) 
0.002 
(0.136) 
0.036 
(0.089) 
0.050 
(0.090) 
0.061 
(0.073) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the real per capita GDP, 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
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6.4         Short-run Analysis  
The signs of the short-run dynamic impacts changed little if compared to those in the long-run 
(see tables 4 and 5). When statistically significant, total expenditure is negatively associated 
with economic growth. With regard to detailed economic components of expenditure, capital 
and current aggregate expenditures confirm the same effect as that detected in the long-run. 
Capital spending still has a negative effect, even if its impact is significantly less than those of 
the long-run (i.e. a unit increase in this share of spending decreases economic growth by 2%, in 
eq. (1) table 4, whereas it is 18% in the long-run). The same result is found for capital transfers 
expenditure. Current expenditure does not play any role in the short-run. Among the sub-
components, current services expenditure plays a negative role on determining the economic 
growth in the short-run. As for the non-linear relationship, the results confirm theory and the 
intuition: the economic growth is an increasing function of the share of capital expenditure 
and a decreasing function of the square term.   
Among the functional components, defence expenditure has a negative effect on the 
dependent variable in the short-run, both in isolation and when considered with other 
variables. Economic affairs expenditure is currently positive (cf. eq. (7) in Table 5), but it shows 
a different effect on economic growth if different years are considered19. Education is again 
negative in the short-run when it is included with other variables. Yet, it turns not to be 
significant when considered in isolation. Finally, health care expenditure is not significant when 
considered with other variables, but it turns to be negatively in relation to economic growth 
when considered in isolation, as shown in eq. (11) in Table 5.  
Devarajan et al. (1996) find a negative but not significant relationship between expenditure on 
defence and growth rate, a negative and statistically significant relationship between 
education spending and growth rate; however, they do not display any difference between 
short- and long-run. 
The estimated coefficient for the error correction term is negative and statistically significant 
in all estimated equations. This means that real GDP in Italy functions according to an 
automatic mechanism that responds to deviations from equilibrium in a balanced manner. The 
value of 0.13 (cf. eq. (1) in Table 4) for the ECM coefficient suggests an adjustment slow speed 
strategy, which is roughly equal to 13%.  
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 This is not surprising since we are considering at the change from one year to another one in the 
short-run. It is therefore valid for each series. 
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Table 4. Short –run Coefficients for Economic Classification based on the ARDL model 
Variables 
Economic Classification 
Short-run coefficients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
const 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.038*** 
(0.010) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
0.021** 
(0.008) 
∆gdp_pt-1 
0.439*** 
(0.119) 
0.873*** 
(0.141) 
0.498*** 
(0.045) 
-0.067 
(0.292) 
0.248* 
(0.127) 
0.392 
(0.279) 
∆tot_expt      
0.060** 
(0.023) 
∆tot_expt-1  
0.830*** 
(0.154) 
0.016 
(0.023) 
-0.870** 
(0.383) 
 
-0.475 
(0.403) 
∆tot_expt-2    
-0.745*** 
(0.200) 
0.755* 
(0.379) 
-0.719*** 
(0.106) 
∆tot_expt-3    
-0.442** 
(0.200) 
-0.708*** 
(0.168) 
-0.365*** 
(0.085) 
∆cap_exp_tott-1   
0.287*** 
(0.095) 
   
∆cap_exp_tott-2 
-0.022** 
(0.010) 
 
0.197* 
(0.106) 
   
∆curr_exp_tott-1    
-0.058** 
(0.025) 
 
1.024 
(0.622) 
∆cap_serv_expt-1  
0.001 
(0.013) 
    
∆cap_transft-2  
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
    
∆curr_serv_exp_t-3     
-0.128** 
(0.048) 
 
∆curr_transft-1     
0.015 
(0.026) 
 
∆cap_exp_tot^2t-1   
-0.057*** 
(0.018) 
   
∆cap_exp_tot^2t-2   
-0.044** 
(0.020) 
   
∆curr_exp_tot^2t-1      
-0.140 
(0.081) 
∆private_kt 
-0.087*** 
(0.024) 
-0.077*** 
(0.017) 
-0.065** 
(0.024) 
   
∆private_kt-1  
0.807*** 
(0.148) 
 
-0.939** 
(0.384) 
 
-0.446 
(0.396) 
∆private_kt-2    
-0.793*** 
(0.198) 
0.904** 
(0.412) 
-0.701*** 
(0.111) 
∆private_kt-3    
-0.417* 
(0.200) 
-0.524*** 
(0.149) 
-0.360*** 
(0.092) 
∆opent 
0.142*** 
(0.034) 
0.088*** 
(0.023) 
0.115*** 
(0.036) 
  
0.139*** 
(0.030) 
∆opent-1 
-0.095*** 
(0.029) 
-0.014 
(0.040) 
 
0.101** 
(0.035) 
0.132*** 
(0.029) 
 
∆opent-3    
-0.034 
(0.030) 
-0.087** 
(0.040) 
 
ECMt-1 
-0.126*** 
(0.044) 
-0.127*** 
(0.034) 
-0.141*** 
(0.045) 
-0.316*** 
(0.079) 
-0.313*** 
(0.048) 
-0.365*** 
(0.061) 
No. of obs 35 35 35 33 33 34 
R-sq 0.71 0.91 0.82 0.94 0.87 0.85 
Adj. R-sq 0.63 0.82 0.70 0.82 0.73 0.73 
JB Test 0.280 (0.870) 0.215 (0.898) 0.003 (0.998) 3.051 (0.217) 1.236 (0.539) 1.481 (0.477) 
Ser. Corr LM1 2.291 (0.130) 0.290 (0.590) 1.511 (0.219) 0.073 (0.787) 1.347 (0.246) 0.280 (0.597) 
Ser. Corr LM2 3.610 (0.165) 2.844 (0.241) 4.539 (0.103) 0.433 (0.805) 3.471 (0.176) 0.433 (0.806) 
Ramsey-Reset 0.709 (0.407) 0.057 (0.814) 0.087 (0.772) 0.213 (0.654) 3.691 (0.074) 0.221 (0.644) 
Bound test 7.8603*** 5.1644** 4.82636** 9.1262*** 5.2362** 6.7802*** 
ARDL order (1, 1, 2, 0, 1) (1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2, 2, 0, 0) (3, 4, 4, 4, 4) (2, 4, 4, 2, 4, 4) (1, 3, 1, 1, 3, 0) 
Notes: The dependent variable in the long-run equations, is the real per capita GDP. In the short-run specifications, 
the dependent variable is ∆𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The ARDL order is selected on the bases of the SBC. The relevant 
critical value bounds are obtained from Table case III (with unrestricted intercept and no trend) in Narayan (2005). 
They are 4.590 – 6.368 at 1% level, 3.276 – 4.630 at 5% level, 2.696 – 3.898 at 10% level (for 35 observations and 4 
regressors) and 4.257 – 6.040 at 1% level, 3.037 – 4.443 at 5% level, 2.508 – 3.763 at 10% level (for 35 observations 
and 5 regressors). ***denotes F-statistic falling above the 99% upper bound, **above the 95% upper bound, and 
*above the 90% upper bound. Dummy variables for some years are also included in each regression. 
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This means that approximately 13% discrepancy for the previous year is adjusted to the 
current year, i.e. 13% of disequilibria from the previous year’s shock converge forward to the 
long-run equilibrium in the current year. This is due to the fact that the present value of the 
dependent variable is lower than that found in the long-run.  
All the regressions for the underling ARDL models passed the diagnostic tests. We test for the 
presence of any autocorrelation (i.e. serial correlation LM test) in the residuals of our 
estimations. It is well known that the absence of autocorrelation in residuals is a crucial 
assumption for the accuracy of ARDL estimations. We also test for the normality (i.e. Jarque-
Bera test) of the residuals and for the correct functional form (i.e. Ramsey-Reset test) of our 
model specifications.  
According to Pesaran and Shin (1999), the stability of the estimated coefficient of the error 
correction model should also be graphically investigated. The stability of the long-run 
coefficients is used to form the error-correction term in conjunction with the short-run 
dynamics. Some of the problems of instability could stem from inadequate modelling of the 
short-run dynamics characterizing departures from the long-run relationship. Hence, it is 
expedient to incorporate the short-run dynamics for the constancy of long-run parameters. To 
this end, we apply the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests as developed by Brown et al. (1975). The 
CUSUM test is based on the cumulative sum of recursive residuals based on the first set of 𝑛 
observations. It is updated recursively and plotted against the break points. If the plot of 
CUSUM statistic stays within the 5% significance level, the estimated coefficients are said to be 
stable. A similar procedure is used to carry out the CUSUMSQ test which is based on the 
squared recursive residuals. A graphical presentation of these two tests is provided in Figures 5 
and 6 below. The cumulative sum of the squares is within the 5% significance lines, thus 
suggesting that the residuals variance is somehow stable. 
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Table 5. Short–run coefficients for Functional Classification based on the ARDL model 
Variables 
Functional Classification 
Short-run coefficients 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
const 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.282*** 
(0.049) 
0.386*** 
(0.021) 
0.018*** 
(0.003) 
0.038*** 
(0.009) 
∆gdp_pt-1 
-0.442 
(0.334) 
-1.175*** 
(0.316) 
 
0.313*** 
(0.083) 
-1.318** 
(0.456) 
∆gdp_pt-2 
1.491*** 
(0.368) 
    
∆gdp_pt-3   
0.167** 
(0.059) 
 
1.324*** 
(0.144) 
∆tot_expt    
-0.698*** 
(0.145) 
 
∆tot_expt-1 
-0.924** 
(0.353) 
-2.062*** 
(0.320) 
-1.122*** 
(0.066) 
 
-2.082*** 
(0.556) 
∆tot_expt-2 
0.712** 
(0.287) 
-0.642*** 
(0.150) 
-0.493*** 
(0.078) 
 
-0.960*** 
(0.087) 
∆def_expt-1 
-0.075** 
(0.026) 
-0.026** 
(0.011) 
   
∆econ_aff_expt-1 
0.018 
(0.011) 
 
0.029*** 
(0.003) 
  
∆econ_aff_expt-2 
0.036*** 
(0.007) 
    
∆econ_aff_expt-3   
-0.040*** 
(0.003) 
  
∆econ_aff_expt-4   
-0.059*** 
(0.004) 
  
∆educ_expt    
0.008 
(0.016) 
 
∆educ_expt-2 
-0.097*** 
(0.021) 
    
∆health_expt-1 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
   
-0.047*** 
(0.014) 
∆health_expt-2     
-0.041*** 
(0.010) 
∆private_kt    
-0.722*** 
(0.141) 
 
∆private_kt-1 
-0.821** 
(0.364) 
-2.017*** 
(0.323) 
-0.936*** 
(0.067) 
 
-2.125*** 
(0.561) 
∆private_kt-2 
0.740** 
(0.302) 
-0.670*** 
(0.143) 
-0.304*** 
(0.074) 
 
-1.045*** 
(0.088) 
∆private_kt-3 
-0.510*** 
(0.136) 
-0.765*** 
(0.104) 
0.091*** 
(0.010) 
  
∆opent 
0.090*** 
(0.023) 
 
0.210*** 
(0.010) 
0.019 
(0.016) 
 
∆opent-1 
0.044 
(0.028) 
 
-0.234*** 
(0.009) 
 
0.151*** 
(0.031) 
∆opent-2  
0.084*** 
(0.025) 
  
0.067** 
(0.022) 
ECMt-1 
-0.245*** 
(0.056) 
-0.420*** 
(0.033) 
-0.213*** 
(0.020) 
-0.062** 
(0.024) 
-0.531*** 
(0.041) 
Obs 34 33 33 36 33 
R-sq 0.94 0.95 0.99 0.93 0.94 
Adj. R-sq 0.86 0.88 0.97 0.89 0.86 
JB Test 0.335 (0.846) 0.596 (0.742) 4.949 (0.084) 2.726 (0.256) 2.861 (0.239) 
Ser. Corr LM1 0.046 (0.830) 0.138 (0.710) 2.998 (0.083) 0.408 (0.523) 4.381 (0.036) 
Ser. Corr LM2 1.200 (0.549) 1.936 (0.380) 3.582 (0.167) 3.078 (0.215) 4.387 (0.112) 
Ramsey-Reset 1.599 (0.230) 0.710 (0.415) 3.484 (0.095) 1.714 (0.203) 0.625 (0.445) 
Bound test 4.04167* 18.0313*** 31.6027*** 12.7751*** 155.6359*** 
ARDL order (3, 3, 1, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3) (1, 4, 1, 4, 4) (4, 2, 4, 3, 4) (1, 0, 0, 0, 1) (4, 4, 3, 4, 4) 
Notes: The dependent variable, in the long-run equations, is the real per capita GDP. In the short-run specifications, 
the dependent variable is ∆𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance respectively at 1 %, 5% and 10% levels. The ARDL order is selected on the basis of the SBC. The relevant 
critical value bounds are obtained from Table case III (with unrestricted intercept and no trend) in Narayan (2005). 
They are 3.841 – 5.686 at 1% level, 2.753 – 4.209 at 5% level, 2.300 – 3.606 at 10% level (for 35 observations and 7 
regressors) and 4.590 – 6.368 at 1% level, 3.276 – 4.630 at 5% level, 2.696 – 3.898 at 10% level (for 35 observations 
and 4 regressors). ***denotes F-statistic falling above the 99% upper bound, **above the 95% upper bound, and 
*above the 90% upper bound. Dummy variables for some years are also included in each regression. 
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   Figure 5. Stability test for equations 1-6 (Economic components) 
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Equation (5) 
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   Figure 6. Stability test for equations 7-11 (Functional components) 
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Equation (9) 
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We also estimate equations from (1) to (11). This is done without including private capital (see 
Tables A13-A16 in Appendix 2). The aim of this sensitivity analysis is to highlight the differences 
in the results given by the private capital series. Since the results do not show significant 
difference between the two analyses, we also estimate the same relationships for the 
remaining sample period 1862-1969, for which data are available. The results for the 
computed Wald test (F-statistics), reported in the last row of each table and reveal that a long-
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run co-integration relationship still exists for 8 out 11 estimated20 specification. This also 
confirms the robustness of our results21. 
 
 
6.5        Co-integration (sample period 1862-1969) 
In this section we estimate the relationship between economic and functional components of 
government spending, as well as real per-capita GDP during the period 1862-1969 (for which 
all variables are available, apart from the series for private capital22). Firstly, we estimate our 
models for the entire period, although the results do not show evidence for error correction 
mechanism. The reason for this could be the many events occurred in Italy during this long 
period. Hence, we decide to endogenously split our sample, thus involving a multiple 
breakpoint test. It is worth noting that we eliminate those observations in correspondence to 
the World War I and II, namely the years from 1914 to 1918 and from 1943 to 1946.  
Table 6 shows the dates for two, three and five structural breakpoints. The breaks basically 
coincide with the main historical events occurred in Italy, even if they are different depending 
on the estimated specification. This is not surprising since the multiple breakpoint test 
searches for a break in the residual of the regression.  
The first break corresponds to the end of the nineteenth century, when Italy was hit by a great 
depression, or to the years between World War I and II. These years were characterized by 
many crises that culminated in the Wall Street crash in 1929. The second main break occurred 
after World War II, around the 1950s. In 1953, the so called “Economic Miracle” began and 
lasted until the first half of the 1960s.  
In this light, we are interested in dividing our sample into three sub-samples. This can help us 
avoid any samples with few observations. Unfortunately, our third sub-sample does not 
contain more than 19 observations; consequently, results should be cautiously interpreted.   
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 In three specifications it was not possible estimate the long- and short-run relations because residuals 
were not stationary (see Appendix 2). Yet, this is also due to the fact that private capital has a 
statistically significance effect on economic growth so it contributes to the long-run relationship.   
21
 To investigate the determinants of short- and long-run economic growth simultaneously, we have also 
estimated a VECM specification for the real per capita GDP. In this case, we have considered only the 
ADF and PP test results, from which all variables are integrated of the same order. In spite of the 
presence of multiple independent variables, the Johansen test identifies no more than two co-
integrating vectors. Overall, the results are extremely similar to those obtained by means of the ARDL 
approach. The signs of the series are coherent with the ARDL estimation results.  
22
 We can now refer to Devarajan et al. (1996) theoretical model. 
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Table 6. Multiple breaks test with 𝒍+ 𝟏 breaks 𝒗𝒔 global 𝒍 BP test (1862-1969) 
 2 structural breaks 3 structural breaks 5 structural breaks 
Specification1 1897, 1953 1862-1896 (35) 
1897-1952 (47) 
1953-1969 (17) 
1896, 1923, 
1953 
1862-1895 (34) 
1896-1922 (22) 
1923-1952 (26) 
1953-1969 (17) 
1879, 1893, 
1920, 1935, 
1953 
1862-1878 (17) 
1879-1892 (14) 
1893-1919 (22) 
1920-1934 (15) 
1935-1952 (14) 
1953-1969 (17) 
Specification2  1919, 1953 1862-1918 (52) 
1919-1952 (30) 
1953-1969 (17) 
1893, 1923, 
1953 
1862-1892 (31) 
1893-1922 (25) 
1923-1952 (26) 
1953-1969 (17) 
1882, 1904, 
1923, 1937, 
1955 
1862-1881 (20) 
1882-1903 (22) 
1904-1922 (14) 
1923-1936 (14) 
1937-1954 (14) 
1955-1969 (15) 
Specification3 1898, 1951 1862-1897 (36) 
1898-1950 (44) 
1951-1969 (19) 
1896, 1923, 
1953 
1862-1895 (34) 
1896-1922 (22) 
1923-1952 (26) 
1953-1969 (17) 
1878, 1896, 
1923, 1938, 
1956 
1862-1877 (16) 
1878-1895 (18) 
1896-1922 (22) 
1923-1937 (15) 
1938-1955 (14) 
1956-1969 (14) 
Specification4 1927, 1953 1862-1926 (60) 
1927-1952 (22) 
1953-1969 (17) 
1895, 1927, 
1953 
1862-1894 (33) 
1895-1926 (27) 
1927-1952 (22) 
1953-1969 (17) 
1880, 1901, 
1921, 1935, 
1953 
1862-1879 (18) 
1880-1900 (21) 
1901-1920 (15) 
1921-1934 (14) 
1935-1952 (14) 
1953-1969 (17) 
Specification5 1922, 1951 1862-1921 (55) 
1922-1950 (25) 
1951-1969 (19) 
1882, 1922, 
1951 
1862-1881 (20) 
1882-1921 (35) 
1922-1950 (25) 
1951-1969 (19) 
1882, 1901, 
1922, 1937, 
1955 
1862-1881 (20) 
1882-1900 (19) 
1901-1921 (16) 
1922-1936 (15) 
1937-1954 (14) 
1955-1969 (15) 
Notes: Results obtained from OLS breakpoint test estimation on the 1862-1969 sample. We have omitted any 
observations for those years close to World War I and II (i.e. from 1914 to 1918 and from 1943 to 1946) to avoid 
already known breaks. Number of observations are provided in parenthesis. Specification 1 and 3 include capital 
and current expenditure, specification 2 and 4 include their sub-components and specification 5 includes functional 
expenditure components.  
 
 
After finding the integration order of all variables, our equations have been estimated via the 
ARDL co-integration technique. In the first stage, the individual lag length order (which is 
different for each series) is obtained from an unrestricted vector autoregressive model (VAR), 
which has been selected through the minimum value of the Schwartz Bayesian Criteria (SBC). 
Finally, the F-statistics is estimated on the basis of the Wald-test. The results of the test are 
reported in the last row of each table. The results obtained by means of the Bound testing 
approach show that the calculated F-statistics are statistically significant for our estimated 
equations. In addition, they are higher than the upper bound critical value, thus implying that 
there is co-integration among the variables in the models. Long- and short-run results are 
reported in the same table. Table 7 shows the estimated relationship between capital 
expenditure and real per-capita GDP in the three sub-samples. In the long-run and on an 
aggregate level, total spending plays a positive and statistically significant role on augmenting 
the real per-capita GDP in Italy, within entire period under consideration. Capital spending has 
a positive and significant effect only during the period 1897-1952 (eq. (3a)), while the results 
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do not show any evidence for the no linear relationship. It is interesting to note that, as far as 
capital sub-components are concerned, as estimated in Table 8, the breaks date is are almost 
the same. This positive effect of capital spending is driven by both capital services spending 
and capital transfers. The signs of the long-run dynamic impacts for capital expenditure are 
also maintained in the short-run for the first and the third sub-samples (1953-1969), but they 
are not in the second sub-sample (1897-1952). Furthermore, the period 1862-1897 shows 
evidence of a short-run no-linear relationship between capital expenditure and economic 
growth. Table 9 shows the results of the current expenditure for sub-samples 1862-1918 and 
1953-1969. During the period 1919-1952, there is no evidence of long-run relationship among 
our variables since residuals were not stationary. In the first sub-sample (1862-1918), there is 
evidence of no-linear relationship between current expenditure and real per-capita GDP. Once 
again, these results must be cautiously interpreted due to the weak significance (at 10% level) 
of the bound test. In the short-run, evidence of linear and negative relationship can be found. 
Also, for current sub-components expenditure, as reported in Table 10, the breaks are very 
similar to those found for total current spending. The positive effect found in the first sub-
sample seems to be driven by current transfers. In the period 1953-1969, a significant 
relationship among our variables cannot be found. Hence, it seems safe to conclude that the 
long-run relationship is given by the positive role played by openness to real per-capita GDP.  
Table 11 shows the results of the functional expenditure components in all three different sub-
samples. Overall, the results for each period are slightly different. In the short-run, defence, 
economic affairs and health expenditures have a negative effect on economic growth in the 
period 1862-1921. 
The period that spans from Italy’s political Unification to the post World War I years 
demonstrate that expenditures on defence, economic affairs, education and healthcare played 
a positive role in augmenting real per-capita GDP in the long-run. This effect is confirmed for 
expenditure on education in all three sub-samples, which means that this functional 
component contributed significantly to the Italian GDP during the period 1862-1969. 
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Table 7. ARDL capital expenditure (1862-1969) 
Variables 
1862-1896 1897-1952 1953-1969 
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) 
Long-run coefficients 
Const 
0.153 
(0.162) 
0.095 
(0.173) 
0.111 
(0.318) 
0.561 
(0.383) 
-5.030*** 
(0.505) 
-12.206 
(8.173) 
tot_exp 
0.427*** 
(0.045) 
0.443*** 
(0.047) 
0.261*** 
(0.051) 
0.225*** 
(0.048) 
1.183* 
(0.618) 
1.188* 
(0.643) 
cap_exp 
0.002 
(0.012) 
0.068 
(0.044) 
0.163*** 
(0.034) 
-0.069 
(0.211) 
-0.332 
(0.301) 
4.432 
(5.199) 
cap_exp^2 
 -0.020 
(0.016) 
 0.057 
(0.050) 
 -0.790 
(0.871) 
open 
-0.190*** 
(0.066) 
-0.201*** 
(0.066) 
-0.050 
(0.058) 
-0.098 
(0.061) 
1.514*** 
(0.353) 
1.513*** 
(0.363) 
 Short-run coefficients 
Const 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.029 
(0.021) 
-0.035 
(0.025) 
0.010** 
(0.003) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
∆gdp_pt-1 
1.105*** 
(0.139) 
0.910*** 
(0.101) 
0.394** 
(0.146) 
0.218 
(0.153) 
0.765*** 
(0.058) 
0.750*** 
(0.183) 
∆gdp_pt-3  
0.486*** 
(0.116) 
    
∆tot_expt   
-0.013 
(0.033) 
   
∆tot_expt-1 
-0.290*** 
(0.028) 
-0.215*** 
(0.018) 
 
-0.064** 
(0.028) 
0.095*** 
(0.014) 
0.084 
(0.043) 
∆cap_expt     
0.118*** 
(0.014) 
0.103** 
(0.027) 
∆cap_expt-1 
0.033*** 
(0.004) 
0.034*** 
(0.003) 
0.018 
(0.017) 
0.025 
(0.100) 
  
∆cap_expt-2 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.069*** 
(0.015) 
    
∆cap_expt-4 
-0.039*** 
(0.004) 
     
∆cap_exp^2t-1    
-0.003 
(0.022) 
 
0.002 
(0.006) 
∆cap_exp^2t-2  
-0.020*** 
(0.005) 
    
∆cap_exp^2t-4  
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
    
∆opent   
0.068 
(0.051) 
0.076*** 
(0.027) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
0.050 
(0.043) 
∆opent-1 
0.159*** 
(0.020) 
0.096*** 
(0.008) 
  
0.080*** 
(0.017) 
 
ECMt-1 
-0.440*** 
(0.078) 
-0.145** 
(0.060) 
-0.201*** 
(0.069) 
-0.205** 
(0.089) 
-0.081*** 
(0.009) 
-0.106** 
(0.038) 
Obs 30 30 38 38 15 15 
R2 0.94 0.98 0.61 0.64 0.99 0.82 
Adj. R-sq 0.91 0.96 0.46 0.46 0.96 0.51 
JB Test 0.362 (0.835) 2.718 (0.257) 0.823 (0.663) 0.537 (0.765) 4.848 (0.089) 2.315 (0.314) 
Ser. Corr LM1 0.067 (0.796) 0.926 (0.336) 1.560 (0.212) 0.001 (0.975) 0.619 (0.431) 0.948 (0.330) 
Ser. Corr LM2 1.005 (0.605) 1.273 (0.529) 1.562 (0.458) 0.364 (0.834) 1.816 (0.403) 1.938 (0.379) 
Ramsey-Reset 0.706 (0.413) 6.263 (0.029) 0.352 (0.558) 1.302 (0.265) 0.168 (0.710) 0.786 (0.426) 
Bound test 9.9810*** 46.9247*** 12.5061*** 5.3244** 1259.830*** 4.61483* 
ARDL order (1, 2, 4, 2) (4, 4, 3, 4, 3) (2, 0, 1, 0) (2, 1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0, 1, 0) 
Notes: The dependent variable in the long-run equations is the real per capita GDP. In the short-run specifications, 
the dependent variable is ∆𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐. We have omitted observations for those years close to World War I and II (i.e.  
from 1914 to 1918 and from 1943 to 1946) to avoid already known breaks. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The ARDL order is selected on the 
basis of the SBC. The relevant critical value bounds are obtained from Table case III (with unrestricted intercept and 
no trend) in Narayan (2005). They are 5.333 – 7.063 at 1% level, 3.710 – 5.018 at 5% level and 3.008 – 4.150 at 10% 
level (for 30 observations and 3 regressors). They are 4.768 – 6.670 at 1% level, 3.354 – 4.774 at 5% level and 2.752 
– 3.994 at 10% level (for 30 observations and 4 regressors). They are 5.018 – 6.610 at 1% level, 3.548 – 4.803 at 5% 
level and 2.933 – 4.020 at 10% level (for 40 observations and 3 regressors). Equation (4a) includes unrestricted 
intercept and unrestricted trend, so critical values from table case V are: 5.376 – 7.092 at 1% level, 3.958 – 5.226 at 
5% level and 3.334 – 4.438 at 10% level (for 40 observations and 4 regressors). ***denotes that the F-statistic falls 
above the 99% upper bound, **above the 95% upper bound, and *above the 90% upper bound. Dummy variables 
for some years are also included in each regression. 
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Table 8. ARDL capital expenditure components (1862-1969) 
Variables 
1862-1897 1898-1950 1951-1969 
(1b) (2b) (3b) 
Long-run coefficients 
Const 
-0.007 
(0.255) 
0.553 
(0.334) 
-0.455*** 
(0.832) 
tot_exp 
0.473*** 
(0.059) 
0.206*** 
(0.051) 
1.716*** 
(0.493) 
cap_serv_exp 
-0.025 
(0.025) 
0.126*** 
(0.039) 
-0.295** 
(0.115) 
cap_transf 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
0.055*** 
(0.020) 
-0.538** 
(0.242) 
Open 
-0.161* 
(0.085) 
-0.113 
(0.068) 
1.127*** 
(0.376) 
 Short-run coefficients 
Const 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
∆gdp_pt-1 
1.303*** 
(0.292) 
-0.148 
(0.117) 
0.935*** 
(0.070) 
∆gdp_pt-3 
0.572*** 
(0.165) 
  
∆tot_expt   
0.180** 
(0.048) 
∆tot_expt-1 
-0.302*** 
(0.029) 
-0.081 
(0.046) 
 
∆tot_expt-2 
-0.103*** 
(0.020) 
  
∆cap_serv_expt-1 
0.046*** 
(0.008) 
0.041 
(0.031) 
0.053*** 
(0.011) 
∆cap_serv_expt-2 
0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.091*** 
(0.026) 
 
∆cap_serv_expt-3 
0.014** 
(0.005) 
0.098*** 
(0.016) 
 
∆cap_serv_expt-4 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
  
∆cap_transft   
0.024** 
(0.009) 
∆cap_transft-1 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
 
∆opent-1 
0.105*** 
(0.010) 
0.062 
(0.040) 
-0.042* 
(0.019) 
∆opent-2 
0.046* 
(0.025) 
-0.024 
(0.037) 
 
ECMt-1 
-0.506*** 
(0.154) 
0.215*** 
(0.069) 
-0.295*** 
(0.061) 
Obs 31 32 17 
R2 0.96 0.85 0.96 
Adj. R-sq 0.91 0.72 0.87 
JB Test 1.356 (0.508) 1.142 (0.565) 1.418 (0.492) 
Ser. Corr LM1 1.137 (0.286) 0.001 (0.979) 1.243 (0.265) 
Ser. Corr LM2 4.045 (0.132) 0.548 (0.760) 1.759 (0.415) 
Ramsey-Reset 0.001 (0.982) 1.606 (0.224) 0.954 (0.384) 
Bound test 10.5478*** 4.96038** 4.7611* 
ARDL order (4, 2, 4, 2, 3) (1, 1, 3, 3, 2) (1, 0, 1, 0, 1) 
Notes: The dependent variable in the long-run equations, is the real per capita GDP. In the short-
run specifications, the dependent variable is ∆𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The ARDL order is 
selected on the basis of the SBC. Equation (1b) includes unrestricted intercept and unrestricted 
trend, so critical values from table case V in Narayan (2005) are: 5.856 – 7.578 at 1% level, 4.154 – 
5.540 at 5% level and 3.430 – 4.624 at 10% level (for 30 observations and 4 regressors). The 
relevant critical value bounds for equations (2b) and (3b) are obtained from Table case III (with 
unrestricted intercept and no trend) in Narayan (2005). They are 4.768 – 6.670 at 1% level, 3.354 – 
4.774 at 5% level and 2.752 – 3.994 at 10% level (for 30 observations and 4 regressors). 
***denotes F-statistic falling above the 99% upper bound, **above the 95% upper bound, and 
*above the 90% upper bound. We delete observations in correspondence to the two world wars, 
namely: years from 1914 to 1918 and from 1943 to 1946. 
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Table 9. ARDL current expenditure components (1862-1969) 
Variables 
1862-1918 1953-1969 
(1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) 
Long-run coefficients 
Const 
-1.872*** 
(0.507) 
-30.221*** 
(10.138) 
-5.162* 
(2.791) 
-33.344 
(115.86) 
tot_exp 
-0.047 
(0.092) 
0.116 
(0.123) 
0.738* 
(0.368) 
0.762 
(0.428) 
curr_exp 
0.289* 
(0.158) 
14.262*** 
(5.200) 
0.012 
(0.496) 
13.464 
(55.761) 
curr_exp^2 
 -1.743** 
(0.654) 
 -1.606 
(6.691) 
Open 
0.542*** 
(0.139) 
0.532*** 
(0.105) 
1.640*** 
(0.358) 
1.626*** 
(0.410) 
 Short-run coefficients 
Const 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.044*** 
(0.009) 
0.042*** 
(0.013) 
∆gdp_pt-1 
0.015 
(0.066) 
0.121 
(0.078) 
0.153 
(0.193) 
0.245 
(0.230) 
∆gdp_pt-2 
-0.196*** 
(0067) 
-0.075 
(0.076) 
  
∆gdp_pt-3 
-0.254*** 
(0.060) 
-0.230*** 
(0.074) 
  
∆tot_expt    
-0.055 
(0.022) 
∆tot_expt-1 
-0.087*** 
(0.023) 
-0.078*** 
(0.017) 
-0.001 
(0.030) 
 
∆curr_expt 
-0.084*** 
(0.024) 
 
-0.156* 
(0.071) 
2.105 
(3.870) 
∆curr_expt-1  
0.441 
(0.823) 
  
∆curr_exp^2t    
-0.281 
(0.469) 
∆curr_exp^2t-1  
-0.066 
(0.103) 
  
∆opent  
-0.001 
(0.024) 
0.186** 
(0.068) 
0.267*** 
(0.071) 
∆opent-1 
-0.021 
(0.023) 
   
ECMt-1 
-0.197*** 
(0.049) 
-0.133*** 
(0.036) 
-0.162** 
(0.050) 
-0.143** 
(0.045) 
Obs 48 47 15 15 
R2 0.82 0.88 0.77 0.89 
Adj. R-sq 0.76 0.83 0.46 0.69 
JB Test 0.503 (0.778) 0.662 (0.718) 0.176 1.343 (0.511) 
Ser. Corr LM1 1.925 (0.165) 0.424 (0.515) 1.324 (0.250) 0.002 (0.964) 
Ser. Corr LM2 2.201 (0.333) 2.302 (0.316) 3.398 (0.183) 3.214 (0.200) 
Ramsey-Reset 0.195 (0.662) 0.004 (0.951) 2.196 (0.199) 0.399 (0.562) 
Bound test 13.5885*** 4.5046* 12.9804*** 9.1763*** 
ARDL order (3, 2, 1, 1) (3, 1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 0) 
Notes: Table 9 above does not show the estimated results for the period 1919-1952 because over 
that period residuals from the long-run relationship were not stationary. It means that there is not 
long-run relationship among these variables. We delete observations in correspondence to the two 
world wars, namely: years from 1914 to 1918. Equations (1c) and (2c) include unrestricted intercept 
and unrestricted trend, so the critical values from table case V in Narayan (2005) are: 5.995 – 7.335 
at 1% level, 4.368 – 5.545 at 5% level and 3.673 – 4.715 at 10% level (for 50 observations and 3 
regressors). They are 5.184 – 6.684 at 1% level, 3.834 – 5.064 at 5% level and 3.240 – 4.350 at 10% 
level (for 50 observations and 4 regressors). The relevant critical value bounds for equations (3c) and 
(4c) are obtained from Table case III (with unrestricted intercept and no trend) in Narayan (2005). 
They are 5.333 – 7.063 at 1% level, 3.710 – 5.018 at 5% level and 3.008 – 4.150 at 10% level (for 30 
observations and 3 regressors). They are 4.768 – 6.670 at 1% level, 3.354 – 4.774 at 5% level and 
2.752 – 3.994 at 10% level (for 30 observations and 4 regressors). ***denotes F-statistic falling 
above the 99% upper bound, **above the 95% upper bound, and *above the 90% upper bound. 
Dummy variables for some years are also included in each regression. 
 
 
 
157 
 
Table 10. ARDL current expenditure components (1862-1969) 
Variables 
1862-1926 1953-1969 
Long-run coefficients 
(1d) (2d) 
Const 
-1.770*** 
(0.347) 
-3.857 
(3.582) 
tot_exp 
-0.015 
(0.054) 
0.670 
(0.385) 
curr_serv_exp 
0.115 
(0.073) 
-0.427 
(0.696) 
curr_transf 
0.267*** 
(0.031) 
0.217 
(0.289) 
Open 
0.516*** 
(0.094) 
1.553*** 
(0.362) 
 Short-run coefficients 
Const 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.047* 
(0.019) 
∆gdp_pt-1  
0.150 
(0.322) 
∆gdp_pt-2 
0.072 
(0.087) 
 
∆gdp_pt-3 
-0.475*** 
(0.083) 
 
∆tot_expt  
0.253*** 
(0.068) 
∆tot_expt-1 
-0.047** 
(0.018) 
 
∆tot_expt-2 
0.036* 
(0.013) 
 
∆tot_expt-3 
0.110*** 
(0.024) 
 
∆curr_serv_expt  
-0.146 
(0.073) 
∆curr_serv_expt-1 
-0.092*** 
(0.020) 
 
∆curr_transft 
-0.020 
(0.012) 
 
∆curr_transft-1  
-0.048 
(0.037) 
∆opent-1  
-0.157** 
(0.051) 
ECMt-1 
-0.119*** 
(0.028) 
-0.427** 
(0.101) 
Obs 48 15 
R2 0.77 0.88 
Adj. R-sq 0.69 0.57 
JB Test 0.584 (0.747) 0.346 (0.841) 
Ser. Corr LM1 0.144 (0.705) 0.008 (0.929) 
Ser. Corr LM2 2.168 (0.338) 0.068 (0.967) 
Ramsey-Reset 0.400 (0.531) 0.015 (0.911) 
Bound test 6.6458*** 2879.211*** 
ARDL order (3, 5, 1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 1, 1) 
Notes: The dependent variable in the long-run equations, is the real per capita GDP. In the short-
run specifications, the dependent variable is ∆𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The ARDL order 
has been selected on the basis of the SBC. Table 10 does not show the estimated results for the 
period 1927-1952 because in that period the residuals from the long run relationship were not 
stationary. It means that there is not long-run relationship among our variables. Equations (1d) 
includes unrestricted intercept and unrestricted trend, so critical values from table case V in 
Narayan (2005) are: 4.306 – 5.874 at 1% level, 3.136 – 4.416 at 5% level and 2.614 – 3.746 at 10% 
level (for 50 observations and 4 regressors). The relevant critical value bounds for equation (2d) 
are obtained from Table CI(i) (with no intercept and no trend) in Pesaran et al. (2001) because 
they are not available in Narayan (2005). They are 3.07 – 4.44 at 1% level, 2.26 – 3.48 at 5% level 
and 1.90 – 3.01 at 10% level (4 regressors). ***denotes F-statistic falling above the 99% upper 
bound, **above the 95% upper bound, and *above the 90% upper bound. We delete observations 
in correspondence to the two world wars, namely: years from 1914 to 1918 and from 1943 to 
1946. 
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Furthermore, this result is coherent with both theoretical expectations and the signs of short-
run dynamics maintained in relation to the long-run. Apart from defence spending, all other 
components lost significance in the period starting from 1922 to 2007. Interestingly, defence 
spending turns to be negative and statistically significant in the long-run period 1951-1969. 
Devarajan et al. (1996) find public spending in defence negatively related to the per-capita 
growth for developing countries and statistically insignificant for developed countries. As for 
Italy, we attribute this effect to the substantial resources devoted to defence spending during 
World War II23 so that an increase in this share was ultimately counterproductive.     
The error correction term indicates the speed of the equilibrium restoring adjustment in the 
dynamic models. The ECM coefficient shows how variables return to equilibrium, thus having a 
negative and statistically significant impact. Bannerje et al. (1998) holds that a highly 
significant error correction term is further proof of the existence of a stable long-term 
relationship. All statistically significant error correction adjustment coefficients are negative, 
thus implying the convergence to the long-run equilibrium in each specification. Each table in 
this chapter also presents results for several post-estimation diagnostic tests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 During the World War II expenditure on defence reached more than 50% of total spending. 
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Table 11. ARDL functional components (1862-1969) 
Variables 
1862-1921 1922-1950 1951-1969 
Long-run coefficients 
(1e) (2e) (3e) 
const -0.477*** (0.169) -1.042* (0.547) 2.407*** (0.693) 
tot_exp 0.049 (0.035) 0.293*** (0.089) -0.011 (0.128) 
def_exp 0.079** (0.036) 0.107 (0.071) -0.746*** (0.086) 
econ_aff_exp 0.119** (0.046) -0.074 (0.043) -0.056 (0.040) 
educ_exp 0.178*** (0.039) 0.380*** (0.062) 0.702*** (0.090) 
health_exp 0.023*** (0.008) 0.029 (0.054) -0.048 (0.065) 
open 0.135*** (0.038) 0.181** (0.068) -0.016 (0.130) 
 Short-run coefficients 
const -0.018*** (0.004) -0.009* (0.005) 0.013 (0.019) 
∆gdp_pt-1 0.469*** (0.078) 0.866*** (0.197) 0.492 (0.327) 
∆tot_expt  0.045 (0.117) -0.441** (0.126) 
∆tot_expt-3 0.086*** (0.018)   
∆def_expt  0.219*** (0.056) -0.386** (0.119) 
∆def_expt-1 -0.080*** (0.010)   
∆def_expt-2 -0.047*** (0.013)   
∆econ_aff_expt-1  -0.150** (0.054) 0.118** (0.037) 
∆econ_aff_expt-2 -0.037*** (0.009)   
∆econ_aff_expt-3 -0.041*** (0.011)   
∆educ_expt  0.195** (0.065)  
∆educ_expt-1 0.108*** (0.019)  0.151 (0.097) 
∆educ_expt-2 0.070** (0.023)   
∆health_expt  -0.100 (0.067) -0.013 (0.035) 
∆health_expt-1 -0.018*** (0.006)   
∆health_expt-2 -0.023*** (0.007)   
∆opent  0.151* (0.068) -0.030 (0.032) 
∆opent-2 0.036* (0.018)   
∆opent-4 0.040** (0.021)   
ECMt-1 -0.329*** (0.081) -1.584*** (0.223) -0.344* (0.149) 
Obs 46 21 17 
R2 0.93 0.91 0.68 
Adj. R-sq 0.87 0.75 0.13 
JB Test 0.072 (0.965) 0.933 (0.627) 0.180 (0.914) 
Ser. Corr LM1 2.222 (0.136) 0.008 (0.929) 0.082 (0.774) 
Ser. Corr LM2 2.279 (0.256) 0.085 (0.958) 3.929 (0.140) 
Ramsey-Reset 1.431 (0.243) 0.284 (0.613) 0.196 (0.676) 
Bound test 6.3996*** 4297.574*** 269.0789*** 
ARDL order (1, 4, 4, 4, 4, 3, 4) (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) 
Notes: The dependent variable in the long-run equations, is the real per capita GDP. In the short-run 
specifications, the dependent variable is ∆𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The ARDL order on the bases of the 
SBC. Equation (1e) includes unrestricted intercept and unrestricted trend, so critical values from table case V 
in Narayan (2005) are: 4.310 – 5.881 at 1% level, 3.229 – 4.536 at 5% level and 2.750 – 3.944 at 10% level 
(for 50 observations and 6 regressors). The relevant critical value bounds for equations (2e) and (3e) are 
obtained from Table case III (with no intercept and no trend) in Narayan (2005). They are 4.270 – 6.211 at 
1% level, 2.970 – 4.499 at 5% level and 2.457 – 3.797 at 10% level (with 30 observations and 6 regressors). 
***denotes F-statistic falling above the 99% upper bound, **above the 95% upper bound, and *above the 
90% upper bound. We delete observations in correspondence to the two world wars, namely: years from 
1914 to 1918 and from 1943 to 1946. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
The main objective of this chapter has been to explore the relationship between government 
spending and economic growth in Italy from 1862 to 2007 by using Devarajan et al.’s (1996) 
and Ghosh and Gregoriou’s (2008) extended version. This model can derive the conditions 
under which a change in the mix of public spending may lead to a higher steady-state growth 
rate for the economy. The conditions depend not only on the physical productivity of different 
components of public spending but also on the shares of government expenditure allocated to 
them. Our key explanatory fiscal variables are grouped into two main categories: economic 
and functional components. The former classification includes capital and current 
expenditures (and related sub-components), while the latter includes expenditures on 
defence, economic affairs, education and health care. 
Given the size of our sample, we decided to segment it according to the following criteria. We 
took into account the oil crisis of the 1970s (which is a break also confirmed by the multiple 
breakpoint test). Moreover, we considered the availability of private capital series for the 
period 1970-2007 and separated this sample from the period 1862-1969. The main 
contribution of this analysis is the investigation of the series for unit root with structural 
breaks to ascertain the order of integration of them. We employed an ARDL approach in order 
to disentangle the effects of economic and functional components of public spending in the 
short- and long-run. 
Overall, the effect of each fiscal variable differs according to the sub-sample under scrutiny. On 
the basis of the theoretical model used, our empirical results suggest that expenditures that 
are normally considered productive may become unproductive if an excessive amount of 
resources is devoted to them. As for Italy, this is the case of capital expenditure during the 
period 81970-2007, both in the short- and long-run. In particular, capital expenditure may 
have been excessive in Italy during last 40 years, thus rendering them unproductive at the 
margin. A more accurate analysis demonstrated that the negative effect of capital spending 
was essentially driven by capital transfers during the same period. On the other hand, current 
expenditure had an insignificant effect on economic growth in the short- and long-run. Among 
functional components, both defence and economic affairs had a significant effect 
(respectively, negative and both negative and positive) on economic growth in the short-run. 
In the long-run, only economic affairs expenditure maintained a significant and negative effect 
on real per-capita GDP. On an aggregate level, total government spending had a negative 
effect on economic growth in the short-run. Conversely, it had a positive effect in the long-run. 
In this light, we endogenously divided this sample by taking into account two structural breaks. 
We also estimated the same models without private capital for the sample period 1862-1969 
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by applying the ARDL technique. In general, the most significant results are from the first sub-
samples because they show a greater number of observations. That said, the results of this 
study must be cautiously since the data are based on a historical reconstruction and they may 
not be perfectly homogeneous. 
As for capital expenditure, during the period between the Italy’s Unification and the end of the 
nineteenth century, the results obtained by our analysis reveal a positive no linear effect on 
economic growth in the short-run. Conversely, they show a positive effect in the long-run 
during World War I and II. This effect has been driven by the positive impact of both capital 
services and capital transfers expenditures. Current expenditure does not show significant 
effects on economic growth for the period 1862 to 1969. Among functional components, the 
co-integration analysis showed that the main driving force behind short- and long-run growth 
is spending on education, which includes human capital.  
The lessons policy that can be learnt from these results is that Italy needs to facilitate private 
investment and put more emphasis on the productive components of government spending. 
This can be done by increasing health care and education spending as well as generally 
increasing the efficiency of expenditure on infrastructures and economic affairs. All in all, this 
study advocates the allocation of government spending so as to maintain existing 
infrastructures and social projects. Moreover, the government should carefully evaluate the 
possibility to take action and start new investment projects. 
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Appendix 1 – Further Information on Variables 
 
Definitions of the variables 
The definitions of all variables used in this study are provided below. All the variables have 
been expressed in logarithms and converted in real terms by the GDP deflator (2005=100). 
gdp_pc: per capita GDP (thousands of euros)  
tot_exp: total government spending as share of GDP  
cap_exp: capital government spending as share of total  
curr_exp: current government spending as share of total  
cap_serv_exp: capital services government spending as share of total  
cap_transf: capital transfers government spending as share of total  
curr_serv_exp: current services and personnel expenditures as share of total  
curr_transf: current transfers government spending as share of total  
defen_exp: government spending on defence as share of total  
econ_aff_exp:  government spending on economic affairs as share of total  
educ_exp: government spending on education as share of total 
health_exp: government spending on social activities as share of total  
private_k: private capital, the ratio of real private capital and total real government spending  
open: openness to trade, the ratio of sum of real exports and imports to the real GDP 
 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of variables involved in the analysis (1862-1969) 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
gdp_pc 3.394 2.031 1.837 11.200 
tot_exp 18.525 7.990 10.47 44.96 
cap_exp 11.876 6.750 1.00 29.25 
curr_exp 59.218 11.341 40.99 88.22 
cap_serv_exp 4.911 2.573 0.53 11.94 
cap_transf 6.965 6.063 0.08 23.64 
curr_serv_exp 42.956 9.844 32.25 74.32 
curr_transf 16.262 9.324 5.47 54.01 
defen_exp 23.563 13.235 9.07 74.37 
econ_aff_exp 19.059 6.110 4.21 35.39 
educ_exp 5.483 4.894 1.12 19.14 
health_exp 5.071 5.231 0.13 16.02 
open_gdp 20.316 4.705 9.27 34.84 
Notes: Statistics are based on series not expressed in logarithm form.   
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics of variables involved in the analysis (1970-2007) 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
gdp_pc 19.144 4.267 11.815 25.243 
tot_exp 40.149 9.646 20.79 51.38 
cap_exp 13.041 5.028 6.14 24.00 
curr_exp 51.549 9.205 35.95 70.19 
cap_serv_exp 1.001 0.650 0.51 3.71 
cap_transf 12.041 4.646 5.54 22.44 
curr_serv_exp 20.451 6.355 13.77 36.78 
curr_transf 31.099 5.049 19.48 42.74 
defen_exp 4.136 2.099 2.1 9.94 
econ_aff_exp 21.426 10.295 8.12 38.75 
educ_exp 10.544 3.292 7.16 19.24 
health_exp 17.751 4.074 11.82 29.06 
private_k 1.205 0.300 0.910 1.940 
open_gdp 36.053 5.379 25.7 47.49 
Notes: Statistics are based on series not expressed in logarithm form.   
 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Economic and Functional expenditure components (1862-1969) 
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Figure A2. Economic and Functional expenditure components (1970-2007) 
         
          
            
            
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
re
a
l 
p
e
r 
c
a
p
it
a
 G
D
P
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
%
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
to
t_
e
x
p
 a
s
 %
 o
f 
G
D
P
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
%
%
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
c
a
p
_
e
x
p
 a
s
 %
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
e
x
p
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
c
u
rr
_
e
x
p
 a
s
 %
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
e
x
p
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
%
0
1
2
3
4
c
a
p
_
s
e
rv
_
e
x
p
 a
s
 %
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
e
x
p
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
%
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
c
u
rr
_
s
e
rv
_
e
x
p
 a
s
 %
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
e
x
p
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
%
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
c
a
p
_
tr
a
n
s
f 
a
s
 %
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
e
x
p
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
%
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
4
5
c
u
rr
_
tr
a
n
s
f 
a
s
 %
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
e
x
p
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
years
%
170 
 
           
           
 
 
 
Unit Root Tests   
Table A3. Unit Root Tests (1862-2007) 
Variables 
ADF PP 
Level First Difference Level First Difference 
gdp_pc -1.847600 -7.876961*** -1.557297 -7.657295*** 
tot_exp -2.963293 -9.689738*** -3.140807 -9.134906*** 
cap_exp -3.503649** -14.20430*** -4.238182*** -16.02742*** 
curr_exp -3.100122 -10.20637*** -3.152249* -12.71576*** 
cap_serv_exp -3.373604* -10.62233*** -3.205166* -10.71358*** 
cap_transf -3.715175** -9.294539*** -6.621785***  
curr_serv_exp -2.067533 -11.76771*** -2.243830 -11.76537*** 
curr_transf -5.027205***  -4.942673***  
def_exp -1.779233 -11.32473*** -1.992467 -11.45300*** 
econ_aff_exp -3.385575* -10.50136*** -2.879624 -11.58290*** 
educ_exp -2.515558 -8.438854*** -2.400324 -7.705078*** 
health_exp -2.619550 -12.29436*** -2.587602 -12.29436*** 
open -1.035303 -13.23646*** -0.667490 -13.41806*** 
Notes: This author's elaboration based on the entire 1862-2007 sample. 
***,**,* implied significance is respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The lag length for the ADF test has 
been selected using the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). Under the null hypothesis the series 
has a unit root, while under the alternative the series is stationary. 
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Table A4. Clemente-Montañés-Reyes’s Unit Root Tests with Two Structural Breaks  
1862-2007 
 Additive Outliers (AO) Innovational Outliers (IO) 
Variables t-stat TB1 TB2 t-stat TB1 TB2 
gdp_pc -2.341 1952*** 1969*** -9.219** 1942*** 1944*** 
tot_exp -4.492 1911*** 1979*** -6.224** 1912*** 1976*** 
cap_exp -4.753 1929 1942** -5.687** 1916 1943*** 
curr_exp -2.244 1933*** 1972*** -5.082 1934*** 1973*** 
cap_serv_exp -3.169 1968*** 1979*** -4.175 1887** 1967*** 
cap_transf -3.194 1906*** 1942*** -6.347** 1903*** 1943*** 
curr_serv_exp -4.316 1946*** 1979*** -4.694 1942** 1973*** 
curr_transf -3.139 1918*** 1941*** -6.801** 1919*** 1942*** 
def_exp -3.656 1948*** 1977*** -3.979 1942*** 1971*** 
econ_aff_exp -3.081 1914*** 1948*** -3.985 1912* 1943* 
educ_exp -1.966 1927*** 1949*** -5.179 1916*** 1943*** 
health_exp -4.479 1898*** 1920*** -5.622** 1889*** 1915*** 
Notes: This author's elaboration based on the entire 1862-2007 sample. TB1 and TB2 denote the structural break 
dates suggested by the tests. The t-stat value is the minimum calculated t-statistics. 5% critical value for both 
breaks: -5.490. Under the null hypothesis the series has a unit root with two structural breaks, while under the 
alternative the series is stationary with two structural breaks. For TB ***,**,* implied significance is respectively at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level.            
 
 
 
Table A5. Clemente-Montañés-Reyes’s Unit Root Tests with One Structural Break  
1862-2007 
 Additive Outliers (AO) Innovational Outliers (IO) 
Variable t-stat TB t-stat TB 
gdp_pc -2.743 1964*** -6.113** 1944*** 
tot_exp -2.985 1979*** -2.433 1912** 
cap_exp -3.895** 1915*** -5.437** 1943*** 
curr_exp -2.473 1985*** -2.664 1934 
cap_serv_exp -4.614** 1974*** -3.747 1967*** 
cap_transf -3.830** 1942*** -4.515** 1943*** 
curr_serv_exp -4.025** 1979*** -4.171 1971*** 
curr_transf -3.160 1939*** -3.491 1939*** 
def_exp -3.663** 1970*** -2.908 1963*** 
econ_aff_exp -1.475 1984*** -3.634 1943 
educ_exp -2.325 1927*** -3.749 1943*** 
health_exp -4.384** 1914*** -3.893 1915*** 
Notes: This author's elaboration based on the entire 1862-2007 sample. TB denotes the structural break date 
suggested by the tests. Critical levels at 5% are respectively: -3.560 for the AO model and -4.270 for the IO model. 
Under the null hypothesis the series has a unit root with one structural break, while under the alternative the series is 
stationary with a single structural break. For TB ***,**,* implied significance is respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level.            
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Table A6. Zivot and Andrews’s Unit Root Tests with One Structural Break  
1862-2007 
Variable TB K t-stat 
gdp_pc 1953 2 -3.203 
tot_exp 1945 2 -4.255 
cap_exp 1945 2 -6.305*** 
curr_exp 1937 0 -5.030** 
cap_serv_exp 1945 3 -4.450 
cap_transf 1945 2 -6.035*** 
curr_serv_exp 1936 0 -4.447 
curr_transf 1941 2 -5.459** 
def_exp 1936 2 -4.570 
econ_aff_exp 1971 1 -4.983 
educ_exp 1945 3 -4.211 
health_exp 1917 0 -5.471** 
Notes: This author's elaboration based on the entire 1862-2007 sample. The critical values are respectively at 
1% and 5% are -5.58 and -5.08. The null of the Zivot and Andrews test is unit root (without break) while, under 
the alternative, the series is stationary (with one break).  
 
 
 
 
Table A7. Unit Root Tests (1862-1969)  
Variables 
ADF PP 
Intercept and trend Intercept only Intercept and trend Intercept only 
Level First Diff Level First Diff Level First Diff Level First Diff 
gdp_pc -1.01 -6.80*** 1.03 -6.51*** -0.34 -6.43*** 1.75 -6.38*** 
tot_exp -2.72 -8.70*** -2.30 -8.74*** -2.97 -7.67*** -2.53 -7.54*** 
cap_exp -3.44* -11.9*** -2.99** -12.0*** -4.11***  -3.57***  
curr_exp -3.87** -8.86*** -2.88* -8.88*** -3.91** -10.7*** -2.98** -10.74*** 
cap_serv_exp -3.89** -6.49*** -3.85***  -3.55** -8.86*** -3.55***  
cap_transf -3.77** -18.16*** -2.61* -18.25*** -6.50***  -4.28***  
curr_serv_exp -3.23* -7.51*** -3.21** -7.55*** -3.38* -9.50*** -3.39** -9.55*** 
curr_transf -4.92***  -2.50 -9.76*** -4.94***  -2.50 -14.69*** 
0def_exp -2.31 -9.21*** -2.28 -9.24*** -2.71 -9.35*** -2.68* -9.38*** 
econ_aff_exp -4.20***  -4.14***  -3.28* -10.10*** -3.23** -10.18*** 
educ_exp -3.05 -7.64*** -0.85 -7.66*** -2.84 -7.43*** -0.46 -6.76*** 
health_exp -3.49** -10.41*** -0.57 -10.40*** -3.50** -10.41*** -0.56 -10.40*** 
open -1.58 -11.42*** -1.56 -11.47*** -1.30 -11.72*** -1.29 -11.77*** 
Notes: This author's elaboration based on the entire 1862-1969 sample. 
***,**,* implied significance is respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The lag length for the ADF test has 
been selected by using the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC).  
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Table A8. ADF and PP Unit Root Tests (1970-2007)  
Variables 
ADF PP 
Intercept and trend Intercept only Intercept and trend Intercept only 
Level First Diff Level First Diff Level First Diff Level First Diff 
gdp_pc -1.34 -5.25*** -3.05** -5.31*** -0.81 -6.79*** -3.93***  
tot_exp -1.28 -8.71*** -2.31 -7.61*** -1.28 -8.71*** -2.45 -7.46*** 
cap_exp -5.45***  -0.80 -9.55*** -5.42***  -1.09 -24.84*** 
curr_exp -2.18 -6.71*** -1.81 -7.00*** -2.26 -6.76*** -1.74 -7.02*** 
cap_serv_exp -2.40 -8.92*** -3.50** -7.86*** -2.27 -11.32*** -3.83***  
cap_transf -5.278***  -0.63 -9.59*** -5.25***  -0.89 -19.23*** 
curr_serv_exp -2.01 -8.09*** -1.94 -7.62*** -1.79 -8.20*** -2.00 -7.55*** 
curr_transf -2.49 -6.49*** -2.28 -6.58*** -2.49 -6.60*** -2.28 -6.71*** 
def_exp -1.93 -7.95*** -2.52 -7.25*** -1.80 -7.95*** -2.63* -7.12*** 
econ_aff_exp -3.72** -7.27*** -0.53 -7.37*** -3.72** -7.37*** -0.42 -7.48*** 
educ_exp -1.65 -8.19*** -2.63* -7.09*** -1.38 -11.00*** -2.98** -7.06*** 
health_exp -2.72 -7.18*** -2.17 -7.24*** -2.68 -10.72*** -2.17 -8.70*** 
private_k -1.24 -8.61*** -2.11 -7.55*** -0.97 -8.79*** -2.11 -7.36*** 
open -2.02 -6.06*** -1.78 -6.14*** -2.04 -6.06*** -1.78 -6.14*** 
Notes: This author's elaboration based on the entire 1970-2007 sample. 
***,**,* implied significance is respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The lag length for the ADF test has been 
selected by using the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC).  
 
 
 
Table A9. Clemente-Montañés-Reyes’s Unit Root Tests with Two Structural Breaks 
1862-1969 
 Additive Outliers (AO) Innovational Outliers (IO) 
Variables t-stat TB1 TB2 t-stat TB1 TB2 
gdp_pc -2.698 1907*** 1950*** -3.489 1902 1944*** 
tot_exp -2.684 1916*** 1921*** -5.301 1912*** 1944*** 
cap_exp -4.732 1929 1942*** -6.411** 1916 1943*** 
curr_exp -1.618 1913*** 1933 -6.111** 1908*** 1934 
cap_serv_exp -4.207 1894*** 1947 -4.408 1891* 1943 
cap_transf -3.148 1906*** 1942*** -5.868** 1903*** 1943*** 
curr_serv_exp -2.431 1911*** 1922*** -5.474 1912*** 1918*** 
curr_transf -2.777 1918*** 1942*** -6.018** 1919*** 1943*** 
def_exp -1.315 1913*** 1922*** -3.248 1912*** 1918*** 
econ_aff_exp -4.635 1914*** 1948*** -5.729** 1912*** 1943*** 
educ_exp -1.739 1927*** 1949*** -3.641 1922** 1943*** 
health_exp -4.438 1901*** 1919*** -5.207 1893*** 1915*** 
Notes: This author's elaboration based on the entire 1862-1969 sample. TB1 and TB2 denote the structural break 
dates suggested by the tests. t-stat value is the minimum calculated t-statistics. 5% critical value for both breaks: -
5.490. Under the null hypothesis the series has a unit root with two structural breaks, while under the alternative 
the series is stationary with two structural breaks. For TB ***,**,* implied significance is respectively at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level. 
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Table A10. Clemente-Montañés-Reyes’s Unit Root Tests with One Structural Break  
1862-1969 
 Additive Outliers (AO) Innovational Outliers (IO) 
Variable t-stat TB t-stat TB 
gdp_pc -1.437 1952*** -3.221 1944*** 
tot_exp -3.935** 1911*** -5.438** 1912*** 
cap_exp -4.621** 1942*** -6.034** 1943*** 
curr_exp -5.098** 1908*** -4.506** 1934*** 
cap_serv_exp -4.221** 1915** -2.607 1943 
cap_transf -4.415** 1942*** -4.290** 1943*** 
curr_serv_exp -3.454 1946*** -3.722 1942** 
curr_transf -2.586 1939*** -2.737 1919*** 
def_exp -3.697** 1950*** -3.674 1942*** 
econ_aff_exp -3.707** 1914 -4.916** 1943** 
educ_exp -2.048 1949*** -1.589 1922* 
health_exp -3.965** 1914*** -3.094 1915*** 
Notes: This author's elaboration based on the entire 1862-1969 sample. TB denotes the structural break date 
suggested by the tests. Critical levels at 5% are respectively: -3.560 for the AO model and -4.270 for the IO model. 
Under the null hypothesis the series has a unit root with one structural break, while under the alternative the series is 
stationary with a single structural break. For TB ***,**,* implied significance is respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level.            
 
 
 
 
Table A11. Clemente-Montañés-Reyes’s Unit Root Tests with Two Structural Breaks  
1970-2007 
 Additive Outliers (AO) Innovational Outliers (IO) 
Variables t-stat TB1 TB2 t-stat TB1 TB2 
gdp_pc -2.791 1985*** 1995*** -2.549 1983* 1993 
tot_exp -4.265 1979*** 1999 -3.594 1977 1980* 
cap_exp -3.431 1987*** 1995*** -0.933 1977 1988 
curr_exp -3.058 1980*** 1992*** -4.480 1981 1991*** 
cap_serv_exp -3.869 1979*** 1989 -4.255 1976** 1981 
cap_transf -2.737 1987*** 1997*** -0.129 1977 1988 
curr_serv_exp -3.521 1979*** 1995*** -3.034 1976 1993 
curr_transf -2.041 1985 1992*** -3.769 1982 1991*** 
def_exp -2.891 1987*** 1997 -2.255 1988 1996 
econ_aff_exp -2.304 1987*** 1994*** -6.005 1986*** 1995*** 
educ_exp -3.900 1979*** 1993 -3.520 1976* 1980 
health_exp -1.742 1986*** 1990*** -0.320 1985 1991*** 
private_k -3.480 1979*** 1988* -3.464 1977*** 1996 
open -2.984 1985 1996*** -0.710 1984*** 1993*** 
Notes: This author's elaboration based on the entire 1970-2007 sample. TB1 and TB2 denote the structural break 
dates suggested by the tests. t-stat value is the minimum calculated t-statistics. 5% critical value for both breaks: -
5.490. Under the null hypothesis the series has a unit root with two structural breaks, while under the alternative, 
the series is stationary with two structural breaks. For TB ***,**,* implied significance is respectively at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level.            
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Table A12. Clemente-Montañés-Reyes’s Unit Root Tests with One Structural Break  
1970-2007 
 Additive Outliers (AO) Innovational Outliers (IO) 
Variable t-stat TB t-stat TB 
gdp_pc -2.335 1990*** -1.989 1999 
tot_exp -4.482** 1977*** -4.049 1976*** 
cap_exp -3.420 1992*** -0.933 1988 
curr_exp -2.668 1992*** -3.506 1991*** 
cap_serv_exp -4.008** 1979*** -4.207 1976*** 
cap_transf -3.486 1992*** -0.129 1988 
curr_serv_exp -2.811 1979*** -3.034 1993 
curr_transf -1.548 1990*** -3.266 1991** 
def_exp -4.020** 1976*** -2.316 1996 
econ_aff_exp -3.118 1993*** -2.725 1995** 
educ_exp -3.784** 1976*** -3.530 1976** 
health_exp -3.436 1998*** -0.054 1991*** 
private_k -0.010 1976*** -2.218 1977 
open -2.752 1996*** -2.611 1998* 
Notes: This author's elaboration based on the entire 1970-2007 sample. TB denotes the structural break date 
suggested by the tests. Critical levels at 5% are respectively: -3.560 for the AO model and -4.270 for the IO model. 
Under the null hypothesis the series has a unit root with one structural break, while under the alternative the series is 
stationary with a single structural break. For TB ***,**,* implied significance is respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level.           
 
 
Appendix 2 – Robustness Check Estimations 
 
Table A13. Long –run coefficients for Economic Classification (1970-2007 without private capital) 
Variables 
Economic Classification 
Long-run coefficients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
const 
2.604*** 
(0.669) 
2.765*** 
(0.870) 
3.499*** 
(0.920) 
- 7.817** 
(3.175) 
- 
tot_exp 
0.318*** 
(0.065) 
0.251** 
(0.122) 
0.398*** 
(0.071) 
- -0.237 
(0.395) 
- 
cap_exp 
-0.384*** 
(0.065) 
 -1.255** 
(0.533) 
   
cap_exp_serv 
 -0.074 
(0.057) 
    
cap_transf 
 -0.359*** 
(0.062) 
    
cap_exp^2 
  0.181 
(0.107) 
   
curr_exp    -  - 
curr_exp_serv 
    -1.077** 
(0.464) 
 
curr_transf 
    -0.034 
(0.134) 
 
curr_exp^2      - 
open 
0.033 
(0.105) 
0.028 
(0.109) 
-0.015 
(0.100) 
- -0.197 
(0.251) 
- 
Notes: The dependent variable is the real per capita GDP, 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. This table does not show estimated 
coefficients for current expenditure because residuals are not stationary. 
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Table A14. Short –run Coefficients for Economic Classification based on the ARDL model (without 
private capital) 
Variables 
Economic Classification 
Short-run coefficients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
const 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
- 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
- 
∆gdp_pt-1 
0.472*** 
(0.126) 
0.458*** 
(0.109) 
0.571*** 
(0.129) 
- 
0.436*** 
(0.130) 
- 
∆gdp_pt-2  
0.190** 
(0.068) 
    
∆tot_expt 
-0.007 
(0.025) 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
-0.009 
(0.018) 
   
∆tot_expt-1     
-0.007 
(0.018) 
 
∆cap_exp_tott-1 
-0.056*** 
(0.008) 
 
0.242*** 
(0.053) 
   
∆curr_exp_tott-1    -  - 
∆cap_serv_expt-1  
-0.011 
(0.009) 
    
∆cap_transft  
-0.044*** 
(0.010) 
    
∆cap_transft-1  
0.009 
(0.014) 
    
∆cap_transft-2  
0.016 
(0.013) 
    
∆cap_transft-3  
0.017* 
(0.009) 
    
∆curr_serv_expt     
0.007 
(0.025) 
 
∆curr_transft     
0.009 
(0.010) 
 
∆cap_exp_tot^2t-1   
-0.043*** 
(0.010) 
   
∆cap_exp_tot^2t-2   
0.004 
(0.003) 
   
∆cap_exp_tot^2t-3   
0.005* 
(0.002) 
   
∆curr_exp_tot^2t-1      - 
∆opent 
0.032 
(0.033) 
0.039 
(0.029) 
0.060 
(0.036) 
 
0.060 
(0.037) 
 
∆opent-1 
-0.044* 
(0.025) 
-0.026 
(0.031) 
  
-0.021 
(0.023) 
 
ECMt-1 
-0.098*** 
(0.029) 
-0.101*** 
(0.026) 
-0.062** 
(0.028) 
 
-0.039** 
(0.014) 
 
Obs 36 34 34 - 36 - 
R-sq 0.86 0.89 0.89  0.88  
Adj. R-sq 0.80 0.82 0.80  0.79  
JB Test 0.387 (0.824) 1.849 (0.397) 0.274 (0.872)  0.904 (0.636)  
Ser. Corr LM1 0.679 (0.410) 0.730 (0.393) 3.005 (0.083)  0.674 (0.412)  
Ser. Corr LM2 0.738 (0.691) 0.911 (0.634) 3.039 (0.219)  1.436 (0.488)  
Ramsey-Reset 0.898 (0.353) 1.552 (0.229) 1.834 (0.507)  0.508 (0.485)  
Bound test 5.1297*** 4.0702* 7.5039*** -- 6.1676*** - 
ARDL order (1, 0, 0, 1) (2, 0, 1, 3, 1) (1, 0, 1, 3, 0)  (1, 1, 0, 0, 1)  
Notes: The dependent variable is ∆𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The ARDL order is selected on the basis of SBC. The relevant 
critical value bounds for equations (1), (3) and (5) are obtained from Table CI(i) (with no intercept and no trend) in 
Pesaran et al. (2001) because they are not available in Narayan (2005). They are 3.42 – 4.84 at 1% level, 2.45 – 3.63 
at 5% level and 2.01 – 3.10 at 10% level (3 regressors). They are 3.07 – 4.44 at 1% level, 2.26 – 3.48 at 5% level and 
1.90 – 3.01 at 10% level (4 regressors). The relevant critical value bounds for equation (2) are obtained from Table 
case III (with unrestricted intercept and no trend) in Narayan (2005). They are 4.590 – 6.368 at 1% level, 3.276 – 
4.630 at 5% level, 2.696 – 3.898 at 10% level (for 35 observations and 4 regressors). ***denotes F-statistic falling 
above the 99% upper bound, **above the 95% upper bound, and *above the 90% upper bound. This table does not 
show estimated coefficients of current expenditure in equations (4) and (6) because residuals are not stationary. 
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Table A15. Long –run coefficients for Functional Classification (1970-2007 without private capital) 
Variables 
Functional Classification 
Long-run coefficients 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
const 
2.291* 
(1.692) 
- 1.723*** 
(0.623) 
-3.961* 
(1.984) 
0.940* 
(0.551) 
tot_exp 
0.240 
(0.247) 
- 0.405*** 
(0.077) 
1.142*** 
(0.272) 
0.648*** 
(0.064) 
def_exp 
0.131 
(0.100) 
-    
econ_aff_exp 
-0.251*** 
(0.061) 
 -0.226*** 
(0.041) 
  
educ_exp 
-0.332** 
(0.146) 
  0.596* 
(0.337) 
 
health_exp 
-0.015 
(0.063) 
   -0.315*** 
(0.086) 
open 
0.139 
(0.140) 
- 0.108 
(0.116) 
0.372** 
(0.161) 
0.144 
(0.143) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the real per capita GDP, 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * 
indicate statistical significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. This table does not show estimated 
coefficients for defence in equation (8) because residuals are not stationary. 
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Table A16. Short –run Coefficients for Functional Classification based on the ARDL model (without 
private capital) 
Variables 
Functional Classification 
Short-run coefficients 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
const 
0.020*** 
(0.003) 
- 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
∆gdp_pt-1 
0.149 
(0.122) 
- 
0.379*** 
(0.079) 
0.294** 
(0.112) 
0.470*** 
(0.085) 
∆gdp_pt-2     
0.320*** 
(0.079) 
∆gdp_pt-3     
0.052 
(0.081) 
∆gdp_pt-4     
-0.147 
(0.093) 
∆tot_expt 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
  
0.007 
(0.019) 
 
∆tot_expt-1   
-0.001 
(0.013) 
 
0.013 
(0.025) 
∆def_expt-1 
-0.067*** 
(0.020) 
-    
∆def_expt-2 
-0.082*** 
(0.018) 
-    
∆econ_aff_expt 
-0.035*** 
(0.007) 
    
∆econ_aff_expt-1 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
- 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
  
∆econ_aff_expt-2 
0.053*** 
(0.013) 
    
∆educ_expt    
0.014 
(0.020) 
 
∆educ_expt-1 
0.099** 
(0.045) 
    
∆educ_expt-2 
0.104*** 
(0.027) 
    
∆health_expt      
∆health_expt-1 
0.030 
(0.011) 
   
0.019 
(0.014) 
∆opent 
0.028 
(0.019) 
- 
0.053 
(0.032) 
0.107*** 
(0.026) 
0.114** 
(0.048) 
∆opent-3 
-0.103*** 
(0.015) 
-    
ECMt-1 
-0.104*** 
(0.032) 
- 
-0.047*** 
(0.015) 
-0.037** 
(0.011) 
-0.054*** 
(0.012) 
Obs 34 - 36 36 33 
R-sq 0.94 - 0.91 0.89 0.86 
Adj. R-sq 0.85  0.84 0.83 0.77 
JB Test 1.853 (0.396)  0.963 (0.618) 0.206 (0.902) 0.118 (0.943) 
Ser. Corr LM1 1.635 (0.201)  0.064 (0.800) 2.007 (0.157) 0.777 (0.378) 
Ser. Corr LM2 2.483 (0.289)  1.906 (0.386) 2.300 (0.317) 0.969 (0.616) 
Ramsey-Reset 0.966 (0.345)  0.187 (0.671) 2.839 (0.107) 0.109 (0.745) 
Bound test 8.6326*** - 14.3276*** 8.1715*** 4.9678** 
ARDL order (1, 0, 2, 3, 2, 1, 3)  (1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0, 1) (4, 1, 1, 0) 
Notes: The dependent variable is ∆𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑐. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The ARDL order is selected on the basis of SBC. The relevant 
critical value bounds for equations (7), (9), (10) are obtained from Table CI(i) (with no intercept and no trend) in 
Pesaran et al. (2001) because they are not available in Narayan (2005). They are 3.42 – 4.84 at 1% level, 2.45 – 3.63 
at 5% level and 2.01 – 3.10 at 10% level (3 regressors). They are 2.54 -3.91 at 1% level, 1.97 – 3.18 at 5% level and 
1.70 – 2.83 at 10% level (7 regressors). The relevant critical value bounds for equation (11) are obtained from Table 
case III (with unrestricted intercept and no trend) in Narayan (2005). They are 5.198 – 6.845 at 1% level, 3.615 – 
4.913 at 5% level and 2.958 – 4.100 at 10% level (for 35 observations and 3 regressors). ***denotes F-statistic 
falling above the 99% upper bound, **above the 95% upper bound, and *above the 90% upper bound. This table 
does not show estimated coefficients of defence expenditure in equation (8) because residuals are not stationary.
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